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THE FAILED TRANSPARENCY REGIME  
FOR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL  
AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS† 
Oona A. Hathaway,* Curtis A. Bradley** & Jack L. Goldsmith*** 
The Constitution specifies only one process for making international agreements.  Article 
II states that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”  The treaty 
process has long been on a path to obsolescence, however, with fewer and fewer treaties 
being made in each presidential administration.  Nevertheless, the United States has not 
stopped making international agreements.  Even as Article II treaties have come to a near 
halt, the United States has concluded hundreds of binding international agreements each 
year.  These agreements, known as “executive agreements,” are made by the President 
without submitting them to the Senate, or to Congress, at all.  Congress has responded to 
the rise of executive agreements by imposing a transparency regime — requiring that all 
the binding executive agreements be reported to Congress and that important agreements 
be published for the public to see. 
Until now, however, there has been no systematic assessment of how well the transparency 
regime has been working.  This Article seeks to fill that gap.  Through a Freedom of 
Information Act lawsuit, we obtained thousands of documents relating to the agreements 
reported to Congress and the legal authority on which the executive branch has relied for 
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these agreements.  Together with a series of interviews with lawyers directly involved in 
the process, this new information has given us an unprecedented look inside the system of 
concluding, publicizing, and reporting executive agreements.  For the first time, we can 
describe how the system for making and scrutinizing executive agreements actually 
works — and when and how it fails to work.  The overall picture that emerges is one of 
dysfunction and nonaccountability.  In brief: there is reason to believe that the executive 
branch’s reporting to Congress has been incomplete; the entire publication and reporting 
process is opaque to everyone involved, including executive branch officials and 
congressional staffers; and Congress is failing in its oversight role.  The “system” is badly 
in need of repair if we are going to preserve the integrity and legality of the United States’ 
primary means of making international commitments. 
INTRODUCTION 
he Constitution specifies one process for making international 
agreements.  Article II states that the President “shall have Power, 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”1  The treaty pro-
cess, however, is on a path to obsolescence.  During President Trump’s 
first three and a half years in office, he submitted only five treaties for 
Senate consent.  This number represents a sharp drop compared to the 
Obama Administration (which submitted about five per year).  The 
Obama Administration, in turn, submitted fewer treaties than the Bush 
Administration (which submitted around twelve per year).  And the 
Bush Administration submitted many fewer treaties than the Clinton 
Administration (which submitted around twenty-three per year).2 
The near collapse of the treaty process does not mean that the United 
States has stopped making international agreements.  The Trump 
Administration, like prior administrations, has concluded hundreds of 
binding international agreements for the United States without submit-
ting them to the Senate, or to Congress, at all.3  These agreements, 
known as “executive agreements,” have long been the primary mecha-
nism through which the United States makes international commit-
ments.  Since the late 1930s, well over ninety percent of all international 
agreements concluded on behalf of the United States have been execu-
tive agreements rather than treaties.4  Many of these agreements involve 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
2 On President Trump’s submissions, see Oona Hathaway, Reengaging on Treaties and Other 
International Agreements (Part I): President Donald Trump’s Rejection of International Law, JUST 
SEC. (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72656/reengaging-on-treaties-and-other-international- 
agreements-part-i-president-donald-trumps-rejection-of-international-law [https://perma.cc/6DBU-
UBBP].  On the other figures, see Jeffrey S. Peake, The Decline of Treaties? Obama, Trump, and 
the Politics of International Agreements 40 tbl.1 (Apr. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3153840 [https://perma.cc/9PQQ-M3EL]. 
3 See Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/tias [https://perma.cc/CFC8-BDSU] (follow hyperlinks for each year listed). 
4 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1210 & n.10 (2018).  There has also been some decline in the average number 
of executive agreements concluded per year since the Clinton Administration (including under 
President Trump), but the decline is not as sharp as for treaties.  See Peake, supra note 2, at 40 tbl.1. 
T
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minor or routine commitments, but some are quite consequential, in-
volving matters such as security arrangements and alliances, the station-
ing of troops abroad, outlays of foreign aid, arrangements for border 
security, free trade accords, and weapons programs. 
The main reason for the heavy reliance on executive agreements is 
that they are much easier to make than treaties.  The Article II process 
requires a President to submit a negotiated treaty to the Senate for su-
permajority consent before the President can ratify and conclude it.  By 
design, this is a very difficult process.  In contrast, the primary form of 
executive agreement, known as an ex ante congressional-executive 
agreement, requires none of these steps.  Instead, Congress in advance 
authorizes the President to make the agreement, usually in a statute that 
provides little concrete guidance.  The authorization counts as full con-
sent to the agreement prior to the President’s negotiation of it.  This 
means that the President can make and conclude the agreement, and 
thus render it legally binding on the United States, before Congress or 
the public even knows of its existence.  This is also true of most other 
forms of executive agreements, including ones based on an authorization 
in a prior agreement and ones based on the President’s constitutional 
powers alone. 
Congress has gone along with these alternatives to the Article II 
treaty process with practically no substantive restrictions.  Instead, it 
has imposed two general transparency requirements.  First, since the 
late nineteenth century, it has required the executive branch to publish 
U.S. international agreements.  The precise contours of this obligation 
have varied over time, but it has never resulted in anything close to 
complete public disclosure.  Second, beginning with the 1972 Case Act,5 
Congress has imposed a reporting requirement with broader reach: the 
Secretary of State must transmit to Congress, but need not make public, 
almost every international agreement other than an Article II treaty 
within sixty days after entry into force. 
For a time, Congress also often included legislative veto provisions 
when delegating authority to conclude executive agreements.  These 
provisions required the executive branch to send the negotiated agree-
ment to Congress, prior to entry into force, so that Congress could ex-
amine the agreement and decide whether to disapprove it through one-
house or two-house vetoes.  But this check ended with the Supreme 
Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha,6 in which the Court declared 
such vetoes to be unconstitutional.7  In response to Chadha, Congress 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b). 
 6 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 7 Id. at 959.   
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amended many of the relevant statutes to strip out the legislative veto 
provisions, leaving just the bare delegations behind.8 
As a result of Chadha, the only forms of accountability for the vast 
majority of executive agreements are a publication requirement for some 
agreements and a more comprehensive reporting requirement to  
Congress.  These are very thin forms of accountability for such a conse-
quential form of presidential lawmaking, especially as compared to the 
other major form of delegated executive branch lawmaking: administra-
tive regulations.  In contrast to regulations, executive agreements are 
only rarely publicized by the executive branch before they are con-
cluded.  This means that the public cannot consider the merits and po-
tential effects of such an agreement before it becomes law.  Another 
contrast is that the rules governing executive agreements do not require 
the executive branch to inform the public about their legal basis.  There 
is also no institutionalized judicial review after agreements are con-
cluded to ensure that they are properly authorized and justified.9  And 
many of the agreements are never made public, which means that citi-
zens cannot monitor their content and operation even after the fact. 
A vital but unanswered question of separation of powers and foreign 
relations law is how well this limited regime of ex post monitoring actu-
ally works.  Does the executive branch publish and report as it should?  
When the President claims to be acting pursuant to congressional dele-
gation, are such claims of authority persuasive?  Does Congress pay at-
tention to what the executive branch is doing, and perform its oversight 
role, in this realm? 
The three authors of this Article are among the relatively small cadre 
of scholars who have written about the executive agreement process.  
One of us wrote an article more than a decade ago that emphasized that 
executive agreements had become the key mechanism for making U.S. 
international agreements — and therefore that the President acting 
practically alone had come to dominate international agreement making 
in the United States.10  That article attempted to understand when and 
how Congress had delegated authority to the President to make inter-
national agreements.  But it had to guess at many important questions 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 
119 YALE L.J. 140, 201 (2009) (“Congress responded in most cases either by eliminating the veto 
provision altogether, as it had in the case of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or by rewriting it 
to require the full legislative process in place of the veto.”).   
 9 Contrast this with the judicial review afforded agency actions.  For example, in Department 
of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020), the Court 
blocked the Trump Administration’s effort to end a major immigration program because the Court 
found the effort to be “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559, 701–706; 140 S. Ct. at 1915, despite the executive branch’s substantial 
authority to act in this area. 
 10 Hathaway, supra note 8, at 144.  
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about how the process worked, including which agreements were re-
ported to Congress and the actual legal basis for the international agree-
ments.  Two of us wrote an article more recently that analyzed interna-
tional agreement making in the broader context of the President’s other 
international lawmaking, law-interpreting, and law-terminating pow-
ers.11  This article too tried to understand how the accountability regime 
for executive agreements worked, and it included an extensive analysis 
of one of the nonpublic cover memos that the executive branch includes 
when it reports executive agreements to Congress under the Case Act.12  
But this article also had to guess about how the reporting and transpar-
ency process worked in practice, as well as the legal basis for agreements 
generally.  The lack of an empirical grounding left a significant gap in 
both articles — and is a serious problem in the entire literature on exec-
utive agreements. 
We decided to address this empirical uncertainty by filing a Freedom 
of Information Act13 (FOIA) request with the State Department seeking 
the Case Act cover memos that the Department is required to send to 
Congress with every reported agreement.  We hoped that these memos 
would give us a better sense of the Department’s reporting practices 
under the Act.  We also hoped that they would help us understand the 
claimed legal basis for the agreements, since almost every memo has a 
short section entitled “Legal Authority.”  After a lawsuit and a negotiated 
settlement, the State Department produced 5,689 cover memos reported 
from January 20, 1989, through January 20, 2017 — that is, during the 
administrations of Presidents George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, 
George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. 
The information that we have been able to glean from the cover 
memos — and from a series of interviews with lawyers directly involved 
in the executive agreement process — has given us an unprecedented 
look inside the system of concluding, publicizing, and reporting execu-
tive agreements.  For the first time, we can describe how the system for 
making and scrutinizing executive agreements works — and when and 
how it fails to work.  The overall picture that emerges is one of dysfunc-
tion and nonaccountability: there is reason to believe that the executive 
branch’s reporting to Congress has been incomplete; the entire process 
is opaque to everyone involved, including executive branch officials and 
congressional staffers; and Congress is failing in its oversight role.  There 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1204–06. 
 12 See, e.g., id. at 1250–52.  Since 1981, the State Department has been required by regulation 
to include with each agreement that it reports to Congress under the Case Act a “background state-
ment” that “shall include information explaining the agreement and a precise citation of legal au-
thority.”  22 C.F.R. § 181.7(c) (2019); see infra p. 650. 
 13 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
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are also substantial questions about the underlying legal authority for 
an appreciable number of the agreements.14 
Part I of this Article describes the legal regime governing executive 
agreements.  It begins by describing the various types of executive agree-
ments and the scope of the executive branch’s legal authority to con-
clude them.  Next, it reviews what we call the “transparency regime” for 
executive agreements — the way in which Congress has regulated exec-
utive agreements not by requiring that the agreements be individually 
approved after they are negotiated, but instead by mandating disclosure 
to Congress itself and to the public after the agreement is concluded.  
This review makes clear that while Congress has been content to dele-
gate authority to make executive agreements to the executive branch, it 
has repeatedly intervened in an effort to effectively observe and monitor 
how that authority is used. 
Part II considers how the process of concluding executive agreements 
works in practice.  It begins with information obtained from a dozen 
interviews with current and former government lawyers about how the 
process of concluding executive agreements actually takes place.  These 
interviews were necessary because the process occurs entirely out of 
public view, and the regulatory guidance reveals only the basic outlines.  
That qualitative information then informs our quantitative assessment 
of the process of making executive agreements.  We use data gleaned 
from the more than 5,000 cover memos obtained from the State  
Department to compare what is made public with what is reported to 
Congress.  This comparison reveals that much of what is reported to 
Congress is never made public.  More troublingly, if we treat the cover 
memos as evidence of the unclassified agreements that the executive 
branch reported to Congress, it seems likely that the executive branch 
has failed to comply fully with the reporting obligations that Congress 
has imposed. 
The cover memos also permit us for the first time to discern the legal 
authorities cited in support of the agreements.  By studying the thou-
sands of citations to legal authorities in the cover memos based on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 It bears emphasizing that our study focuses exclusively on unclassified executive agreements.  
The existence of classified agreements compounds the transparency and legality issues.  See CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE 
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 226 tbl.X-1 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS 
TREATY STUDY] (showing the number of executive agreements reported to Congress from 1978–
1999; approximately 1.65% are listed as classified); Ashley S. Deeks, A (Qualified) Defense of Secret 
Agreements, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 724 (2017) (estimating that “the United States is probably party 
to approximately 1,000–1,800 secret agreements”); Ryan Scoville, New Evidence of Secret  
International Agreements, LAWFARE (Feb. 19, 2020, 10:23 AM), https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/new-evidence-secret-international-agreements [https://perma.cc/H42G-3SJH] (finding 
that “the United States continues to enter into classified agreements with considerable frequency”). 
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strength of the authority granted for concluding agreements, we can as-
sess how the executive branch invokes delegated authority from  
Congress to make agreements.  Here we find that less than half of the 
cover memos cite an authority that gives the executive branch clear and 
express authority to conclude a binding international agreement.15  Al-
most one-fifth of the memos cite legal authorities that in our assessment 
offer no support for concluding an agreement.16  Moreover, the cover 
memos frequently cite Article II of the U.S. Constitution in addition to 
other legal authorities; there is very little distinction made between 
agreements that rely entirely on the President’s sole constitutional au-
thority and those that rely on authority granted by Congress or by virtue 
of a prior treaty.  Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable thing that we 
discovered in the process of attempting to analyze and describe how the 
transparency regime works in practice is how disorganized the system 
is.  Multiple legal authorities are cited without any clarity about the 
central legal basis for concluding an agreement, the legal authorities are 
not cited systematically or carefully, public databases of agreements are 
woefully lacking, and reporting to Congress is slow and likely  
incomplete. 
Part III turns to proposed solutions.  These fall into two categories.  
First, our proposals aim to remedy problems in publication and report-
ing.  It is time, we contend, for the revolution of organization and trans-
parency that took place for federal regulations at the dawn of the New 
Deal to extend to executive agreements.  To that end, we propose to do 
away with the bifurcated regime and simply impose a comprehensive 
publication requirement, with minor exceptions, akin to the one that has 
long been in place for federal regulations.  We also propose to reorganize 
the internal executive branch process for collecting and publishing along 
the lines of the process that governs federal regulations.  As we explain, 
these reforms should be normatively uncontroversial, and they are dra-
matically easier to carry out today than they would have been in the 
twentieth century due to the digitalization of information. 
Second, we address the uncertain legality of many of the agreements.  
We propose that Congress require the executive branch to offer greater 
transparency regarding the legal basis for international agreements — 
and clarity about the source of legal authority on which the government 
relies.  A simple solution would be to publish the cover memos them-
selves — rather than keep them hidden from public view — and require 
that they cite a primary legal authority.  These and related reforms will, 
we believe, make it more likely that agreements in the future will possess 
an adequate legal basis. 
We should emphasize at the outset that while we are very critical of 
the current reporting and publication system for executive agreements, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 See infra section II.B.2, pp. 677–91. 
 16 See infra section II.B.2, pp. 677–91. 
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we do not believe that the blame for this dysfunction lays at the feet of 
any particular branch of government or particular agencies or individ-
uals inside the executive branch.  The dysfunction is the product of dec-
ades of neglect, secrecy, disorganization, resource constraints, and mis-
placed priorities, in both Congress and the executive branch.  The 
current system is not admired by anyone in the government or serving 
any institution’s interest.  Reform is clearly needed, as many of our ex-
ecutive branch and congressional interview subjects themselves 
acknowledged.  While some of our proposed reforms will be more diffi-
cult to implement than others, there should be broad agreement, across 
parties and across the political branches of government, that the system 
is badly in need of repair. 
I.  THE LEGAL REGIME FOR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
This Part sets forth the legal background for the analysis that fol-
lows.  It begins by reviewing the various types of executive agreements 
and the scope of the executive branch’s legal authority to conclude them.  
It then describes the transparency regime that Congress has crafted in 
an effort to ensure that these agreements are subject to oversight and 
accountability. 
A.  The Legality of Executive Agreements 
Executive agreements are commonly grouped into one of four cate-
gories based on the type of authorization that supports the agreement.  
A “sole executive agreement” is concluded by the President on his or her 
own constitutional authority without any express congressional author-
ization or approval.17  An “ex ante congressional-executive agreement,” 
which is the most common type of executive agreement, is authorized in 
advance by statute and concluded by the executive branch without sub-
sequent congressional review or approval.18  An “executive agreement 
pursuant to treaty” is authorized by a prior treaty or international agree-
ment.19  Least common (and not the focus of this section) is an “ex post 
congressional-executive agreement,” which is approved by a majority of 
Congress after it is negotiated.20  
Executive agreements date back to early in U.S. history.  In 1792, for 
example, Congress authorized the Postmaster General to conclude ex 
ante congressional-executive agreements concerning the international 
exchange of mail.21  Presidents also sometimes made sole executive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1208. 
 18 See id. at 1213.  
 19 See id. at 1207–08.  
 20 See id. at 1212. 
 21 See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
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agreements in the early days of the nation — for example, to settle claims 
with foreign nations.22  But Article II treaties were the predominant 
process for making international agreements in the first fifty years of the 
nation’s history and continued to be a mainstay of agreement making 
until World War II.23  Since then, executive agreements, and especially 
ex ante congressional-executive agreements, have come to be the domi-
nant form of international agreement making by the United States.24  
Between the late 1930s and the end of the Obama Administration, only 
about six percent of the United States’ international agreements were 
concluded as Article II treaties.25  All the rest were some form of execu-
tive agreement.26  As noted in the Introduction, the percentage of agree-
ments that were concluded as Article II treaties has been even lower 
during the past several presidential administrations.27 
In part because of longstanding historical practice, it is undisputed 
that the executive branch has some legal authority to conclude executive 
agreements.  But this authority is limited.  Executive agreements, like 
Article II treaties, create fully binding legal obligations for the United 
States under international law.  As is true of every action of the federal 
government, executive agreements must be authorized by the  
Constitution or a prior federal enactment.28  For each of the categories 
of executive agreements, the type of authorization that is required car-
ries with it particular limitations.  In reviewing these limitations, we 
begin with sole executive agreements, which are based on constitutional 
authorization, and then we move to agreements that are authorized by 
statute or treaty. 
1.  Sole Executive Agreement Power. — Courts and other interpreters 
commonly give weight to longstanding executive branch practice in as-
sessing presidential authority, at least if the practice has been acquiesced 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT § 57, at 
108–09 (2d ed. 1916); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 133, 174–75 (1998); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) 
(“Though those settlements [of claims by U.S. nationals against foreign nations] have sometimes 
been made by treaty, there has also been a longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive 
agreement without the advice and consent of the Senate.”). 
 23 See Hathaway, supra note 8, at 169–81; Ramsey, supra note 22, at 171–83. 
 24 See Hathaway, supra note 8, at 167–205 (describing this change and the reasons for it). 
 25 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1210. 
 26 On the many political and legal reasons why the United States shifted sharply toward the use 
of executive agreements after World War II, see Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA  
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 861–66 (1995); and Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The 
Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 
1292–302 (2008). 
 27 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1210–12. 
 28 On the general principle of the need for authorization for government action, see, for example, 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 
(1988); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981); and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).   
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in by Congress.29  As a result, a full assessment of the President’s con-
stitutional authority to make sole executive agreements would require 
an in-depth assessment of historical practice, something that is beyond 
the scope of this Article.  Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the gen-
eral outlines of presidential authority in this area and some of the likely 
limitations on that authority. 
First, Presidents have some authority to conclude sole executive 
agreements that relate to their independent constitutional powers.30  The 
President’s commander-in-chief power, for example, has often served as 
a source of authority for some military-related agreements, such as 
agreements to exchange prisoners, conduct joint military exercises, or 
engage in a ceasefire.31  Similarly, the President’s implied power to rec-
ognize foreign sovereigns and their territory has been thought to include 
some authority to conclude agreements facilitating the recognition.32  
Presidents have also long used their powers over diplomacy to enter into 
executive agreements settling international claims against foreign gov-
ernments.33  And Presidents have sometimes entered into short-term 
agreements, such as modi vivendi, in order to preserve the status quo 
pending negotiation of more final arrangements, although it is often un-
clear whether these agreements are binding under international law or 
are mere political commitments.34 
The four Supreme Court decisions that have addressed sole executive 
agreements are all consistent with the need to tie such agreements to an 
independent presidential power.35  Two of these decisions concerned an 
agreement to effectuate President Franklin Roosevelt’s recognition of 
the Soviet Union and to settle claims with that country.36  The third 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 
513, 524 (2014); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the  
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
 30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 303(4) (AM. L. INST. 1987) (“[T]he President, on his own authority, may make an international 
agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the  
Constitution.”).  
 31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE UNITED STATES § 121 cmt. 
b (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“A large proportion of the international agreements made under the powers 
of the President and intended to create legal relationships under international law have been based 
on his power as commander-in-chief and have provided for the conduct of military operations with 
allies of the United States.”). 
 32 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“The recognition, establishment 
of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one 
transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments.”). 
 33 See CRANDALL, supra note 22, § 57, at 109–11; QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 237–40 (1922). 
 34 See CRANDALL, supra note 22, § 59, at 112–14. 
 35 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654, 682–83 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330. 
 36 See Pink, 315 U.S. at 211–14; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326–27, 330. 
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decision concerned an agreement to resolve a national security crisis 
with Iran and, again, to settle claims between the two countries.37  And 
the fourth agreement, too, involved a settlement of claims, albeit one 
involving claims against private companies for actions taken in the 
World War II era.38  Importantly, in its most recent statement on the 
subject, the Supreme Court emphasized that even the long-established 
presidential power to settle claims is “narrow and strictly limited.”39 
Second, whatever the precise scope of the President’s power to con-
clude sole executive agreements, this power is substantially narrower 
than the power to enter into Article II treaties.  This proposition follows 
from constitutional text and structure.  The Constitution specifies that 
the President must obtain legislative approval for treaties.40  The  
Framers believed that such legislative consent was crucial because in-
ternational commitments have important consequences for the nation 
that should not be decided by one person atop the executive branch.41  
The preservation of this principle of legislative-executive collaboration 
for international lawmaking is the main reason why the large-scale sub-
stitution of congressional-executive agreements for treaties has been 
deemed legitimate.42  The principle would effectively be nullified if the 
President could make a wide range of executive agreements without any 
congressional consent.43 
2.  Implied Congressional Authorization to Make an Agreement. — 
Whatever the precise scope of the sole executive agreement power, it is 
clear that a President has broader authority to conclude executive agree-
ments when authorized to do so by Congress.  As Justice Jackson ex-
plained in his famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer44: “When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it  
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662–68. 
 38 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401–02.  
 39 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008).  
 40 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 41 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(explaining that it would be unwise “to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as 
those which concern [this country’s] intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a 
magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States”); see also  
Ramsey, supra note 22, at 192 (“Affording the President unilateral control over entry into such 
agreements . . . would award substantial power to the President and would be inconsistent with 
the emphasis on the checking power of the Senate.”). 
 42 See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 26, at 861–65; Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1306–12. 
 43 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 222 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that full interchangeability of sole executive agreements 
with Article II treaties would be “unacceptable, for it would wholly remove the ‘check’ of Senate 
consent which the Framers struggled and compromised to write into the Constitution”); see also 1 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-4, at 649 (3d ed. 2000). 
 44 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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delegate.”45  A complicating factor here is that congressional authoriza-
tion can be implied rather than express.46  Discerning implied congres-
sional intent can be a difficult enterprise that may turn on a variety of 
considerations, including the historical practice against which Congress 
has legislated and the extent to which the agreement relates to inde-
pendent presidential authority.47 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan48 illustrates 
the difficulty of this inquiry.  The issue there was whether the President 
had the authority to suspend American claims against Iran as part of a 
regulatory implementation of a sole executive agreement with Iran to re-
solve the 1979–1981 hostage crisis.49  The Court observed that the statutes 
invoked by the executive branch in support of the regulations — the  
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Hostage Act — 
did not specifically authorize the presidential suspension of claims.50  But, 
the Court noted, the executive branch had long asserted a sole executive 
agreement power under Article II to settle international claims, and Con-
gress had long “acquiesced” in that power51 — and indeed had “implicitly 
approved” it52 in the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.53 
Based on “the inferences to be drawn from the character of the leg-
islation Congress has enacted in the area” and “from the history of ac-
quiescence in executive claims settlement,” the Court concluded that 
“the President was authorized to suspend” the claims.54  The Court also 
emphasized, however, the “narrowness” of its decision, involving a con-
text in which “the settlement of claims has been determined to be a nec-
essary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute be-
tween our country and another, and where . . . we can conclude that 
Congress acquiesced in the President’s action.”55 
In short, Presidents will sometimes have the authority to conclude 
executive agreements based on an implicit authorization from Congress.  
As we explain in detail in Parts II and III, discerning such authorization 
requires a context-specific inquiry.  Ultimately, however, this is a matter 
of statutory construction, and not all statutes conferring authority on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 46 See id.; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1263. 
 47 For an extended analysis of the relevance of these considerations, see Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 4, at 1264–65.  
 48 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 49 See id. at 662–68. 
 50 Id. at 662, 675–77. 
 51 Id. at 688. 
 52 Id. at 680. 
 53 Id. at 680, 688. 
 54 Id. at 686. 
 55 Id. at 688. 
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executive branch can fairly be read to authorize the conclusion of inter-
national agreements. 
3.  International Agreements Consistent with Domestic Law. —  
Professors Dan Bodansky and Peter Spiro have argued that Presidents 
have the authority to enter into what they refer to as “Executive  
Agreements+.”56  An Executive Agreement+ is an agreement made by 
the executive branch that neither relates to an independent presidential 
power nor is specifically authorized by Congress.57  Its legal justifica-
tion, instead, is that it “complement[s]” or is “consistent with” existing 
federal law.58  The idea seems to be that if Congress regulates a matter 
under domestic law but does not otherwise authorize the making of in-
ternational agreements relating to the subject matter, the executive 
branch can nonetheless make an international agreement on the topic 
“in order to address the transnational aspects of a problem.”59 
The Legal Adviser to the State Department in the Obama  
Administration, Harold Koh, embraced a version of the Executive 
Agreements+ idea while defending the legality of concluding the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement60 (ACTA) without legislative approval.  
ACTA was a controversial multilateral treaty designed to enhance intel-
lectual property enforcement.61  The U.S. Trade Representative initially 
suggested that it could be concluded as a sole executive agreement.62  In 
response to criticism from Senator Ron Wyden and scholars,63 Koh of-
fered a different rationale.64  He maintained that, although the agree-
ment had not been specifically authorized by Congress, the government 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 
887 (2016). 
 57 See id. (defining an Executive Agreement+ as an international agreement “in the absence of 
ex ante or ex post congressional authorization, respecting issues beyond independent Presidential 
authority”); id. at 897 (noting that Executive Agreements+ are not “congressional-executive agree-
ments, since they lack congressional authorization or approval”). 
 58 Id. at 889; see id. at 887–89. 
 59 Id. at 915; see id. at 927. 
 60 Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243.   
 61 See ACTA: Controversial Anti-piracy Agreement Rejected by EU, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2012), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18704192 [https://perma.cc/CAK9-M68U]. 
 62 See Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26 AM. U. INT’L 
REV. 903, 904 (2011). 
 63 See Jack Goldsmith, The Doubtful Constitutionality of ACTA as an Ex Ante Congressional-
Executive Agreement, LAWFARE (May 21, 2012, 1:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doubtful-
constitutionality-acta-ex-ante-congressional-executive-agreement [https://perma.cc/Y7BB-W8SZ]; 
Press Release, Ron Wyden, U.S. Sen., Wyden to President: Isn’t Congress Supposed to Approve 
International Trade Agreements? (Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press- 
releases/wyden-to-president-isnt-congress-supposed-to-approve-international-trade-agreements 
[https://perma.cc/J93F-LW77]; Letter from Law Professors to Members of the United States Senate 
Comm. on Fin. (May 16, 2012), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Law-Professor-
Letter-to-Senate-Finance-Committee-May-16-20122.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ8Y-AP42]. 
 64 See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Ron Wyden, U.S. 
Sen. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-Department-
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had authority under “existing U.S. intellectual property law” to take the 
actions required by it.65  He further noted that Congress had called for 
the executive branch to “work[] with other countries to establish inter-
national standards and policies for the effective protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights.”66  Koh argued that this was enough 
for the executive branch to conclude ACTA.67  And he maintained more 
broadly that the executive branch can conclude binding international 
agreements in every instance in which it “determine[s] that the negoti-
ated agreement fit[s] within the fabric of existing law, [is] fully consistent 
with existing law, and [does] not require any further legislation to  
implement.”68 
We have criticized elsewhere the idea that Presidents can make bind-
ing international agreements based merely on a claim of consistency 
with domestic law, and we will not repeat those arguments here.69  Suf-
fice it to say that the idea seems difficult to reconcile with the proposi-
tion, noted above, that all governmental actions must be authorized by 
the Constitution or by Congress.  One could argue that Congress has in 
fact authorized this broad executive agreement authority (in the Dames 
& Moore sense of authorization) through acquiescence in a longstanding 
pattern of executive branch practice.70  Bodansky and Spiro, however, 
do not make such a claim.  They instead acknowledge that the executive 
branch practice they describe is “not yet constitutionally entrenched.”71  
We would also note that, under most accounts of how congressional ac-
quiescence can enhance executive authority, Congress must at least be 
aware of the executive branch’s assertions of authority in order to be 
said to “acquiesce” in them.  As will become clear in Part II, it is doubtful 
that this is the case here. 
4.  Authorization in a Prior Treaty or Agreement. — Just as an exec-
utive agreement can be authorized by statute, it can also be authorized 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Response-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BF8-LA2P]; Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. 
Sen., to Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 25, 2012), https://www.wyden. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden%20Letter%20to%20Koh%20Re%20Cyber%20and%20ACTA% 
20July%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TJ4-2YDF]. 
 65 Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, supra note 64, at 1. 
 66 Id. at 2 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 8113(a)(6)). 
 67 Id. at 1–2. 
 68 Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century  
International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J.F. 338, 343 (2017).  
 69 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1260–63; Oona A. Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, 
Going It Alone: The Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L.: INSIGHTS (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/23/ 
going-it-alone-anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-sole-executive [https://perma.cc/4CYW-HG9K]. 
 70 Koh lists “widespread and consistent practice of [e]xecutive [b]ranch activity that Congress, 
by its conduct, has essentially accepted” as one of several factors that might support an executive 
agreement.  Koh, supra note 68, at 343. 
 71 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 56, at 890. 
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by a prior Article II treaty or a congressionally authorized agreement.72  
Although this category of executive agreements has been relatively un-
controversial, the same basic considerations that apply to statutory au-
thorizations apply here.  The principal issue is whether the prior treaty 
or agreement truly authorizes the executive agreement that relies on it, 
and the most difficult cases will be those involving claims of implicit 
authorization.73 
B.  The Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements 
This section describes the oversight tools that Congress has deployed 
in response to the sharp rise of executive agreements.  We call these tools 
the “transparency regime” for executive agreements because they focus 
primarily on keeping Congress and (to a lesser extent) the public in-
formed about these agreements.  We will detail how the transparency 
regime works, what it requires, and how Congress has amended and 
changed it over the years in response to concerns about executive branch 
noncompliance. 
1.  Publication Requirements. — Before 1950, the official publication 
source for treaties and executive agreements was the Statutes at Large.74  
The Public Printing Act of 189575 required the Secretary of State, at the 
end of each Congress, to edit, print, bind, and distribute the Statutes at 
Large containing not only “all laws[ and] joint and concurrent resolu-
tions passed by Congress,” but also “all conventions, treaties, proclama-
tions, and agreements.”76  “In practice,” as the Congressional Research 
Service has noted, “a number of agreements escaped publication,” and 
eventually “a hodgepodge of published bits and pieces was developed.”77 
When the Administrator of General Services took over the publica-
tion of the Statutes at Large from the Secretary of State in 1950,  
Congress enacted a publication statute for treaties and executive agree-
ments that is still operative today.78  This statute, 1 U.S.C. § 112a, di-
rected the Secretary of State to “cause to be compiled, edited, indexed, 
and published” a yearly compilation containing: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1267–68. 
 73 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 86 (“Agreements in this category comprise those 
which are expressly authorized by the text of an existing treaty or whose making may be reasonably 
inferred from the provisions of a prior treaty.” (emphasis added)). 
 74 See id. at 210. 
 75 Ch. 23, 28 Stat. 601. 
 76 Id. § 73, 28 Stat. at 615. 
 77 CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 210. 
 78 Id. at 210–11; 1 U.S.C. § 112a. 
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all treaties to which the United States is a party that have been proclaimed 
during each calendar year, and all international agreements other than trea-
ties to which the United States is a party that have been signed, proclaimed, 
or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed.79 
This yearly publication is referred to as “United States Treaties and 
Other International Agreements” (UST).  It was originally compiled 
from agreements published in “slip” form by the State Department in 
the Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), a series that 
dates to 1946.  Because of funding limitations, the Government Printing 
Office has stopped publishing UST volumes.80  As a result, today the 
government publishes the text of executive agreements only as part of 
TIAS.81 
Section 112a was amended in 1994, after the State Department had 
trouble publishing agreements in a timely manner.82  The amendment 
states that the Secretary of State is not required to publish agreements 
if the Secretary determines that “the public interest in such agreements 
is insufficient to justify their publication.”83  Such a determination can 
be made if either the agreements are no longer in force, “the agreements 
do not create private rights or duties, or establish standards intended to 
govern government action in the treatment of private individuals,” the 
“limited or specialized nature of the public interest in such agreements” 
can “adequately be satisfied by an alternative means,” or “the public 
disclosure of the text of the agreement would, in the opinion of the  
President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States.”84 
The State Department implemented this amendment with a regula-
tion that lists various categories of agreements that have been deter-
mined not to require publication.85  The Department explained that, 
“[d]ue to resource constraints,” it “ha[d] been unable to publish agree-
ments promptly.”86  It explained that in selecting categories for non-
publication, it had “focussed on a few areas that have a large volume of 
agreements that do not appear to be of general public interest or are 
frequently revised and readily available from private sources.”87  This 
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 79 1 U.S.C. § 112a(a). 
 80 See Publication of TIAS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/ 
treaty/tias/pubtias/index.htm [https://perma.cc/FCA9-XG58] (noting that “funding to continue pro-
ducing UST has been problematic in recent years” and that “[t]he last UST volume to be produced 
was Volume 35, Part 6, 1983–1984”). 
 81 See Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), supra note 3. 
 82 CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 211. 
 83 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, 
§ 138, 108 Stat. 382, 397 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112a).  
 84 Id. 
 85 See 60 Fed. Reg. 54,319, 54,320 (Oct. 23, 1995) (codified as amended at 22 C.F.R. § 181.8 
(2019)). 
 86 Id. at 54,319. 
 87 Id. 
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regulation was amended in 2006 and again in 2014 and now contains 
sixteen categories of agreements exempted from publication (primarily 
bilateral agreements in specified subject areas, as well as classified 
agreements).88 
Congress amended § 112a again in 2004 to provide that: 
The Secretary of State shall make publicly available through the Internet 
website of the Department of State each treaty or international agreement 
proposed to be published in the compilation entitled “United States Treaties 
and Other International Agreements” not later than 180 days after the date 
on which the treaty or agreement enters into force.89 
In 2006, the State Department amended its regulations to take account 
of this requirement.90  The statutory mandate to publish agreements on 
the internet, along with the lack of publication of volumes of the UST, 
has effectively meant that the State Department’s TIAS website is the 
only official publication source for executive agreements.91 
The Department’s TIAS website currently contains international 
agreements dating back to 1981, but the coverage is very limited for 
years before 1996.92  Article II treaties and executive agreements are 
included on the site without differentiation.  From 2006 through early 
2013, the Department maintained an additional site that contained the 
non–Article II agreements reported to Congress under the Case Act (de-
scribed below), including a notation about whether these agreements 
had been reported late, but that site is no longer being updated.93 
In sum, the State Department has a statutory obligation to publish 
international agreements, including executive agreements, subject to a 
variety of exceptions that are set forth in regulations promulgated by 
the Department.  Agreements that do not fall within the exceptions must 
be published online within 180 days after they enter into force.  Based 
on materials obtained in litigation under FOIA, the Brennan Center has 
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 88 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.8(a). 
 89 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7121(a), 
118 Stat. 3638, 3807 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112a(d)). 
 90 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.9.  
 91 The 2004 amendment also requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to Congress each 
year containing an index that lists all international agreements that have been concluded and that 
will not be published, although this report can be submitted in classified form.  See 1 U.S.C. 
§ 112b(d). 
 92 See Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), supra note 3. 
 93 See Reporting International Agreements to Congress Under Case Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/caseact/index.htm [https://perma.cc/3ERP-SC7P].  The State 
Department also published some Case Act–reported agreements, dating up until 2006, in response 
to a FOIA request.  See Reporting International Agreements to Congress Under Case Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://2001-2009.state.gov/m/a/ips/c24150.htm [https://perma.cc/RT3J-9XNQ]. 
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reported that between 2004 and 2014, 807 binding international agree-
ments made by the executive branch went unpublished.94  As discussed 
below in Part II, that number likely understates the number of agree-
ments left unpublished by the government. 
2.  Reporting Requirements. — The idea of requiring that executive 
agreements be reported to Congress first arose in the 1950s, in the con-
text of congressional debates over the proper scope of the treaty power.  
In this period, Senator John Bricker of Ohio led efforts to limit the treaty 
power through a constitutional amendment, efforts that ultimately died 
out by the late 1950s.95  One of the measures that was proposed as an 
alternative to Senator Bricker’s efforts ended up being a precursor to 
the Case Act.  From 1954 through 1957, Senators Homer Ferguson and 
William Knowland proposed bills that would have required that all ex-
ecutive agreements be submitted to the Senate within sixty days after 
being concluded, and these bills were twice approved by the Senate.96  
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that this legislation 
would serve three purposes: (1) “provid[ing] the basis for keeping the 
Senate duly informed on a variety of matters dealt with by executive 
agreements which had hitherto escaped its attention”; (2) “insur[ing] a 
closer degree of liaison between the Executive and Congress throughout 
the entire range of the treaty process”; and (3) “produc[ing] a salutary 
restraining effect on the conclusion of such agreements as may have 
been, in the past, productive of criticism, furnishing to the Senate the 
means whereby corrective legislative action may be taken if neces-
sary.”97  No action was taken on the bills in the House, however, so they 
never became law.98 
Also during this period, the State Department promulgated an inter-
nal process for determining whether to conclude agreements as Article 
II treaties or as executive agreements.  The process, now part of the 
State Department’s internal Foreign Affairs Manual,99 is known as  
“C-175” because it was first set forth in 1955 in a Department Circular 
numbered 175.  As the Manual notes, the C-175 process is designed to 
“facilitate[] the application of orderly and uniform measures to the ne-
gotiation, conclusion, reporting, publication, and registration of U.S. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 ELIZABETH GOITEIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE NEW ERA OF SECRET LAW 49 
(2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Era_of_Secret_Law. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/3MWE-5X2D].  This figure includes agreements that were not published be-
cause they were classified.  See id. 
 95 See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY 191, 214–15 
(1988). 
 96 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 217 & n.25.  
 97 S. REP. NO. 84-2416, at 3 (1956). 
 98 CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 217. 
 99 See 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 721–727, https:// 
fam.state.gov/fam/11fam/11fam0720.html [https://perma.cc/6W5V-8YS4]. 
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treaties and international agreements, and facilitate[] the maintenance 
of complete and accurate records on such agreements.”100  According to 
the Manual: “An international agreement may be concluded pursuant to 
one or more of these constitutional bases: (1) Treaty; (2) Legislation; (3) 
Constitutional authority of the President.”101  The Manual also sets forth 
various considerations that: 
will be taken into account along with other relevant factors in determining 
whether an international agreement shall be dealt with by the United States 
as a treaty to be brought into force with the advice and consent of the Senate 
or as an agreement to be brought into force on some other constitutional 
basis.102 
Starting in the late 1960s, during the Vietnam War, Congress again 
became concerned about the growth of executive agreements.  These 
concerns intensified as a result of the findings of a congressional sub-
committee created in 1969 — the Symington Subcommittee on Security 
Agreements and Commitments Abroad — that discovered various mil-
itary assistance and base agreements that had been concluded without 
congressional knowledge.103 
Congress responded by imposing reporting requirements in the 1972 
Case-Zablocki Act, also known as the Case Act.104  The Act is similar 
to the proposals by Senators Ferguson and Knowland in the 1950s.  It 
requires that the Secretary of State transmit to Congress the text of any 
international agreement other than an Article II treaty “as soon as prac-
ticable after such [an] agreement has entered into force with respect to 
the United States but in no event later than sixty days thereafter.”105  
The Act also provides that if the President concludes that immediate 
public disclosure of an agreement would be prejudicial to U.S. national 
security, he or she does not need to transmit it to the full Congress and 
can instead transmit it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
the House Committee on International Relations under an injunction of 
secrecy.106 
The basic problem that motivated the Case Act, as noted by  
Representative Zablocki, was that “Congress ha[d] not been notified or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 Id. § 721. 
 101 Id. § 723.2-2. 
 102 Id. § 723.1; see also id. § 723.3. 
 103 See SUBCOMM. ON SEC. AGREEMENTS & COMMITMENTS ABROAD, 91ST CONG., 
SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD (Comm. Print 1970); see also 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 201–06 (Mariner Books 2004) 
(1973). 
 104 See Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619, 619 (1972) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b). 
 105 Id.  Shortly before the adoption of the Act, Congress considered proposals that would have 
required all international agreements other than Article II treaties to be transmitted at least sixty 
days before they took effect, but these proposals were not adopted.  See CRS TREATY STUDY, 
supra note 14, at 216. 
 106 See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a).  
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fully informed about international agreements entered into by the  
President or other officials of the executive branch.”107  The Act did not 
aim to regulate the permissible scope of executive agreements.  But it 
did aim to facilitate Congress’s substantive review of executive agree-
ments through greater transparency.  When testifying in support of the 
Act, Senator Case noted, for example, that “to have knowledge of and 
copies of all agreements would make it possible for us to decide whether 
or not particular agreements should come before us as treaties.  We can 
deal with that question, and we do not estop ourselves by getting copies 
of the agreements.”108 
In 1981, pursuant to a directive in a 1978 amendment to the Case 
Act, the State Department adopted regulations implementing both the 
Act and the publication statute discussed above.109  Among other things, 
the regulations provide that the Department will transmit to Congress 
a background statement to accompany each agreement reported under 
the Act, and that this background statement will include “a precise ci-
tation of legal authority.”110  These background statements are not man-
dated by the Case Act, however, and the regulations do not require their 
disclosure to the public.111  Prior to our FOIA litigation, these back-
ground statements, which we refer to as “cover memos,” had rarely been 
seen outside of the government. 
The regulations also exclude various materials from what the  
Department considers to be “international agreements” for purposes of 
both its publication and reporting obligations.112  For example, the reg-
ulations state that “[d]ocuments intended to have political or moral 
weight, but not intended to be legally binding, are not international 
agreements.”113  (We will return to the special issues presented by non-
binding agreements below in section III.A.3.)  In addition, implementing 
agreements that “are closely anticipated and identified in the underlying 
agreement” are not treated by the Department as separate international 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 118 CONG. REC. 28,085 (1972) (statement of Rep. Zablocki). 
 108 Id. at 4092 (statement of Sen. Case); see also S. REP. NO. 92-591, at 5 (1972) (“The present 
proposal, which was originally initiated as a modest alternative to the Bricker amendment, does 
not purport to resolve the underlying constitutional question of the Senate’s treaty power.  It may 
well be interpreted, however, as an invitation to further consideration of this critical constitutional 
issue.”); CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 23 (“A basic concern of the Senate has been 
whether an executive agreement is properly within the authority of a treaty or statute.”). 
 109 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.1–.9 (2019); see also 1 U.S.C. § 112b(f). 
 110 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(c).  The State Department apparently had voluntarily been providing this 
information to Congress for classified agreements since 1973.  See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra 
note 14, at 23, 228. 
 111 See Ryan Harrington, Understanding the “Other” International Agreements, 108 LAW LIBR. 
J. 343, 352 (2016) (“Critically, the Case Act does not require the Executive to publish the authority 
for the agreement.”). 
 112 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a). 
 113 Id. § 181.2(a)(1). 
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agreements for purposes of publication and reporting.114  Nor, according 
to the regulations, do international agreements for these purposes in-
clude “[m]inor or trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal language 
and form.”115  This latter limitation is presumably narrower than the 
sixteen categories of agreements currently exempted by regulation from 
publication.  Indeed, the publication obligation was already subject to 
this “minor or trivial” limitation when the Department started adding 
the specific exemptions.  Importantly, the specific exemptions apply only 
to the Department’s publication obligation, not its obligation to report 
to Congress.116 
In sum, the Case Act requires the State Department to report to  
Congress all non–Article II international agreements within sixty days 
after they enter into force, subject to limitations relating to secret agree-
ments.  This reporting obligation, even with the restrictions on what the 
State Department considers to be “international agreements,” is signifi-
cantly broader than the Department’s publication obligation, described 
above in section I.B.1.  In addition, pursuant to regulation, the State 
Department must provide Congress with a “precise citation of legal au-
thority” for each non–Article II agreement, but these citations are not 
made available to the public. 
3.  Periodic Congressional Concerns and Amendments. — As dis-
cussed, the transparency regime for executive agreements consists of bi-
furcated requirements of publication and reporting.  These requirements 
are bifurcated because the publication requirements substantially pre-
date the Case Act, serve a different purpose, have a longer transparency 
delay, and eventually developed a carve-out for relatively unimportant 
agreements because publication (in hard copy) was thought to take sub-
stantially more resources than reporting to Congress. 
Congress has often expressed concerns about how well the transpar-
ency regime is working.117  These concerns have related in particular to 
late reporting and underreporting of agreements by the State  
Department.118  One reason that has often been cited by the Department 
for such deficiencies is that it does not always receive timely notice of 
agreements from other departments and agencies within the executive 
branch.119  These departments and agencies are generally supposed to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 114 Id. § 181.2(c). 
 115 Id. § 181.2(a)(2). 
 116 Id. § 181.8(a). 
 117 See generally CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 218–33 (describing various problems 
with reporting under the Case Act and congressional efforts to address them). 
 118 See id. 
 119 See id. at 230. 
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coordinate with the State Department prior to negotiating agree-
ments,120 but it can be difficult for State to monitor the subsequent con-
clusion of these agreements.  A related issue is that agencies do not al-
ways understand which agreements are covered by the Case Act.121 
In 1977, Congress attempted to address this coordination problem 
by amending the Case Act to provide that “[a]ny department or agency 
of the United States Government which enters into any international 
agreement on behalf of the United States shall transmit to the  
Department of State the text of such agreement not later than twenty 
days after such agreement has been signed.”122  In an effort to further 
reduce incomplete and late reporting, Congress amended the Act in 1978 
to require that agreements concluded orally had to be reduced to writing 
and reported within the sixty-day window.123  A report from the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee discussing this change explained that it 
was designed to “eliminate any possible incentive for entering into cer-
tain agreements orally rather than in writing” and to “require the trans-
mission of intelligence-sharing and intelligence liaison agreements, many 
of which are oral.”124   
The 1978 amendments also required the President to give Congress 
a report every year on any agreements submitted late, “describing fully 
and completely the reasons for the late transmittal.”125  The Senate  
Foreign Relations Committee noted that “[l]ate transmittals ha[d] been 
a continuing problem.  Roughly one-third of all agreements transmitted 
[the previous] year were transmitted late, and nearly a fourth of those 
late transmittals were over a year late.”126  This presidential reporting 
requirement was eliminated, however, effective as of May 15, 2000, pur-
suant to a general sunset provision enacted in late 1995 that phased out 
a variety of executive branch reporting requirements.127 
The “late transmittal” reports from 1978 to 2000 have not generally 
been made public, and we were able to find only two of them — the one 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 120 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(a). 
 121 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 230–32. 
 122 Act of June 15, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-45, § 5(a), 91 Stat. 221, 224 (codified at 1 U.S.C. 
§ 112b(a)); see S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 95TH CONG., MARK-UP: LEGISLATION 
DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION REQUEST 14–15 (1977) 
(statement of Sen. Case). 
 123 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 708, 92 Stat. 
963, 993 (1978) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a)); see S. REP. NO. 95-842, at 45 (1978). 
 124 S. REP. NO. 95-842, at 45. 
 125 § 708, 92 Stat. at 993 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b(b)). 
 126 S. REP. NO. 95-842, at 46. 
 127 See Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 3003, 109 
Stat. 707, 734 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1113 note). 
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for calendar year 1978128 and the one for calendar year 1981.129  In the 
report covering 1978, the State Department reported, on behalf of the 
President, that 132 of 520 international agreements — that is, about 
twenty-five percent — had been transmitted late to Congress under the 
Case Act.130  In the report for 1981, President Reagan reported that 99 
of 368 international agreements — that is, about twenty-seven per-
cent — had been reported to Congress late.131  Both reports indicated 
that in many cases the agreements were reported late because the State 
Department had not received them in a timely manner from other exec-
utive agencies and departments.132 
In 1987, Congress sought to improve compliance with the Case Act 
by providing that no funds would be available to implement any agree-
ment not transmitted within sixty days until the text of the agreement 
had been transmitted.133  The report from the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the legislation containing this provision explained that, 
“during 1986, 65 Executive Agreements were transmitted after the 60-
day period had expired,” and that the funding restriction was “intended 
to enforce compliance with the Case-Zablocki Act.”134  However, due to 
a limitation added when the House and Senate versions of the legislation 
were reconciled, the funding restriction applied for only two years.135 
Late reporting of agreements to Congress continued to be a concern 
after these amendments.  In a 2001 study, the Congressional Research 
Service presented detailed statistics on late reporting between 1978 and 
1999.  During this period, sometimes more than twenty-five percent of 
agreements were reported late in a given year.136  The Congressional 
Research Service reported that untimely reporting was “still a source of 
concern although the numbers [were] notably lower in recent years than 
in earlier periods,” pointing out that “[b]etween 1993 and 1999, the per-
cent[age] of late to total transmittals fell to 13.5 percent.”137  (As dis-
cussed below in section II.B.1.b, this improvement did not last, and un-
timely reporting increased sharply in the years after the Congressional 
Research Service study.) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 128 See 96TH CONG., REPORTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1979 (PUBLIC LAW 95-426), at 134–47 (J. 
Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter 1978 LATE TRANSMITTAL REPORT]. 
 129 See H.R. DOC. NO. 97-148 (1982); CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 223. 
 130 1978 LATE TRANSMITTAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 134. 
 131 H.R. DOC. NO. 97-148, at 3. 
 132 Id.; 1978 LATE TRANSMITTAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 140. 
 133 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 139, 
101 Stat. 1331, 1347 (1987) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b note).  
 134 S. REP. NO. 100-75, at 40 (1987).  
 135 § 139(b), 101 Stat. at 1347. 
 136 CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 226 tbl.X-1. 
 137 Id. at 228. 
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Additional controversy concerning late reporting and nonreporting 
of agreements arose in 2004 when “the House Committee on  
International Relations learned that, due to numerous management fail-
ures within the Department of State, over 600 classified and unclassified 
international agreements dating back to 1997 . . . had not been transmit-
ted to Congress.”138  In response, Congress amended both the Case Act 
and the publication statute described above in section I.B.1.  As previ-
ously noted, the amendments required the Secretary of State to publish 
international agreements on the Department’s website not later than 180 
days after they entered into force.139  In addition, the amendments re-
quired the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress 
containing an index of all signed or proclaimed international agreements 
made that year that were not published in the TIAS compilation, which 
the Department was allowed to submit in classified form.140  They also 
revived the funding restriction from the 1980s for three years (2005–
2007), thus withholding funding to implement any agreement that the 
executive branch did not transmit to Congress within sixty days.141 
Members of Congress have continued to worry about agencies not 
reporting their agreements to the State Department in a timely manner, 
which in turn causes the Department to be late in its reporting under 
the Case Act.  In 2017, Senator Bob Corker, then Chairman of the  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed an amendment to the 
Case Act that would have required “[e]ach department or agency of  
the United States Government that enters into any international agree-
ment” to “designate a Chief International Agreements Officer” who 
would “have department- or agency-wide responsibility for efficient and 
appropriate compliance with [the obligation] to transmit the text of any 
international agreement to the Department of State not later than 20 
days after such agreement has been signed.”142  But this proposed 
amendment to the Case Act was not enacted.143 
The tables below show, first, a chronology of the most important 
amendments to the publication and reporting statutes (Table 1), and, 
second, a comparison of the current publication and reporting obliga-






 138 150 CONG. REC. 25,704 (2004). 
 139 1 U.S.C. § 112a(d). 
 140 Id. § 112b(d). 
 141 Id. § 112b note (reinstating limitation for fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007). 
 142 S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 802 (as reported by S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., Sept. 6, 2017). 
 143 This proposed amendment to the Case Act was included in a subsequent bill — the Depart-
ment of State Authorization Act of 2019.  See H.R. 3352, 116th Cong. § 901 (2019). 
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Table 1: Important Amendments to the  
Publication and Reporting Statutes 
 
1977 
Reporting statute amended to require agencies  
and departments to transmit agreements to  
the State Department within twenty days after  
the agreements are signed. 
1978 
Reporting statute amended to require the President  
to give a yearly report to Congress about agreements 
submitted late; this amendment was later subjected  
to a sunset provision and has not been operative  
since 2000. 
1987 
Reporting statute amended to impose funding re-
striction on implementing agreements reported late; 
this amendment lasted two years (1988–1989). 
1994 
Publication statute amended to allow exemption  
for agreements where there is insufficient public  
interest to warrant publication; regulations  
currently list sixteen categories of agreements  
not requiring publication. 
2004 
Publication statute amended to require online  
publication within 180 days of agreement  
entering into force. 
 
Reporting statute amended to impose funding re-
striction on implementing agreements reported late; 
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Table 2: Comparison of Publication and Reporting Requirements 
 
 Publication Reporting 
Scope of  
obligation 
All non–Article II agree-
ments, except those for 
which there is insuffi-
cient public interest 
(now including sixteen 
categories of agreements 
pursuant to regulation). 
All non–Article II 
agreements, with a 







Article II and non– 
Article II agreements 
published together with-
out distinction. 
Only non–Article II 




No citation of legal  
authority given. 
Citation of legal au-
thority given to  
Congress pursuant to 
regulation but not to 
public. 
Timing Within 180 days after entering into force. 
Within sixty days  
after entering  
into force. 
 
4.  Other Transparency Requirements. — We have described above 
only the generally applicable transparency regime for executive agree-
ments.  Congress has also sometimes imposed additional and more tar-
geted transparency requirements.  Most notably, in a number of in-
stances it has required reporting of particular types of agreements before 
they take effect.144  For example, Congress has long specified that inter-
national fishery agreements shall not become effective “before the close 
of the first 120 days (excluding any days in a period for which the  
Congress is adjourned sine die) after the date on which the President 
transmits to the House of Representatives and to the Senate a document 
setting forth the text” of the agreement.145  Similarly, it has long required 
that nuclear cooperation agreements be submitted to Congress for ex 
ante review.146 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 144 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 235–38, 236 tbl.X-3; Robert E. Dalton, United 
States, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 765, 770–71 (Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. 
Blakeslee & L. Benjamin Ederington eds., 2005). 
 145 16 U.S.C. § 1823(a).  The Congressional Research Service published a table containing a non-
comprehensive list of statutory reporting requirements relating to various types of agreements, most 
of which require ex ante reporting.  See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 236 tbl.X-3. 
 146 See 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d). 
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More recently, the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and  
Accountability Act of 2015147 requires presidential reporting of an in-
tention to conclude an agreement concerning tariff barriers.148  In other 
instances, Congress has not regulated the transparency of executive 
agreements directly but has instead imposed reporting duties relating to 
executive branch programs that are often the subject of executive agree-
ments.149  For example, many ex ante congressional-executive agree-
ments are based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.150  Congress has 
long imposed a variety of reporting obligations in connection with the 
executive branch’s foreign aid programs, and recently it enacted the 
Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016,151 which im-
poses new publication and reporting duties.152 
* * * 
In sum, Congress has relied primarily on transparency directives to 
regulate executive agreements.  Rather than insist on approving each 
individual agreement that the executive branch has concluded, Congress 
has contented itself with requiring that the executive branch keep it — 
and, to a lesser degree, the public — informed about the binding inter-
national legal commitments concluded on behalf of the United States.  
Particularly after the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, 
which eliminated Congress’s ability to have a legislative veto check on 
agreements, transparency became the principal tool that Congress used 
to ensure that the executive branch was not overstepping the bounds of 
delegated authority.153  We now turn to examine how that transparency 
regime has worked in practice. 
II.  DOES THE TRANSPARENCY REGIME WORK?   
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
How well is the transparency regime for executive agreements de-
scribed in Part I working?  How well does the executive branch meet 
its legal obligations to keep Congress and the public informed?  And 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 147 19 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4210. 
 148 See id. § 4202(a)(2).  For a report by President Trump submitted pursuant to this provision, 
see Message to the Congress on Notification of Initiation of the United States–Japan Trade  
Agreement, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Sept. 16, 2019). 
 149 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 238–39. 
 150 Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.); see 
Hathaway, supra note 8, at 156–57. 
 151 Pub. L. No. 114-191, 130 Stat. 666 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151 note, 2394c). 
 152 See 22 U.S.C. § 2394c.  For a report to Congress on the implementation of the Act, see OFF. 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (FATAA) (2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FataaOmbReport_Master_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M2LH-L7CL]. 
 153 See supra pp. 633–34. 
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how well does the executive branch adhere to the limits on its constitu-
tional and statutory authority to conclude executive agreements? 
To answer these questions, we sought and eventually obtained under 
FOIA thousands of the cover memos that the State Department has sent 
to Congress during the last several decades when reporting executive 
agreements under the Case Act.  With the assistance of a team of stu-
dents, we spent almost two years coding and analyzing the memos.  To 
help put this information in context, we also conducted interviews with 
executive branch and congressional participants in the process.  The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative material provided us with 
novel findings regarding the transparency regime for executive  
agreements. 
This Part begins by describing the qualitative evidence: How are 
agreements actually made, and what is the internal process for comply-
ing with the statutory requirements?  It then describes the results of our 
analysis of the more than 5,000 cover memos that we received from the 
State Department.  These memos have rarely been seen by anyone out-
side the U.S. government, and they have never been made public on 
anything approaching this scale.  Analyzing them, and the legal bases 
they cite for the agreements to which they are attached, reveals a great 
deal about how the executive branch uses its delegated authority.   
Finally, this Part uses these data to gain some insight — and raise new 
questions — about how well the executive branch keeps Congress and 
the American public informed about the binding international agree-
ments that it concludes almost daily. 
A.  Qualitative Evidence: How Executive Agreements 
 Are Made and Reported to Congress 
To understand the context in which the State Department sends the 
cover memos to Congress under the Case Act, it is important to have 
some understanding of the internal executive branch process for making 
executive agreements.  Unfortunately, there is no public account of this 
process.  To get some sense of it, we interviewed more than a dozen 
current and former government attorneys.154  They spoke with us about 
their experiences working on the process of negotiating and concluding 
executive agreements for the United States, or — in the case of attorneys 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 154 The description in this section is based on a series of interviews and discussions with past and 
present lawyers from the State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, the House Foreign Affairs  
Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  Unless they are specifically quoted, in-
dividual interviews are not cited.  Hathaway applied for and received an exemption determination 
from the Yale Human Research Protection Program Institutional Review Board (IRB Protocol ID 
2000025293).  Letter from the Hum. Rsch. Prot. Prog. Institutional Rev. Bds., Yale Univ., to Oona 
Hathaway 1 (May 6, 2019) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The research was 
deemed exempt under 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(2)(ii).  Letter from the Hum. Rsch. Prot. Prog. Institutional 
Rev. Bds. to Oona Hathaway, supra, at 1.  All interviews are anonymous. 
  
2020] TRANSPARENCY REGIME FOR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 659 
who worked for Congress — receiving the reports provided by the ex-
ecutive branch regarding the agreements concluded.  Although the three 
authors of this piece have each studied executive agreements for more 
than a decade and have worked in the executive branch on international 
law issues, much of what we learned from these conversations came as 
a surprise. 
How does the process work?  Let us begin with a hypothetical agree-
ment — say an agreement to engage in scientific and technological co-
operation with Kazakhstan.155  The U.S. Geological Survey of the  
Department of the Interior might want to collect information about the 
mineral resources of Kazakhstan.  Its officials would reach out to their 
counterparts in the State Department’s Bureau of Oceans and  
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) about how 
best to proceed, and a person in that office may suggest that it would be 
easier to conduct that work if there were an international agreement 
between the U.S. Department of the Interior and the corresponding de-
partment in Kazakhstan.  Someone in OES would then likely reach out 
to a State Department lawyer in the Office of the Assistant Legal  
Adviser for Oceans, Environment, and Science (L/OES) to seek advice 
about how to proceed.156  While there is an office in the Legal Adviser’s 
Office, Treaty Affairs (L/T), tasked with managing international agree-
ments, these lawyers generally do not get involved until later in the pro-
cess.  L/T may be involved earlier, however, “when things are thorny.”157 
Before negotiation of the agreement may begin, the State  
Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual requires a “C-175 authorization.”  
As discussed in Part I, the Circular 175 (or “C-175”) procedure lays out 
the steps that the executive branch must take to negotiate, conclude, 
report, publish, and register U.S. treaties and international agree-
ments.158  One of the objectives of this process is to ensure “[t]hat the 
making of treaties and other international agreements for the United 
States is carried out within constitutional and other appropriate lim-
its.”159  The request for C-175 authorization will generally be drafted by 
the State Department policy bureau seeking the agreement (here OES).  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 155 This is not, in fact, entirely hypothetical. This agreement exists, having been concluded in 
2014.  See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the 
Earth Sciences, Kaz.-U.S., at 1, June 6–16, 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 14-616. 
 156 The Legal Adviser’s Office of the State Department is organized to mirror the policy offices 
in the Department.  Generally speaking, for each major policy office, there is an office within the 
Legal Adviser’s Office that supports it.  For a list of the regional and functional offices within the 
State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, see Other Legal Adviser Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/Other-Legal-Adviser-Offices [https://perma.cc/DEW8-5DAW].  
 157 Interview by Oona Hathaway with Former U.S. Government Lawyer (June 4, 2019). 
 158 The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual requires that the Secretary of State or a 
designee give advance authorization for negotiation of an agreement as well as signature of the final 
text.  See 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 99, §§ 721–727. 
 159 Id. § 722(1). 
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The lawyer in the relevant section of the Legal Adviser’s Office (here 
L/OES) will then prepare a separate memorandum of law to attach to 
the C-175 request.  This memorandum of law will address the legal basis 
for the proposed action — and whether the agreement contemplated can 
be concluded without additional congressional action (either approval 
by two-thirds of the Senate as an Article II treaty or approval via ordi-
nary legislation as an ex post congressional-executive agreement).160 
If the person preparing the request (here the person in OES) knows 
a great deal about what the ultimate agreement will contain, then the 
request will detail the content of the intended agreement and seek ap-
proval for both negotiation and authority to conclude at the same time.  
(In the ordinary course, there must be separate C-175 requests — one 
for negotiation and, after negotiation is completed or nearly completed, 
another for authority to conclude.)  In some instances, the request may 
seek approval to negotiate or conclude a series of related agreements — 
for example, it might request approval to negotiate a number of similar 
agreements on scientific and technological cooperation with a series of 
countries.  Although there is a general template for C-175 memos, the 
level of detail provided in the memos varies a great deal across offices 
and over time.  Individual offices within the Legal Adviser’s Office may 
require more detailed information about the agreements and the legal 
authority to conclude them than do others.  This is largely an artifact of 
differing office cultures and practices. 
Sometimes if an agreement is novel in some important way, the law-
yer in L/OES will work with a lawyer in L/T to reach out to lawyers in 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the agreement.  The 
State Department lawyer will explain the proposed agreement and ask 
if the staff has any particular concerns.  (Similar conversations may hap-
pen with House staff, but the interviewees did not mention them.)  The 
degree to which such informal consultations take place has varied over 
time.  It depends on the relationships between the people in the offices 
involved and how comfortable they are “picking up the phone” to talk 
to their counterpart.161  Informal outreach from State to Congress is 
unlikely, for example, concerning an agreement that has similarities with 
another one recently concluded and reported.  The C-175 request would 
likely be shorter in this circumstance as well.  As one former Legal  
Adviser’s Office attorney put it: “These things accrete over time.  Maybe 
for the first science and technology agreement with Kazakhstan the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 160 In some cases, the memorandum of law is not a separate, attached memorandum but is in-
cluded as a section of the memo seeking C-175 authorization. 
 161 In the past, the Legal Adviser’s Office at the State Department has loaned lawyers to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, creating a bridge between the Committee and the State  
Department.  
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memorandum of law would be longer.  The eighteenth science and tech-
nology agreement would be pro forma.  There could be dozens and doz-
ens of similar agreements.”162 
When ready, the C-175 request is sent to a policy official designated 
by the Secretary of State, such as the Deputy Secretary or the Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs, or to lower-level officials designated, in 
turn, by them.  For science and technology agreements such as our hy-
pothetical agreement with Kazakhstan, for example, approval authority 
is delegated to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.  The entire package 
must also be approved by the Legal Adviser’s Office.  In the Legal  
Adviser’s Office, normally, both L/T and the substantive office (here 
L/OES) must sign off on the request.  In the case of requests raising 
more significant issues or relating to more significant agreements, the 
Deputy Legal Adviser or Legal Adviser (the “front office” or “L/FO”) 
will also be asked to approve.  No agreement can be concluded without 
the approval of both the State Department’s policy office and the Office 
of the Legal Adviser.  Thus, the C-175 process serves a centralizing role 
for executive agreements concluded by the U.S. government. 
Once the U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior 
has finished negotiating the executive agreement, OES and L/OES must 
prepare a second C-175 request before the agreement may be signed and 
concluded (unless the first request folded together negotiation and con-
clusion).  The same process applies.  Once the Assistant Secretary for 
the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, L/OES, and L/T have all signed off, the agreement may be 
signed and concluded.  At this point, L/T is supposed to report the agree-
ment to Congress within sixty days after it enters into force.163  As our 
data below will make clear, that does not always happen.  The most 
common reason why is that the agencies and departments that usually 
negotiate the agreements do not always report the agreements back to 
State in time to meet the Case Act deadline.  In addition, L/T is often 
busy and understaffed and has not always prioritized timely Case Act 
reporting.  As one former attorney in the office explained: “We were 
doing hundreds of these a year; it was overwhelming how many were 
coming in.”164 
The Case Act reports to the congressional committees contain the 
agreement and a cover memo.  That cover memo includes a title, the 
date the agreement was concluded, a brief explanation of the agreement, 
and a section entitled “Legal Authority.”  This last section is usually very 
brief, normally containing a citation or string of citations to some  
combination of statutes, the U.S. Constitution, prior treaties, and other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 Interview by Oona Hathaway with Former U.S. Government Lawyer, supra note 157. 
 163 There are a few exceptions.  See supra section I.B.4, pp. 656–57. 
 164 Interview by Oona Hathaway with Former U.S. Government Lawyer, supra note 157. 
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authorities.  Though the level of detail varies across cover memos,  
they are always limited to a single page.  We include an example in 
Appendix B. 
Importantly, these cover memos are not prepared by lawyers.  In-
stead, they are prepared by treaty analysts in L/T.  The analysts draw 
the information contained in the cover memo from the agreement and 
from the C-175 request.  They are assigned to work with particular of-
fices (for example, OES and L/OES will work with the same treaty an-
alyst on all their executive agreements), and they continue with those 
assignments in some cases for decades.  Treaty analysts develop rela-
tionships not only with the personnel in offices inside the State  
Department but also within the agencies with which those offices regu-
larly work.  As one former Legal Adviser’s Office attorney explained, 
the treaty analysts play a key role in the process: 
The treaty analysts would check the texts for grammar, they would get the 
ribbons and pens, keep the treaties in the treaty vault.  They kept the 
travaux, subsequent practice, and interpretations in a file.  They kept the 
files, they did depository functions, and they would often be the technical 
advisers to L lawyers.  They were the institutional memory.  There was one 
analyst who had been in the office since 1972, and she would get a call 
about, say, a basing agreement they wanted to conclude, and she would say, 
“I saw something similar in 1978.”  They would also sometimes serve as a 
point of contact with the agencies: Treasury, Defense, etc.  They would often 
be the one saying we need to get a C-175 because an agreement was getting 
prepared in another agency.165 
As a result of the robust role of treaty analysts, the approach to the 
cover memos may reflect different practices not only of the different 
offices (L/OES vs. Office of Political-Military Affairs (L/PM)) but also 
of individual treaty analysts.  Before 2014, the memos were rarely re-
viewed by lawyers in L/T or the other lawyers in the Legal Adviser’s 
Office.  (We are told that this changed in 2014 and that lawyers now 
regularly review the cover memos.)  The limited involvement of lawyers 
in preparing the memos before 2014 probably explains some of the odd 
citations we found in them.  For example, the memos frequently cite the 
State Department’s general authority to negotiate even though that au-
thority is legally irrelevant to the authority to conclude the agreement. 
More than one former lawyer in the office cautioned that these cover 
memos may not reflect the considered legal judgment of the lawyers, 
because they were until recently prepared by the analysts alone and be-
cause they are prepared without any intent to make them public.  No-
tably, one lawyer who had written a number of international agreements 
during a multidecade career in the office had not even seen a cover 
memo for most of that time and was unaware until seeing one that the 
memo contains a summary of legal authorities for the agreement.  Even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 165 Id. 
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though lawyers were not directly involved in preparation of the cover 
memos before 2014, the legal citations they contain are likely based on 
the underlying C-175 legal memos that are prepared by lawyers.  More-
over, whatever the process for generating them, the memos contain the 
executive branch’s response to the regulatory obligation to inform  
Congress of the legal authority on which it relies in concluding reported 
executive agreements. 
A number of practices related to the cover memos likely emerged as 
a result of limited staff and resources.  At one point in the early 2000s, 
for example, L/T had only two attorneys.  That thin staffing meant that 
the attorneys could not meaningfully oversee every proposed executive 
agreement.  Record keeping has not always been careful, again because 
it was not a priority and resources were limited.  That led to significant 
reliance on the institutional memory provided by treaty analysts.  It was 
only in the Obama Administration that the office finally hired an archi-
vist to properly store and manage the treaty collection that had been 
held in a makeshift “treaty vault” containing definitive legal copies of 
some of the country’s most important and historic treaties, some with 
presidential signatures dating back to the early years of the country.  At 
one point, an attorney in the office discovered that, contrary to what is 
required by the Case Act,166 classified agreements had not been reported 
to Congress for at least a couple of years.  The general consensus of 
those interviewed was that late and otherwise incomplete reporting to 
Congress was not an intentional act by the State Department staff, but 
rather was the result of oversight by an office that did not have enough 
attorneys to properly manage the workload. 
Finally, the interviews revealed interesting information about the  
Office of the Legal Adviser’s views about the nature and scope of the 
President’s legal authority to enter into agreements.  As noted above, 
the “legal authority” sections of the cover memos are cursory and before 
2014 were usually not written or reviewed by State Department lawyers.  
The interviews made clear that the opacity goes even deeper, since the 
Office of the Legal Adviser itself lacked a consistent view about the 
degree of authority needed to authorize the conclusion of an agreement.  
Two basic views — both very favorable to presidential authority — 
emerged from the interviews. 
One view is that the President can make a binding international 
agreement on any topic, without authorization from Congress, so long 
as the President has authority to regulate the matter under domestic law 
and the agreement is consistent with domestic law.  This view is akin to 
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 166 See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a); 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(b) (2019) (“Classified agreements shall be transmitted 
by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
and to the House Committee on International Relations.”). 
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the Executive Agreements+ view described by Professors Bodansky and 
Spiro.167  A second and more modest view is that, although mere con-
sistency with domestic law is not enough by itself, there is authority to 
make an agreement if Congress has authorized international cooperation 
on the topic, something more readily inferred when the Executive has 
engaged in similar practices in the past in which Congress has acqui-
esced.168  Those who take this latter view note that when a new type of 
executive agreement that relies on something less than express authori-
zation from Congress is proposed, the lawyer working on the agreement 
in the Office of the Legal Adviser might reach out to his or her counter-
part in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss it and ensure 
that it does not raise any concerns.  Such informal interaction has not 
been consistent, however, and several interviewees reported that it broke 
down during the Trump Administration.  One interviewee stated that 
“[t]he message from the top [of the Administration] is resist, defy, don’t 
respond,”169 and that this attitude has led to growing mutual  
distrust. 
The interviews also made clear, relatedly, that the State Department 
does not draw a sharp distinction between agreements concluded under 
the President’s own constitutional authority (what scholars refer to as 
sole executive agreements) and agreements concluded on the basis of 
congressional authority granted to the President (what scholars refer to 
as ex ante congressional-executive agreements).  The C-175 request pro-
cess is the same for both, and they are reported to Congress together, 
without any formal distinction made between them.170  The only way in 
theory to tell them apart is to examine the legal authorities cited in the 
cover memo — information that is not generally made public and that, 
as we shall see, often does not permit one to infer the type of agreement 
with any confidence.  As we explain further in section III.B.1, the failure 
to clearly distinguish between the two categories of agreements in the 
course of negotiating, concluding, and reporting them may partially ex-
plain some of what might appear to be carelessness in identifying the 
legal basis for an international agreement. 
Once the Case Act reports are ready for transmittal to Congress, they 
are printed out and delivered via courier to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  Upon receipt, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 167 See supra p. 643.  
 168 One interviewee referred to this theory of executive power as a “three-legged stool,” where 
the three legs are (1) consistency with domestic law, (2) some indication from Congress that it favors 
global cooperation, and (3) consistent past practice in which Congress has acquiesced.  Interview 
by Oona Hathaway with Former U.S. Government Lawyer (Aug. 29, 2019). 
 169 Interview by Oona Hathaway with Former U.S. Government Lawyer (July 23, 2019). 
 170 The Department’s internal legal memorandum included with the C-175 request would, how-
ever, assess whether the agreement could be concluded without further congressional action — 
whether because the agreement rested on the President’s constitutional authority, existing statutory 
authority, a prior treaty, or some combination of these sources. 
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each committee scans the unclassified reports and circulates the elec-
tronic versions to the appropriate staff members.  Classified reports are 
sent to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, and attorneys 
from the committees have to make special arrangements to view them.   
All those who had reviewed the Case Act reports as congressional 
staffers agreed that there was no time to carefully review them.  None 
had researched the legal authority cited in a cover memo to confirm that 
it in fact supported the agreement.  There are only a small handful of 
lawyers in both committees to handle a huge range of topics, and they 
do not have time to conduct that level of oversight.  As one former con-
gressional staff member put it: “It’s not a lack of engagement; we just 
have to choose what we will work on.”171  Another echoed the im-
portance of those outside government raising the alarm about problem-
atic agreements: “Our scarcest resource is time.  To do our jobs, we have 
to leverage everyone out there in the think tank and public advocacy 
space to flag important issues. . . . You are going to focus on the thing 
that is getting attention.”172 
B.  Quantitative Evidence: Assessing the Transparency 
 and Legality of Executive Agreements 
As noted above, when the State Department reports an executive 
agreement to Congress as required under the Case Act, it attaches a 
cover memo in which it identifies the agreement title, parties, dates of 
signature and entry into force, and, most important, the legal authority 
for the agreement.  Under our settlement with the Department of State, 
we received 5,689 cover memos that the executive branch certified were 
the entirety of its records during the last four presidential administra-
tions (between the dates of January 20, 1989, and January 20, 2017), 
except for records relating to classified agreements.173  This is the first 
time that researchers have had access to this treasure trove of infor-
mation.174  All of the data on which this Article relies, including the 
cover memos themselves, are available, together with dynamic data vis-
ualizations, through the Harvard Law Review’s website.175 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 171 Interview by Oona Hathaway with Former U.S. Government Lawyer, supra note 169. 
 172 Interview by Oona Hathaway with Current U.S. Government Lawyer (May 19, 2020). 
 173 These were the dates of our FOIA request to the Department of State.  There is reason to 
believe that the State Department may have been overresponsive to our request and included some 
cover memos that are outside of this date range.  We kept these cover memos in the database and 
matched them to agreements in each of the databases described below even if the agreement fell 
outside the date range for the request. 
 174 For a description of how we obtained these memos, see Appendix A, infra pp. 721–22. 
 175 See Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Failed Transparency 
Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empirical and Normative Analysis: Data Visualizations, 
HARV. L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://harvardlawreview.org/executive-agreements-visualizations 
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The memos, which are brief, allow us to examine two sets of key 
questions.  First, we compared the agreements disclosed to Congress 
(based on the cover memos) with the agreements disclosed by the gov-
ernment to the public, as well as the more than six thousand agreements 
available from HeinOnline through private subscription during this 
same period.176  This comparison allowed us to determine whether the 
legal requirements above regarding publication and reporting of agree-
ments were being followed in practice.  We were able to examine the 
gaps between what could be made public and what is made public and 
between what should be reported and what is reported.  Second, we 
were able to analyze the legal bases offered for the agreements.  Working 
with our team of research assistants, we read and analyzed the thou-
sands of separate legal authorities cited in the legal authority section of 
the cover memos to determine whether they could reasonably provide 
legal bases for negotiating and concluding binding executive agree-
ments.  Using this information, we were able to evaluate the strength of 
the legal justifications the government relies upon when it reports exec-
utive agreements to Congress.  This empirical analysis sets the stage for 
Part III, where we discuss the implications of the findings for the effec-
tive working of the transparency regime and for the legality of executive 
agreements. 
The comprehensive database that we built to analyze these questions 
also provides valuable insight into the extensive use of executive agree-
ments by the federal government.  Even as Article II treaties have nearly 
disappeared, the number of executive agreements has kept up a steady 
pace.  Over the course of the last three decades, the federal government 
has concluded hundreds of executive agreements a year across a vast 
range of topics.  HeinOnline alone lists hundreds of subject categories,177 
which we grouped into twelve substantive categories: Defense (1,991) 
agreements); Finance, Trade, and Investment (1,166); Humanitarian 
(731); Science, Space, and Technology (728); Environment, Conserva-
tion, and Energy (723); Law Enforcement (624); Transportation and Avi-
ation (513); Nonproliferation (353); Educational Exchanges and Cultural  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(containing data visualizations and links to Dataverse, where the cover memos and underlying data 
used in this Article are posted). 
 176 This figure would be more than eight thousand if we included the 1,423 “record-only” agree-
ments, for which HeinOnline does not have the text. 
 177 The subject areas were distilled from the existing categorizations on HeinOnline and TIAS.  
Executive agreements on HeinOnline had an overarching Treaty in Force (TIF) Subject, a more 
granular “Short Title,” a detailed “Description,” and a “Kavass Subject Indexing” that overlapped 
with the first three.  On TIAS, agreements were associated with either one general category or two 
categories (one being a subcategory to the other).  While neither database seemed to categorize 
agreements systematically or consistently, categorizations followed patterns that could be used to 
group agreements into distinct subject areas.  Taking the HeinOnline and TIAS categories as a 
starting point, one of our student assistants, Tobias Kuehne, consolidated those categories into 
twelve (plus miscellaneous) subject areas.  
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Cooperation (235); Taxation (250); Diplomacy and Consular Affairs 
(186); and Maritime (182).178 
1.  Transparency of Executive Agreements. — In order to assess the 
State Department’s compliance with its publishing and reporting obliga-
tions, we sought to compare the agreements reflected in the cover memos 
to those in publicly available databases of international agreements. 
There are three databases of non–Article II agreements that those 
outside government can access.  First, as noted in Part I, the State  
Department maintains an online database, TIAS, in which it publishes 
all executive agreements except for agreements that are classified or 
where “the public interest in such agreements is insufficient to justify 
their publication.”179  TIAS is the primary database that the Department 
of State uses to make international agreements other than treaties pub-
lic.  Second, after some investigation, our team found an archived web-
site (difficult to search for and no longer updated) where the State  
Department published unclassified agreements reported under the Case 
Act between 2006 and early 2013 (which we refer to as the Case Act 
Reports database).180 
Finally, HeinOnline maintains a commercial database of interna-
tional agreements but requires a paid subscription to access it.181  This 
database was initially compiled by Igor Kavass, who for twenty years 
served as director of the law libraries at Duke and Vanderbilt and wrote 
on international law.182  As the HeinOnline database (named “KAV” in 
his honor) description notes, he “spent much of his career identifying 
and obtaining treaties and agreements entered into by the United  
States since 1950 that have not yet been published in UST or TIAS.”183   
Indeed, Kavass took it as his personal mission to construct the database  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 The numbers are based on analysis of executive agreements in HeinOnline that entered into force 
or were last signed between January 20, 1989, and January 20, 2017.  To explore these data further, 
please visit the dynamic data visualizations for this Article.  See Hathaway et al., supra note 175. 
 179 1 U.S.C. § 112a(b)(2); see Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), supra note 3; 
supra p. 646. 
 180 See Reporting International Agreements to Congress Under Case Act, supra note 93; supra p. 
647. 
 181 See KAV Agreements, HEINONLINE, https://home.heinonline.org/titles/World-Treaty-Li-
brary/KAV-Agreements [https://perma.cc/P745-KWCP].  Some elements of the database can be 
viewed without a subscription, but full access requires a subscription. 
 182 Id.; Obituary, Igor Ivan Kavass, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 8, 2008), https://obits. 
tennessean.com/obituaries/tennessean/obituary.aspx?n=igor-ivan-kavass&pid=107218294 [https:// 
perma.cc/59YE-SQG3]. 
 183 KAV Agreements, supra note 181.  Hein describes the U.S. Treaties and Agreements Library 
this way: “This library includes all U.S. treaties, whether currently in-force, expired, or not-yet 
officially published.  It includes prominent collections such as the United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements set (commonly referred to as the ‘Blue set’), as well as famous sets from 
Bevans, Miller, Malloy and others.”  U.S. Treaties and Agreements Library, HEINONLINE, 
https://home.heinonline.org/u-s-treaties-and-agreements-library [https://perma.cc/ULZ9-R7BC].  
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the government lacked, building the most complete database of U.S. exec-
utive agreements — far more comprehensive than the government’s 
own.184  He was so personally responsible for building the HeinOnline da-
tabase that at least one likely reason for the decline in the public availabil-
ity of executive agreements after the mid-2000s was his death in 2008.  
(a)  Publication. — When we first set out to explore how many of 
the cover memos pertain to agreements that have been made public, we 
expected that there would be more agreements reported to Congress 
than made public by the State Department or available by private sub-
scription.  While this turned out to be the case, the data brought some 
surprises.  Comparing the datasets, we found the following185:   
The TIAS dataset — the public site maintained by the U.S. govern-
ment — includes just 31.43% of the unclassified agreements reported to 
Congress during the period of our FOIA request.  Of our 5,689 cover 
memos, 1,788 match agreements published in TIAS.186  This finding 
highlights that the publication of agreements by the government in 
TIAS is very far from comprehensive, perhaps because the executive 
branch, exercising its discretion under the relevant regulations, has con-
cluded that a large percentage of agreements are not sufficiently im-
portant to be published.187  Whatever the reason, these statistics indicate 
that the government’s current mechanism to publish international 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 184 See Igor I. Kavass, Researching International Law, 83 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 107, 110 (1989). 
 185 Using the information about the underlying agreement in each cover memo, we compared 
them to publicly available databases to identify probable matches.  If the country name and subject 
were the same, and the date of the agreement was comparable, we recorded it as a “probable match.”  
Because the databases list agreements by different dates, we were as generous as possible with date 
matching.  TIAS lists agreements by the date they entered into force.  The Case Act Report lists 
them by the year they were reported to Congress.  HeinOnline lists the agreements by the date they 
were last signed, which is frequently the same date that they entered into force.  As a result, the 
same agreement may be reported in TIAS in December 2009 (because that is the date of entry into 
force) but in the Case Act Report in January 2010 (because that was the date it was reported to 
Congress).  We then compared the cover memos to the matched agreements, removing erroneous 
matches.  We repeated this process for each of the three databases.  Matching with HeinOnline also 
had another special consideration.  While HeinOnline usually has the full text of an agreement, it 
sometimes has only a record of the agreement, without the text.  See infra notes 189–190.  We 
considered an agreement a “match” only if the full text was available.  However, we also included 
statistics below regarding these “record-only” agreements, to provide maximum information. 
 186 There were 1,698 agreements in the TIAS database that matched 1,788 cover memos.  We 
use this second number to calculate the percentage (1,788/5,689).  The difference between these 
numbers is due to the fact that multiple cover memos (for example, for amendments and follow-on 
agreements) may match a single underlying agreement in TIAS. 
 187 There were some puzzling discrepancies, as well.  HeinOnline listed 582 additional agree-
ments with TIAS numbers, but those agreements were not in the TIAS database.  These were likely 
drawn from the U.S. government publication Treaties in Force, which lists the agreements to which 
the United States is a party but not their text.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 
(2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5Z76-F7PX]. 
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agreements results in significantly incomplete public access to the coun-
try’s binding executive agreements. 
The Case Act Reports database — the archived website briefly main-
tained by the U.S. government — included 88.49% of the agreements 
reported in the cover memos for the short period that the database was 
active.  Though it covered only eight years, the State Department Case 
Act Reports database contained almost as many agreements as TIAS 
during the period of our study (1989–2017): 1,507 of the cover memos 
match agreements in the Case Act Reports database.188  If we exclude 
2013, when it reported only seven agreements, it included 94.48% of the 
agreements reported in the cover memos from the period in which it was 
maintained.  Needless to say, the Case Act Reports database is more 
comprehensive than the TIAS database.  This suggests that it is feasible 
for the State Department to much more comprehensively provide agree-
ments to the public through an online website than it currently does — 
because it has done so in the recent past. 
HeinOnline is by far the most complete overall source for executive 
agreements, containing 82.93% of the agreements that were reported to  
Congress during the period of our FOIA request.  The HeinOnline data-
base is much more complete than the government-run databases of ex-
ecutive agreements.189  4,718 cover memos match agreements in the  
HeinOnline database.190  We found that there are 2,454 cover memos — 
or 43.14% of our dataset — that match agreements available only in 
HeinOnline.191  We reached out to HeinOnline to understand how it 
obtained so many more agreements than are available in government 
databases.  Its representative explained:  
[T]hrough a FOIA request Igor [Kavass] setup an arrangement for the State 
Department to send [HeinOnline] any agreements they were sending to  
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 188 1,507 cover memos match agreements in the Case Act Reports database.  There are 1,703 
cover memos for agreements that entered into force between 2006 and 2013 (the years the database 
was active).  Hence, the Case Act Reports database included 88.49% of the agreements reported in 
the cover memos during the period the database was active.  However, because the Case Act  
Reports database’s reporting of agreements may be delayed, this should be understood as an estimate.  
 189 Of the agreements in HeinOnline during this period, 2,871 had TIAS numbers and 3,756 had 
KAV numbers only.  In addition, HeinOnline cataloged 1,423 “record-only” agreements.  Of those 
agreements, 276 had TIAS numbers, and 1,147 had only KAV numbers.  However, due to renum-
bering by HeinOnline and because sometimes the text of an underlying agreement, but not an 
amendment, was on HeinOnline, these numbers should be viewed as estimates. 
 190 In total, 5,150 agreements in HeinOnline (including record-only agreements) corresponded to 
5,245 cover memos.  Of the 5,150 agreements, the text of the agreement was available for only 4,643 
agreements — or 90.16%.  One possible explanation for the gap between HeinOnline and TIAS is 
that Kavass may have defined agreements differently from the U.S. government — for example, 
treating political commitments as agreements.  But the size of the gap suggests that this is unlikely 
to explain its entirety. 
 191 Puzzlingly, we also found that, for our time period, HeinOnline had 2,871 agreements given 
TIAS numbers — more than the total number of agreements available in TIAS itself for the period 
(2,287).   
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Congress.  These agreements contained temporary State Department Num-
bers which we recorded in [HeinOnline’s] database.  This flow went on for 
years and ceased when the State Department [adopted] their new TIAS 
numbering systems [in 2016].192 
In other words, the United States government provided “any agree-
ments” that it was reporting to Congress to a researcher working on 
behalf of the subscription-based HeinOnline, but published only about 
a third of those in the government-run public database, TIAS.193   
Kavass also “spent a good deal of time identifying international agree-
ments that were in the National Archives that were never officially pub-
lished by the State Department.”194  As a result, a representative  
explained, HeinOnline “obtained a great number of agreement texts 
from the National Archive which were added to our database and our 
collection.”195 
Several current and former State Department lawyers responsible for 
maintaining the TIAS database told us that they consider HeinOnline’s 
databases to be more comprehensive and reliable than the government’s 
own TIAS database.  They also said that it is not uncommon for a law-
yer working on an agreement to have difficulty getting access to the 
most recent examples of similar agreements.  In other words, the execu-
tive branch department responsible for organizing agreements and keep-
ing the public and Congress informed about them cannot even keep it-
self organized and informed about them, and must instead rely on a 
private company.196  This is an obvious indication of a broken system. 
The FOIA litigation produced cover memos for 605 agreements that 
were not published in any database.  These 605 cover memos could not 
be matched to agreements in TIAS, the Case Act Reports database, or 
HeinOnline.  HeinOnline cataloged, but did not have the text of, 314 of 
these agreements.  Although these agreements are unclassified, it ap-
pears that we are providing the very first public indication of the exist-
ence of nearly 300 of them. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 192 Email from Daniel Rosati, Chief Res. Officer, William S. Hein & Co., Inc., to Oona Hathaway, 
Professor of L., Yale L. Sch. (YLS), & Lucie Olejnikova, Head of Foreign & Int’l L., Lillian  
Goldman L. Libr., YLS (Jan. 21, 2020, 12:16 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 193 See supra p. 668.  
 194 Email from Daniel Rosati to Oona Hathaway & Lucie Olejnikova, supra note 192. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Problems relating to the executive branch’s internal organization and record keeping with respect 
to international agreements are longstanding.  See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/NSIAD-00-24, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO TRACK AND ARCHIVE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 4 (1999), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228531.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8WU-H4Z7] 
(“The number of trade agreements to which the United States is currently a party is uncertain.  Officials 
at key agencies were unable to provide a definitive count of all U.S. trade agreements that are currently 
in force, despite the fact that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, State, and Commerce have 
created separate archives containing many agreements.”). 
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Figure 1 includes the number of agreements reported in each dataset 
each year.  The comparison makes clear that HeinOnline’s advantage over 
the other databases began to fall in the mid-2000s.  This is likely due to 
the fact that some of HeinOnline’s special access declined in the wake of 
Igor Kavass’s departure.  TIAS, the official government database of inter-
national agreements, underperforms throughout.  The Case Act Reports 
database, during the short period it was active, pretty well matches the 
cover memos.197  In sum, the official government database, TIAS, pub-
lishes only a fraction of the agreements reported to Congress — and it pub-
lishes far fewer agreements than are published by HeinOnline. 
 
Figure 1: Publication and Reporting  
of Executive Agreements198 
 
(b)  Reporting. — The data also offer insights into how well the ex-
ecutive branch has met its obligations to report executive agreements to 
Congress.  The State Department represented in U.S. district court that 
the cover memos it provided in response to our FOIA request represent 
a complete record of unclassified cover memos provided to Congress in 
the period from January 20, 1989, to January 20, 2017.  It is not, there-
fore, unreasonable to treat the cover memos as evidence of all of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 197 The failure to obtain a perfect match is likely due at least in part to differences in dating.  See 
supra note 185. 
 198 Our thanks to Aucher Serr and Natalie Erdem, of Two-N, for creating this data visualization.  
To examine how these data have changed over time through dynamic data visualizations, see Hath-
away et al., supra note 175. 
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unclassified agreements that the executive branch reported to Congress 
during this period.  If this inference is correct, then it appears likely that 
not all agreements were reported to Congress as legally required. 
Figure 1 makes clear that HeinOnline published many more agree-
ments in most years than the executive branch reported to Congress.  
Looking just at the cover memos, we see that, on average, there were 
about 200 each year.  The highest was in 2007, with 278 cover memos.  
The lowest was 1991, with fifty-eight cover memos.199  Comparing the 
three databases during the relevant time period, TIAS had an additional 
610 agreements for which we did not receive cover memos, the Case Act 
Reports database had an additional 161 agreements for which we did 
not receive cover memos, and HeinOnline had a whopping 2,027 agree-
ments for which we did not receive cover memos.200  That gap has 
closed in recent years not, it appears, because reporting to Congress has 
become more comprehensive but rather because HeinOnline’s access to 
nonpublic sources declined after Kavass’s departure. 
What’s more, many of the agreements for which the State  
Department did not produce cover memos are exceptionally important.  
Take, for example, the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United 
States and Afghanistan.  The agreement, which was concluded in 2014 
and entered into force in 2015, ensured that close to 10,000 U.S. troops 
would remain in Afghanistan to assist Afghan security forces in battling 
the Taliban.201  In addition, agreements dedicating between $40 million 
and $258 million in aid for a total of $851 million to the Afghan govern-
ment after the Taliban was pushed from power were not reported in  
the cover memos we received.202  Other striking examples include an  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 199 Figure 1 shows cover memos reported to Congress between January 20, 1989, and January 
20, 2017, by date the agreement entered into force (where not available, we used the last reported 
signature date).  We omitted 2017 because few agreements that entered into force in 2017 would 
have been reported before January 20, 2017.  This figure shows that the number of agreements 
peaked in 2007 and then fell off precipitously.  The reason for the falloff is unclear.  There are 
several possibilities: (1) the government may have concluded many fewer executive agreements; (2) 
the government may have concluded just as many agreements but failed to report a higher percent-
age of them; or (3) more agreements were concluded as nonbinding commitments and thus were not 
subject to reporting requirements.   
 200 HeinOnline had 2,945, if agreements identified as existing but that were missing the full text 
are included. 
 201 See Declan Walsh & Azam Ahmed, Mending Alliance, U.S. and Afghanistan Sign Long-Term 
Security Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1nFrIBq [https://perma.cc/AQ3M-
SL3X].  
 202 See Amendment No. Five to Strategic Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-U.S., Sept. 18, 2006, 
Hein’s No. KAV 7,765; Amendment No. Five to Strategic Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-U.S., 
Sept. 18, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,764; Amendment No. Four to Strategic Objective Grant  
Agreement, Afg.-U.S., June 28, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,696; Amendment No. Four to Strategic 
Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-U.S., June 28, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,695; Amendment No. Four 
to Strategic Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-U.S., June 28, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,694;  
Amendment No. Three to Strategic Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-U.S., May 11, 2006, Hein’s 
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agreement that provides for cooperation with Russia on peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, a Joint Declaration on Security Alliance with Japan, a 
multilateral Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodian Conflict, an agreement giving $150 million in aid to the  
Palestinian Authority, an agreement to heighten border security on the 
U.S.-Canada border, a 269-page free trade agreement between the 
United States and Australia, and an agreement creating a multilateral 
F/A-18 weapons program.203  In short, they are not trivial commitments. 
What explains this gap between agreements published by  
HeinOnline and those for which we received cover memos in response 
to our FOIA litigation?  There are several possibilities.  First, it is pos-
sible that there is a gap between what is available in HeinOnline and 
what is reported to Congress due to coordination issues within the exec-
utive branch — in particular that the State Department is not always 
notified about agreements being concluded by other departments or 
agencies, despite statutory and regulatory provisions mandating such 
notice.  We know, for example, that agreements are concluded by the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) using a process 
that USTR has treated as an alternative to the Case Act.204  Those agree-
ments would not necessarily appear among those reported to Congress.205 
To test this possibility, we examined whether the percentage of agree-
ments missing cover memos varied across subject areas.  We found that 
it did.  For example, forty-five percent of finance, trade, and investment 
agreements did not have cover memos.  This suggests that at least part 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
No. KAV 7,653; Amendment No. Two to Strategic Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-U.S., Apr. 6, 
2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,607; Amendment No. Two to Strategic Objective Grant Agreement, Afg.-
U.S., Apr. 6, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,606; Amendment No. Two to Strategic Objective Grant  
Agreement, Afg.-U.S., Apr. 6, 2006, Hein’s No. KAV 7,605. 
 203 Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Russ.-U.S., May 
6, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 11-111; Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, Japan-
U.S., Apr. 17, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1002; Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, Hein’s No. KAV 3,073; Cash Transfer Grant Agreement,  
Palestine-U.S., Oct. 10, 2008, Hein’s No. KAV 8,532; Agreement for Cooperation in Science and 
Technology for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security, Can.-U.S., June 1, 2004, 
T.I.A.S. No. 04-601; Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., May 18, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 6,422; 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Cooperative Framework for the F/A-18 Program, 
Aug. 23–Sept. 23, 2005, Hein’s No. KAV 7,426.  
 204 19 U.S.C. § 1872 establishes an interagency trade organization that includes the Secretary of State 
and can “perform such other functions with respect to the trade agreements program as the President 
may from time to time designate.”  19 U.S.C § 1872(b)(4); see id. § 1872(a)(3)(C).  According to inter-
views, attorneys at USTR have taken the position that agreements approved through this process could 
bypass the C-175 requirements, though State Department lawyers have disagreed, arguing that the 
§ 1872 interagency organization does not have explicit authority to approve proposed international 
agreements.  It is possible that other agencies or interagency committees may be using their own statu-
tory authorizations to conclude agreements without properly reporting them to State. 
 205 For an outstanding, extensive examination of executive agreements in the trade area, see 
Kathleen Claussen, Trade Executive Agreements (Sept. 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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of the explanation is the conclusion of trade agreements outside the Case 
Act process.  But trade accounted for only 530 of the 2,361 agreements 
that did not have cover memos, or about twenty-two percent. 
 
Table 3: Agreements by Subject Area206 
 









Defense 1,991 342 17% 
Finance, Trade,  
and Investment 1,166 530 45% 
Humanitarian 731 123 17% 
Science, Space,  
and Technology 728 177 24% 
Environment,  
Conservation, and Energy 723 227 31% 
Law Enforcement 624 305 49% 
Transportation  
and Aviation 513 119 23% 
Nonproliferation 353 80 23% 
Miscellaneous 294 92 31% 
Educational Exchanges 
and Cultural Cooperation 235 59 25% 
Taxation 250 106 42% 
Maritime 182 67 37% 
Diplomacy and  
Consular Affairs 186 60 32% 
Total207 8,050 2,361 29% 
 
Second, it is possible that the State Department did report the agree-
ments to Congress and made a genuine effort to locate information re-
sponsive to the FOIA request but failed to locate much of the relevant 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 206 For more data on the topics addressed by executive agreements and how they interact with other 
features of agreements, view the dynamic data visualizations in Hathaway et al., supra note 175. 
 207 There are seventy-seven agreements with no identified subject area that are therefore not reflected 
in the table, except for in the totals.  One hundred percent of those agreements have no cover memo.  
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material due to poor record keeping.  There is significant evidence for 
this explanation as well.  We have learned that many of the examples 
cited above were “misfiled” (the Bilateral Security Agreement between 
the United States and Afghanistan); were reported with the wrong cover 
memo (the F/A-18 weapons program agreement); fell into “known gaps” 
in department records of background statements believed to have been 
submitted; or were later discovered during a physical move of the offices 
(the Afghanistan assistance agreements).208  In addition, some of the 
agreements apparently were submitted to Congress prior to entering into 
force and under practice at the time did not include background state-
ments (the Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement and Australia free 
trade agreement apparently fall into this category). 
Third, it may be that HeinOnline’s database includes agreements 
that need not be reported under the Case Act.  In particular, some of the 
agreements in HeinOnline for which we do not have a cover memo may 
be Article II treaties.209  But given that there are at most a few hundred 
Article II treaties and over 2,300 agreements without cover memos dur-
ing the period under examination, that leaves a large number of execu-
tive agreements reported in HeinOnline for which there are no cover 
memos.  These agreements might be “nonbinding,”210 so minor as to not 
qualify as international agreements according to the State  
Department,211 or implementing agreements that closely correspond to 
the terms of the underlying agreements.212  Indeed, the Joint Declaration 
on the Security Alliance with Japan cited above is apparently regarded 
by the Department of State as a nonbinding instrument and therefore 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 208 Email from Current U.S. Government Lawyer to Curtis Bradley (Sept. 16, 2020). 
 209 Table 3 offers some support for this hypothesis because  “Taxation” and “Law Enforcement” 
are both areas where Article II treaties are common.  The underreporting hypothesis is further 
supported, however, by additional evidence: As mentioned earlier, TIAS had 610 agreements that 
did not match the cover memos.  A significant number of these were binding agreements effective 
upon signature or shortly after — hence not Article II treaties.  That remaining gap indicates either 
that the State Department published some agreements that it failed to report to Congress or that its 
record keeping was poor, and it failed to provide cover memos to us for all of the agreements that 
it did report.  The former may be correct because only twenty-two of the 610 agreements that were 
in TIAS but not in our cover memos appeared in the State Department Case Act Report Database. 
 210 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(1) (2019) (“[In order for an instrument to be an international agree-
ment for the purposes of the Case Act,] [t]he parties must intend their undertaking to be legally 
binding, and not merely of political or personal effect.  Documents intended to have political or 
moral weight, but not intended to be legally binding, are not international agreements.”).  
 211 See id. § 181.2(a)(2) (providing that “[m]inor or trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal 
language and form, are not considered international agreements within the meaning of the [Case] 
Act”).   
 212 See id. § 181.2(c) (“An implementing agreement, if it satisfies the criteria discussed in para-
graph (a) of this section, may be an international agreement, depending upon how precisely it is 
anticipated and identified in the underlying agreement it is designed to implement.  If the terms of 
the implementing agreement are closely anticipated and identified in the underlying agreement, 
only the underlying agreement is considered and [sic] international agreement.”).   
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not subject to Case Act reporting.  But, again, the number of agreements 
involved — in the thousands — far exceeds what would be expected if 
this were the explanation. 
 To test this last possibility — that HeinOnline includes agreements 
that are not subject to Case Act reporting — we generated a random 
sample of the unreported agreements.213  We found that twenty percent 
were Article II Senate-ratified treaties, nine percent were nonbinding,214 
and two percent were implementing agreements that might qualify for 
the exception.  We could not easily discern whether agreements were 
“minor or trivial” such that they are not reportable agreements within 
the meaning of the Case Act.  None of them identified themselves in this 
way, of course, and most looked much like other executive agreements.  
In our judgment, about twenty percent of the agreements might qualify 
for this exception, but our identification of such agreements was made 
with a low level of confidence, given the absence of any clear public 
criteria.  Our conclusion is that while these exceptions might justify 
some portion of the unreported agreements (perhaps as much as fifty 
percent, depending on how generously the “minor or trivial” exception 
is interpreted), well over a thousand apparently unreported agreements 
should have been reported. 
In sum, the data suggest that either there has been systematic and 
consistent underreporting to Congress during much of the past three 
decades or the State Department incorrectly certified that its FOIA pro-
duction was complete.  The mismatch between what is available on 
HeinOnline and what the State Department disclosed in response to our 
FOIA litigation raises serious questions about whether the executive 
branch properly observes its reporting obligations.  
Using the Case Act Reports database, we are also able to examine how 
well the State Department meets the obligation to report agreements in a 
timely manner.  As explained in Part I, the Case Act requires that executive 
agreements be reported within sixty days after the agreement enters into 
effect.215  To determine how well that rule has been observed, we ana-
lyzed the State Department’s own (now defunct) Case Act Reports data-
base, which includes notations of when reports were submitted to Con-
gress late.  Based on that analysis, in the period from 2006–2013, about 
forty percent of the agreements included notations that they had been re-
ported late.  The government agencies most often blamed were the State 
Department (290 of 643 late-reported agreements), the Department of 
Defense (DOD) (142), the U.S. Agency for International Development 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 213 The sample included ninety-two agreements of the 2,027 for which HeinOnline had an agree-
ment for which there was no cover memo and where the underlying text of the agreement was 
available to be examined (HeinOnline lists a number of agreements for which it does not have the 
underlying text). 
 214 We were guided here by Guidance on Non-binding Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/guidance/index.htm [https://perma.cc/FT6V-U6DX]. 
 215 See 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a); supra section I.B.2, pp. 648–51. 
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(69), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (27), the FAA (26), USTR (26), 
and NASA (20). 
As the above account makes clear, after comparing the agreements 
reported to Congress with the agreements published to the public, we 
found both lacking.  A large majority of executive agreements are never 
published, and many of them are not even reported to Congress.   
Moreover, the congressional reporting, when it does occur, is frequently 
late. 
2.  Legal Bases for Reported Agreements. — Next, we turn to the 
project of examining the legal bases for the agreements.  Each cover 
memo includes a crucial section, “legal authority,” that provides citations 
to the law on which the agreement is based.  This information has not 
previously been available to scholars.  Indeed, when in previous articles 
we wrote about executive agreements and attempted to determine the 
legal basis for an agreement, the only way to do so was to work back-
ward: we had to examine the agreement and then try to determine what 
law, if any, might provide authority to conclude it.216  For the first time, 
the information in the cover memos offers direct and extensive access to 
the legal authorities under which the agreements were, in fact, con-
cluded.  Here we describe the types of authorities cited and assess the 
strength of the legal justifications the government relies upon when it 
reports executive agreements to Congress. 
(a)  Cited Authorities. — There are several different types of legal 
citations in the legal authority section of the cover memos.  Here we 
break the authorities into two broad categories: citations to the U.S. 
Constitution and citations to nonconstitutional sources. 
(i) Citations to the U.S. Constitution. — Among the cover memos, 
3,915 cite the U.S. Constitution.  That is sixty-nine percent of all cover 
memos.  If these citations are meaningful, an assumption we question 
below, then the State Department relies on the Constitution as at least 
part of the authority for the majority of executive agreements.  Just 374 
cover memos cite only the Constitution.  If the executive branch’s as-
sessment of the legal bases of agreements is accurate (once again an as-
sumption we question below), approximately seven percent of the agree-
ments during this period were what would traditionally be considered 
sole executive agreements. 
(ii)  Citations to Authorities Other than the U.S. Constitution. — 
There are over 8,700 total citations to authorities other than the  
Constitution.  There is an average of 1.55 nonconstitutional authorities 
cited per cover memo.  A majority of the cover memos (3,295) cite only 
one nonconstitutional authority, but a large minority cite more than one.  
The most authorities cited in a cover memo is thirteen. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 216 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1250; Hathaway, supra note 8, at 245–46.  The 
former article examined one of these cover memos, concerning the Paris Agreement, which the 
authors obtained through informal means.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1250. 
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There is an immense amount of variation in how the legal authorities 
are cited.  The same legal authority often is cited in numerous different 
ways within the same cover memo and among different cover memos — 
for example, by statute name and section, statute number, or U.S. Code 
designation.217  Altogether, there are about 1,000 unique authorities 
cited in the cover memos. 
Citations to Prior Agreements.  A minority of cover memos cite prior 
agreements.  The vast majority of agreements cited are prior Article II 
treaties, but there are a handful of citations to congressional-executive 
agreements and even a few to sole executive agreements.  There are 119 
unique international agreements cited. 
Citations to Executive Branch Documents and Authorities.  The 
cover memos cite thirty-three different executive branch internal docu-
ments and authorities.  For example, an Attorney General opinion is 
cited in fifty-four cover memos, and the Circular 175 authority is cited 
in thirty.218 
Citations to Statutes.  The overwhelming majority of the nearly 
1,000 unique authorities cited are statutes.  The ten most cited statutes 
are as follows219: 
 
• The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
• The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 
• The Arms Export Control Act 
• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Mutual  
Support Act of 1979 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 217 For example, one of the most cited acts, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is cited in seventy-
four different ways, including “The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,” “Section 237(a) 
of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC 2197(a),” “Section 505(a) of The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,” “Section 635(g) of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, 22 USC 2395(g),” “Sections 503, 505, and 541 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended,” “Section 505 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,” “Section 515 of The 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,” “Section 481(a)(2) of The Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961, as amended,” “Section 505 of The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 USC 2314,” 
and “Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 75 Stat 424.”  To determine whether an authority 
is the “same” even if cited in a different format, we considered whether it refers to the same provi-
sion(s) of the legal authority.  So a citation to an entire act would be treated differently from a 
citation to a single provision of that act.  Similarly, a citation to two different provisions of a single 
act would be treated as two separate citations.  We treated as the same citations to an act and an 
act “as amended.” 
 218 It is important to note that we judged only the authority actually cited in the cover memos.  
It is entirely possible that there are cover memos that cite weak authorities but for which there may 
be a stronger available authority that is not cited. 
 219 There are also a number of statutes that are frequently cited, but which change on a regular 
basis, often every year.  These include the National Defense Authorization Act; the Universal Postal 
Convention; the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act; 
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act; dire emergency or miscellaneous appropriations; 
and the Internal Revenue Code. 
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• The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 
• The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
• The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1960 
• The Agricultural Act of 1956 
• The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 
• The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
 
(b)  Quality of Cited Authority. — Working with our team of re-
search assistants over the course of two years, we read and analyzed the 
thousands of nonconstitutional legal authorities cited to determine 
whether the authorities cited in each memo could reasonably provide 
the legal basis for negotiating and concluding the corresponding binding 
executive agreement.220  Our aim was to determine how strong the cited 
legal basis was for each agreement — how often did a cover memo cite 
a legal authority that gave express authority to conclude the agreement 
to which it was attached, and how often was the authority weaker? 
We categorized each of the authorities as falling into one of five cat-
egories, detailed below.  Only cited authorities in the first category give 
explicit authority to the President to conclude an executive agreement.  
The cited authorities that fall into the second, third, and fourth catego-
ries all approve some form of international negotiation or cooperation 
by the President, but Congress has not made clear in them that it intends 
to authorize the President to enter into or conclude a binding commit-
ment.  Those in the fifth category provide no arguable authority to con-
clude executive agreements.221  More specifically, the five-point scale is 
as follows: 
1: Express authorization to conclude agreements.  Cited authorities 
with this code give clear authority to enter into an agreement, which 
may also be referred to as a convention, treaty, amendment, memoran-
dum of understanding, or arrangement.  With 524 citations, the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is the most commonly cited statute 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 220 Katrin Marquez, Danielle Zucker, Sasha Dudding (all YLS ’20), and Pardis Gheibi (YLS ’19) 
coded each authority according to a five-point scale.  They also provided valuable insights into the 
cited authorities.  The research team met with Oona Hathaway regularly over the course of nearly 
two years and went over the coding decisions as a group to ensure consistency throughout the 
coding process.  A second team of four Yale undergraduates — Ariq Hatibie, Sam Larkin, Kate 
Pundyk, and Tiana Wang — assisted in final data preparation, as did YLS student Ayoub Ouederni 
’21 — who also assisted in database comparisons and analytics.  A final group of research assis-
tants — Natalie Giotta, Tobias Kuehne, Jared LeBrun, Preston Lim, Randi Michel, and Nicole 
Ng — helped fill in additional information. 
 221 If a cited authority fell into more than one category, it was rated according to the highest 
category.  (So, if a statute granted both express authority to conclude agreements and to negotiate 
agreements, it was coded 1.)   
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coded 1.222  This does not come as a surprise.  One of the authors of this 
Article noted in an earlier work on executive agreements that the  
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes commitments in a range of 
different subject matter areas and helped drive the emergence of execu-
tive agreements as the key way in which international agreements are 
made by the United States.223  But what the earlier work could not an-
ticipate is that the citations are frequently to the Act as a whole — rather 
than to its particular sections.  This is radically imprecise.  The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 is, in its most recent amended form, 285 pages 
long.224  In those 285 pages, there is a wide array of grants of authority 
to conclude agreements on specific topics.  Yet the entire Act is cited in 
cover memos for agreements on everything from providing radar data, 
to strengthening good governance in Afghanistan, to strengthening 
South Africa’s health care system, to supporting reconstruction in  
Honduras after Hurricane Mitch. 
2: Authorization to negotiate agreements.  Cited authorities with this 
code grant authority to negotiate an agreement but do not expressly con-
fer authority to conclude an agreement.  Whether the grant of authority 
to negotiate necessarily entails authority to conclude is an unresolved 
question.  As a result, we determined that authority to negotiate and 
authority to conclude or enter a binding agreement were different 
enough that they should be coded separately.225  Only cited authorities 
that create new negotiating authority were coded 2. 
With 239 citations, 22 U.S.C. § 2656d226 is the most cited authority 
coded 2.  It provides: 
In order to implement the policies set forth in section 2656b of this title, the 
Secretary of State . . . shall have primary responsibility for coordination and 
oversight with respect to all major science or science and technology agree-
ments and activities between the United States and foreign countries, inter-
national organizations, or commissions of which the United States and one 
or more foreign countries are members.227  
The statute proceeds to confer additional related authority.  Section 
2656b, meanwhile, states: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 222 The Foreign Assistance Act is cited in many alternative forms.  See supra note 217.  Those 
multiple alternative forms are included in the data posted on Dataverse. 
 223 See Hathaway, supra note 8, at 159, 161–63, 188–91. 
 224 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (2019), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH8P-SQW8].  
 225 Given the information learned in interviews above, it is possible that some of the citations to 
statutes that provide for negotiation are due to the fact that some of the C-175 memos are prepared 
for both negotiation and conclusion.  It would be reasonable for such a memo to cite negotiating 
authority, even if that authority would not support concluding the agreement.   
 226 Here, we included references to “22 U.S.C. 2656(d),” because there is no 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d), 
and therefore, we concluded that such references were simply mistaken references to § 2656d. 
 227 22 U.S.C. § 2656d(a)(1). 
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[T]he Congress declares the following to be the policy of the United 
States: . . . The mutually beneficial applications of technology in bilateral 
and multilateral agreements and activities involving the United States and 
foreign countries or international organizations should be recognized and 
supported as an important element of United States foreign policy.228 
Although the scope of authority granted by this language is debatable, 
we concluded that these provisions, taken together, provide authority to 
negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements on science or science and 
technology but do not provide sufficiently explicit authority to conclude 
an agreement to be coded 1. 
3: Authorization to furnish assistance (supplies, services, loans, etc.) 
to foreign countries or authority to make purchases or enter into other 
economic arrangements.  This category includes the authority to spend, 
furnish financial assistance, enter into contracts, or otherwise engage in 
commerce with foreign actors.  It further includes authorizations to give 
money to or receive money from other nations,229 to make transfers of 
property to other countries (for example, transfers of forfeited prop-
erty),230 to receive support and assistance (not just give it), and to ac-
quire “logistic support, supplies, and services.”231  The idea here is that, 
by authorizing these interactions, Congress may also be authorizing the 
conclusion of binding agreements to facilitate them.  Importantly, if the 
cited authority allows the executive branch to spend, furnish financial 
assistance, enter into contracts, or otherwise engage in commerce but 
does not reference any foreign actors or indicate that the authorization 
contemplates international transfers, then we coded it as a 5, rather than 
a 3. 
10 U.S.C. § 2559, which is cited eighty times, is the most cited statute 
coded 3.  It mandates that “whenever the Secretary of Defense provides 
medical care in the United States on an inpatient basis to foreign mili-
tary and diplomatic personnel or their dependents, the Secretary shall 
require that the United States be reimbursed for the costs of providing 
such care.”232  It also allows for reciprocal provision of medical care to 
military personnel and their dependents from a foreign country if the 
other nation provides comparable care to “a comparable number of U.S. 
military personnel and their dependents in that foreign country.”233 
4: Authorization to engage in international cooperation with foreign 
countries or establish a “program” with foreign countries (for example, 
for exchange of information).  This may include authority to create a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 228 Id. § 2656b(2). 
 229 See, e.g., id. § 2151a. 
 230 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(E). 
 231 10 U.S.C. § 2341(2). 
 232 Id. § 2559(a). 
 233 Id. § 2559(b). 
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new international program, engage in international cooperation, or ex-
change information.  Again, the idea here is that such an authorization 
might implicitly also convey some authority to conclude facilitating 
agreements.  The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993,234 cited 
202 times, is the most cited authority coded 4.  It authorizes “the  
President [to] conduct programs . . . to assist . . . states of the former 
Soviet Union in [their] demilitarization.”235  In particular, “[t]he  
President is authorized to designate a Demilitarization Enterprise 
Fund . . . to receive grants . . . and use the grant proceeds to provide 
financial support . . . for demilitarization of industries and conversion of 
military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities.”236  This 
language clearly contemplates a program of cooperation but does not 
expressly grant authority to conclude an agreement. 
5: No arguable delegation of agreement-making authority.  This cat-
egory includes statutes that establish new agencies, such as the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or Department of Homeland Security; delegate 
existing authority to negotiate to particular actors — for example, the 
Secretary of State; describe duties of an officer more generally (without 
more); authorize the issuance of regulations (without more); contain 
mere definitions; or grant authority to conclude an “agreement” without 
any explicit or obvious implicit reference to any international or global 
context.237  If a statute confers authority to spend, furnish financial as-
sistance, enter into contracts, or otherwise engage in commerce but in-
cludes no reference to any foreign actors or indication that the authori-
zation contemplates international transfers, then it was coded 5; if there 
were references to international or foreign actors, it was coded 3.  If the 
cited authority delegates or refers to authority that is granted elsewhere 
but does not itself grant authority, then it was coded 5. 
22 U.S.C. § 2656, which is cited 571 times, is the most frequently 
cited authority coded 5.  It merely provides: 
The Secretary of State shall perform such duties as shall from time to time 
be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President relative to correspond-
ences, commissions, or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls 
from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign 
states or princes, or to memorials or other applications from foreign public 
ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting foreign 
affairs as the President of the United States shall assign to the Department, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 234 22 U.S.C. §§ 5951–5958. 
 235 Id. § 5952(a). 
 236 Id. § 5953. 
 237 We include here citations to statutes or other authorities that appear in the cover memos but 
do not appear to refer to real legal authorities.  Some of these are likely typos.  If a citation is to an 
authority we believed exists but we could not locate, we coded it as N/A.  There are only three of 
these, and they are all executive agreements that appear to have not been published. 
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and he shall conduct the business of the Department in such manner as the 
President shall direct.238  
In other words, the statute describes the position of Secretary of State 
but grants no new authority relating to agreements.  Subsequent statu-
tory provisions (including 22 U.S.C. § 2656d, described above) may pro-
vide authority to conclude agreements, but this provision alone offers 
none. 
The percentage of authorities coded at each level — 1 through 5 — 
is reflected in Figure 2 below.  A plurality (37.5%) of cited authorities 
were coded 5 — that is, they provide no arguable delegation of agreement- 
making authority.  Weighing them by the frequency with which they 
were cited, the percentage of cited authorities coded 5 falls slightly to 
thirty-four percent, and the percentage of authorities coded 1 jumps 
from twenty-eight percent to thirty-four percent. 
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(c)  Assessing Strength of Legal Authority for Each Agreement. —  
Using the ratings of each authority, we then assigned an overall rating to 
each cover memo based on the citation with the highest rating.  Of the 5,689 
cover memos we received, we found that 2,521 (44.31%) rely on a legal au-
thority with the highest code of 1 (express authority to enter an agreement), 
1,799 (31.62%) rely on an authority coded 2–4 (something less than express 
authority), and 983 (17.28%) rely on authorities with the highest code of 5 
(no authority).  Of those that cite only an authority coded 5, 74.77% also cite 
Article II of the Constitution, a slightly higher percentage than the rate in 
the cover memos overall (68.82%).  Twelve memos cite no legal authority 
whatsoever (0.21%), and 374 cite only the Constitution (6.57%). 
It is worth emphasizing that the most important distinctions for our pur-
poses are between agreements in category 1, agreements in categories 2–4, 
and agreements in category 5.  Those in category 1 are easiest to defend as 
based on express authority, those in category 5 are the hardest to defend, 
and those in the middle categories are debatable.  We ranked category 2 
above 3 or 4 because authorities with this coding usually contemplate future 
agreements, even though they do not expressly authorize them.  3s come 
next because they entail dedication of assistance to foreign countries, and 
that assistance is typically subject to conditions established in international 
agreements.  Those involved in negotiating these agreements tell us that it 
can be difficult to effectively impose the conditions Congress establishes in 
any other way.  There is also a long history dating back to the Foreign  
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4s indicate a general intent of Congress to encourage international cooper-
ation but involve no direct connection to executive agreements.  But others 
might rank agreements in these middle categories differently.239 
 
Table 4: Legal Authorities Cited in Cover Memos 
 
Highest Code Number of Cover Memos 
Percentage of Cover 
Memos 
1 2,521 44.31% 
2 411 7.22% 
3 695 12.22% 
4 693 12.18% 
5 983 17.28% 
Constitution Only 374 6.57% 
No Authority 12 0.21% 
 
Looking at the total number of citations overall to each type of au-
thority over time, as displayed in Figure 3, we see that they have been 
fairly consistent.  
 


















 239 All underlying data will be made public on Dataverse, allowing those who would rank these 
differently to test how that would change the results.  See Hathaway et al., supra note 175 (provid-
ing dynamic data visualizations and access to underlying data through Dataverse). 
 240 Our thanks to Aucher Serr and Natalie Erdem, of Two-N, for creating this data visualization.  
To examine how the legal authorities the government relies on for executive agreements have 
changed over time, view the dynamic data visualizations in Hathaway et al., supra note 175. 
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It is also worth noting that these numbers are stacked in favor of 
finding authority to enter agreements.  That is because we assess only 
whether the cited authority provides express authority to enter into any 
international agreement.  For the purposes of the figures above, we do 
not assess whether the authority in fact provides express authority to 
enter into the agreement for which it is cited.  Doing so is extremely time 
intensive, requiring a careful assessment of whether a cited legal author-
ity authorizes the actions to which the United States commits in a par-
ticular agreement — which may be lengthy and contain many different 
obligations.  It also requires access to the text of the underlying agree-
ment, which is not always available. 
We did conduct this deeper analysis for a statistically significant 
sample of agreements that cite at least one authority in category 1 to see, 
for each agreement, if the cited authority in fact expressly authorizes the 
executive branch to conclude that particular agreement.241  We found 
that for seventy-six percent of agreements that cite at least one authority 
coded 1, the authority coded 1 authorizes the executive branch to con-
clude the particular agreement for which it is cited.  Among the roughly 
twenty-four percent of agreements where a cited authority coded 1 does 
not authorize the executive branch to conclude the particular agreement, 
the authority falls into one of several categories: (1) The cited authority 
does not support the agreement for which it is cited, but there is another 
cited authority that does provide express support.242  (2) A cited statute 
had been repealed at the time it was cited.  The impact was de minimis, 
however, because the statute repealing the authority provides for the 
same authorizations in another section of the statute that is not cited.243  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 241 We analyzed a random sample of ninety-three agreements out of 2,521 that cite at least one 
statute coded 1, allowing us to calculate a ninety-five percent confidence interval with a ten percent 
margin of error.  A team of research assistants led by Nicole Ng then read the agreements and 
assessed whether the cited statutes coded 1 in fact provided support for the agreements for which 
they were cited.  If not, they noted the reasons for the discrepancy. 
 242 Fifty-nine percent of the agreements for which a cited authority coded 1 does not provide 
express support for the agreement fell into this category (or fourteen percent of agreements overall 
in the sample).  For example, the cover memo for the Agreement Concerning the Establishment of 
a Tropical Forest Conservation Fund and a Tropical Forest Conservation Board, Bots.-U.S., Oct. 
5, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1119, cites two statutes coded 1: the Tropical Forest and Coral Reef  
Conservation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2431, 2431a–2431k, and a section of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2430g.  The second does not support the agreement because it only author-
izes agreements concluded with Latin American or Caribbean countries and thus excludes  
Botswana.  See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2430b(a), 2430g.  But the agreement meets the requirements for con-
servation agreements expressly authorized by the Tropical Forest Conservation Act.  See id. 
§ 2431c(a). 
 243 The three agreements in this category all cite the same repealed statute.  For example, the 
cover memo for the Agreement Relating to the Employment of Dependents of Official Government 
Employees, U.S.-Uru., June 26–July 14, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 08-714.1, concluded with Uruguay, cites 
section 401(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 
§ 401(a), 92 Stat. 963, 977 (1978), which was repealed in relevant part in October 1980 by the  
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(3) The cited authority does not provide express authority, but it pro-
vides some lesser authority for the agreement.244  (4) The cited authority 
provides no authority for the agreement at all.245  There were only three 
agreements that fell into this last category.  Hence, overall, our analysis 
of this sample suggests that the technique we adopted — of assessing 
the cited authorities independent of the agreements — may be slightly 
generous to the government but does not lead to wildly different results 
than had we engaged in agreement-by-agreement analysis of all of the 
cited authorities. 
There is, moreover, variation across subject areas in terms of the 
strength of the authorities cited in the cover memos.  As we can see from 
Table 5, some areas (for example, Diplomacy and Consular Affairs and 
Humanitarian Aid) usually rely on express authority, and some areas 
(for example, Transportation and Aviation and Law Enforcement) rely 




Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94 Stat. 2071 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 and 22 U.S.C.); see id. § 2205(2), 94 Stat. at 2160.  However, the 1980 Act provides in 
another section for the same authorization that supports concluding the agreement.  See id. 
§ 2201(a), 94 Stat. at 2154 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2699(a)).  The cover memo for the agreement does 
not cite that new provision. 
 244 For example, the cover memo for the Agreement Relating to the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, Supplementing the Investment Incentive and Financial Agreement of December 16, 
1992, Peru-U.S., May 20, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 12,542, cites “sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Export-Import 
Act of 1945, as amended (12 U.S.C. 635).”  The cited provisions contain a narrow express authori-
zation to enter into international agreements, but that authorization is unrelated to the subject of 
this particular agreement.  See 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(A) (authorizing “international agreements to 
reduce government subsidized export financing”).  However, the cited authority does support a 
coding of 3 for this agreement, because the law directs the Export-Import Bank to provide guaran-
tees and insurance to finance exports of goods and services, which the agreement seeks to facilitate.  
See id. 
 245 Three agreements fell into this category.  The Agreement Regarding the Assignment of  
Foreign Liaison Officers, Arg.-U.S., Feb. 7–Apr. 17, 2007, Hein’s No. KAV 8,037, relies on 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2347c.  That statute does not support this agreement because the statute provides for the attend-
ance of foreign military personnel at professional military education institutions or flight training 
schools in the United States and only authorizes agreements for programs at “training locations in 
Southwest Asia.”  Id. § 2347c(c)(1).  The cover memo for the Agreement Regarding the Prepayment 
of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured by the United States Government and Its 
Agencies, Peru-U.S., Sept. 25, 2007, Hein’s No. KAV 8,275, cites the Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, and 12 U.S.C. § 635i-8.  Both statutes authorize debt relief but only 
for countries eligible to borrow from the International Development Association, which Peru is not.  
See Act of Nov. 29, 1999, § 557(b)(3), 113 Stat. at 1501A-101; 12 U.S.C. § 635i-8(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Finally, 
the cover memo for the Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Personnel Who May Be 
Temporarily Present in Uruguay, U.S.-Uru., Feb. 13–23, 2007, Hein’s No. KAV 8,006, cites 10 
U.S.C. § 168.  That statute authorizes military-to-military contacts and international defense per-
sonnel exchanges to encourage a democratic orientation of foreign militaries, but the agreement 
provides for privileges and immunities to be granted to U.S. military and civilian personnel tempo-
rarily present in Uruguay for an upcoming presidential visit.  See id.; Agreement Regarding the 
Status of United States Personnel Who May Be Temporarily Present in Uruguay, supra. 
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Table 5: Legal Authorities Across Subject Areas 
 
 





































































































































































































In sum, we arrived at a number of conclusions about the executive 
agreements in our dataset: 
The executive branch cites an authority that provides express per-
mission to enter international agreements less than half of the time that it  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 246 The totals listed here include a small number of agreements that cite no authority. 
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enters into executive agreements.  The data show that just under half of 
the cover memos (44.31%) cite at least one authority coded 1. 
When it does not have express authority, the executive branch is of-
ten able to cite some source of authority (to negotiate, offer assistance, 
or cooperate).  This finding is consistent with the interviews, which sug-
gested that it is common for executive branch officials to rely on legal 
authorities that do not expressly authorize them to enter into a binding 
international agreement as long as they provide some suggestion that 
Congress contemplated international cooperation.247 
In 17.28% of cases, the authority cited by the executive branch does 
not plausibly provide any authority to enter into an international agree-
ment.  About seventeen percent of the cover memos fail to cite an au-
thority coded higher than a 5.  It should be noted, however, that seventy-
five percent of this subset also cite Article II of the Constitution.  It is 
possible, then, that some and perhaps many of these agreements are 
properly considered sole executive agreements, even though they pur-
port to rely not only on the Constitution but also on some other author-
ity248 as well.  If one adds up the categories where the government relies 
exclusively on the Constitution and those where it relies on extremely 
weak statutory authority, they sum to 23.85%.  Whether these are 
properly sole executive agreements depends on whether they can rest on 
the President’s constitutional authority alone.  We are not able to eval-
uate that question here, although it is worth noting that this percentage 
far exceeds most estimates of the percentage of sole executive agreements, 
and the executive branch does not appear to be representing them as such. 
Of the 245 agreements that rely solely on a statutory or other author-
ity coded 5, without reference to Article II, many follow the same basic 
formats.  One hundred thirty-nine of the 245 agreements (57%) follow 
one of three boilerplate templates249: (1) an investment incentive  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 247 See supra p. 664.  We did not examine whether citations to something less than express stat-
utory authority to conclude agreements are commonly coupled with underlying domestic authority 
for the President to act in the substantive areas covered by the agreements.  Further exploring how 
this process works in particular substantive areas would be a valuable project for follow-on  
research. 
 248 We occasionally use the term “statutory authority” as shorthand to refer generally to noncon-
stitutional authorities cited in the cover memos, which, as noted above, may include prior interna-
tional agreements and executive branch documents and authorities.  See supra p. 678.  
 249 While many of the agreements that cite only an authority coded 5 consist of these boilerplate 
templates, not all agreements using these templates reference the same authority, and thus not all 
agreements were coded the same way.  For example, TIAS No. 12,552 follows the U.S. Geological 
Survey template but also cites a statute coded 2.  Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation 
in Geoscience, Russ.-U.S., at 2, June 23, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 12,552.  Similarly, KAV 7,360 follows 
the debt restructuring template but references a statute coded 3.  Agreement Regarding the  
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agreement;250 (2) a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Geo-
logical Survey;251 or (3) an agreement on debt consolidation, reschedul-
ing, and refinancing.252  Looking at the subject matter of the agree-
ments, 206 of the 245 agreements (84%) are categorized as “finance, 
trade, and investment” (101); “defense” (47); or “science, space, and tech-
nology” (58).  Interestingly, the agreements citing weak statutory author-
ities that do not also reference Article II almost entirely end in 2005.253  
This does not hold if agreements that also cite Article II are included; 
they extend through the end of the dataset and include a substantial num-
ber of “transportation and aviation” and “law enforcement” agreements.254 
* * * 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured by the 
United States Government and Its Agencies, Congo-U.S., July 8, 2005, Hein’s No. KAV 7,360.  
 250 There are sixty-three total agreements following this template.  See, e.g., Investment Incentive 
Agreement, Egypt-U.S., July 1, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,051; Investment Incentive Agreement, Kenya-
U.S., Dec. 3, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 13,008; Investment Incentive Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., July 30, 1998, 
T.I.A.S. No. 12,980; Investment Incentive Agreement, Pak.-U.S., Nov. 18, 1997, T.I.A.S. No. 12,903; 
Investment Incentive Agreement, Para.-U.S., Sept. 24, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12,478; Investment  
Incentive Agreement, Geor.-U.S., June 27, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12,463. 
 251 There are forty-three total agreements following this template.  See, e.g., Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Earth Sciences, Nor.-U.S., 
Nov. 25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 03-1125.1; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Scientific and 
Technical Cooperation in the Earth Sciences, Turk.-U.S., Feb. 7–Apr. 10, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 02-410; 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Earth  
Sciences, Alg.-U.S., Feb. 21, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,081; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Earth Sciences, Braz.-U.S., May 18–Nov. 4, 1998, 
Hein’s No. KAV 5,423; Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Scientific and Technical  
Cooperation in the Earth Sciences, Mali-U.S., Apr. 23, 1996, Hein’s No. KAV 4,612; Memorandum 
of Understanding Concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Earth Sciences, Morocco-
U.S., Aug. 27–Oct. 11, 1993, T.I.A.S. No. 12,166. 
 252 There are thirty-three total agreements following this template.  See, e.g., Agreement  
Regarding the Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or  
Insured by the United States Government and the Agency for International Development, U.S.-
Viet., Apr. 7, 1997, Hein’s No. KAV 4,906; Agreement Regarding the Consolidation and  
Rescheduling of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured by the United States and Its 
Agencies, Alg.-U.S., Mar. 27, 1996, Hein’s No. KAV 4,607; Agreement Regarding the Consolidation 
and Rescheduling of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured by the United States  
Government and Its Agencies, Croat.-U.S., Feb. 1, 1996, Hein’s No. KAV 4,714; Agreement  
Regarding the Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certain Debts Owed to or Guaranteed by the 
United States Government, Russ.-U.S., Sept. 30, 1993, Hein’s No. KAV 3,690; Agreement  
Regarding the Consolidation and Rescheduling or Refinancing of Certain Debts Owed to,  
Guaranteed by, or Insured by the United States Government and Its Agency, Eth.-U.S., May 3, 
1993, Hein’s No. KAV 3,577; Agreement Regarding the Consolidation and Rescheduling or  
Refinancing of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured by the United States Government 
and Its Agencies, Sierra Leone-U.S., Apr. 19, 1993, Hein’s No. KAV 3,562; Agreement Regarding the 
Consolidation and Rescheduling or Refinancing of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured 
by the United States Government and Its Agencies, Peru-U.S., Aug. 27, 1992, Hein’s No. KAV 3,392. 
 253 The exceptions are one agreement in 2006 and one in 2011.  
 254 Of the 721 cover memos that cite both an authority coded 5 and Article II, 191 are categorized 
as “transportation and aviation,” 150 as “defense,” and 125 as “law enforcement.”  They do not 
frequently repeat any specific boilerplate templates. 
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This Part has examined how the system for making executive agree-
ments works in practice.  It has shown that the transparency regime 
that Congress established to monitor such agreements is failing in a 
number of respects.  Not only do the American people have no easy way 
to learn what binding international agreements have been concluded in 
their name, but Congress, too, seems to have been left out of the loop on 
thousands of international agreements in the last few decades.  Moreo-
ver, within the executive branch itself, there appear to be significant 
problems with record keeping, coordination, and monitoring.  Finally, 
in terms of the output of this system, the executive branch is concluding 
a majority of agreements without express authority from Congress. 
Before turning in the next Part to consider possible reforms to ad-
dress these pathologies, it is important to note that we have not assessed 
whether the broken transparency regime for executive agreements is 
producing bad agreements as a policy matter — that is, agreements that 
are not in the national interest.  It would be very difficult for us to eval-
uate that issue, which would require a highly contextual analysis of each 
agreement, its policy aims, and the extent to which it achieved those 
aims and served the national interest.  Any such assessment would likely 
turn on contestable assumptions and would be impossible to do on a 
large scale.  The transparency regime for executive agreements is de-
signed to allow Congress, both directly and by hearing from interested 
parties, to evaluate these questions, and we can state confidently from 
our data that the system is not working well toward that end.  While 
the policy desirability and soundness of an agreement are obviously im-
portant issues, so too are the issues of whether the executive branch is 
complying with its statutory duties that are a prerequisite to congres-
sional oversight, and whether the Executive is acting lawfully in enter-
ing into these agreements.  The failures of the transparency system im-
plicate these concerns independent of the underlying policy desirability 
of the agreements. 
III.  PATHOLOGIES AND REFORM 
The FOIA materials that we obtained reveal significant noncompli-
ance with several legal duties and raise questions about the legal basis 
for many agreements and the adequacy of the overall system of account-
ability for such agreements.  Our interviews with former officials cor-
roborate these points.  They also reveal that the executive branch is 
poorly structured to meet its legal duties.  In implementing its transpar-
ency obligations, the State Department is understaffed, underresourced, 
and poorly organized.  It also lacks adequate arrangements with other 
agencies to ensure that it receives agreements and related information 
in a timely manner so that it can meet its legal duties.  Finally, the data 
and interviews make plain that Congress has failed in its oversight du-
ties by allowing these dysfunctions to persist. 
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This is an unacceptable state of affairs from any normative perspec-
tive.  Executive agreements create binding obligations on the United 
States under international law, and they often have either direct or in-
direct influences on domestic law.255  As we explain below, the  
President’s independent constitutional foreign affairs powers can in 
some circumstances give the President more leeway in crafting interna-
tional agreements for the United States than he or she has in making 
domestic law.256  But the leeway does not go so far as to permit wide-
spread disregard of statutory duties concerning reporting and publica-
tion of those agreements, or negligent inattention to the legal bases for 
the agreements. 
Our proposals for reform fall into two related categories.  Section 
III.A addresses the lack of compliance with statutory and regulatory 
publication and reporting requirements.  This compliance problem, we 
argue, requires two types of reform.  First, the executive branch bureau-
cracy should be reorganized to ensure that all pertinent agreements are 
centrally collected, akin to the way that the Federal Register requires 
centralized collection of federal regulations.  Second, a central executive 
branch repository, which we propose to be the State Department, should 
publish all nonclassified international agreements, just as all nonclassi-
fied statutes and regulations are published.  Section III.A also addresses 
the problem of publication and reporting for nonbinding political  
commitments. 
The second category of reform, addressed in section III.B, concerns 
the uncertain legality of many of the agreements.  This section briefly 
reiterates our empirical findings about the range of legal bases for the 
agreements and the inadequacies in the State Department’s presentation 
of legal authority for the agreements.  As discussed in Part I, the scope 
of the executive branch’s legal authority to conclude executive agree-
ments is not entirely clear.  Even accounting for that lack of clarity, 
however, there are significant questions about the legal justification for 
many executive agreements.  Section III.B concludes by proposing 
mechanisms to improve the public legal justification for international 
agreements — mechanisms that, we believe, will make it more likely 
that agreements in the future will possess an adequate legal basis. 
Before turning to these proposals, we should explain why they do 
not run afoul of the so-called “inside/outside fallacy.”257  This is the  
fallacy of premising the descriptive or diagnostic part of a paper on  
assumptions about the particular motivations of relevant officials (such 
as self-interest or indifference) and then offering prescriptions that  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 255 Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1256–57 (describing domestic and international 
consequences of presidential control over international law, including over executive agreements). 
 256 See infra p. 713. 
 257 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1743 (2013). 
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assume officials are guided by quite different motivations (such as  
public-spiritedness).  Our reform proposals do not make such incon-
sistent assumptions.  We accept the reasons why Congress has delegated 
significant agreement-making authority to Presidents, such as its recog-
nition of executive branch expertise and the need for flexibility.  We also 
recognize that Congress might be poorly structured, or inadequately mo-
tivated, or both, to engage in fine-grained oversight of executive agree-
ments.  Our proposals do not make heroic suppositions about official 
motivations or capacity.  
Indeed, in contrast to many proposed reforms related to the separa-
tion of powers, the proposals below build on the known aims and actions 
of the two political branches.  As we showed in Part I, Congress has for 
decades been concerned about problems with executive branch trans-
parency, especially reporting, in this context.  It has reflected this con-
cern in a number of statutory amendments and funding restrictions that 
sought to solve the problem, but failed.  The congressional staffers 
whom we interviewed confirmed continuing congressional frustration 
that the statutory requirements are not being followed.  As we showed 
in Part II, former State Department officials have acknowledged prob-
lems in executive branch organization and transparency related to exec-
utive agreements.  The State Department has taken steps in the recent 
past to try to fix the problems, and has sometimes sought more authority 
from Congress to do so.  Our data provide new and concrete evidence 
about the various problems that Congress and the State Department 
have worried about and tried to address for decades. 
Our proposals thus can be seen as an effort to provide solutions to 
problems that Congress and the executive branch have already them-
selves identified and expressed an interest in fixing.  Moreover, congres-
sional motivations are not static.  Congress can and sometimes does fo-
cus more intently on an issue at particular times — often unexpectedly, 
perhaps prompted by a particular controversy.  This happened, for ex-
ample, when it first enacted the Case Act.  Finally, our proposed reforms 
do not make unrealistic assumptions about Congress’s ability to engage 
in robust oversight of executive agreements.  Indeed, many of the pro-
posed reforms are designed to inform the public (including civil society 
groups) about executive agreements and their legal bases so that the 
public can monitor and identify problems that Congress might want to 
address. 
A.  Improving the Collection and Reporting of Agreements 
This section proposes reforms to redress the executive branch’s poor 
record of reporting its agreements to Congress and the public.  It begins 
by briefly summarizing our critique of the current system and then iden-
tifying the likely causes of the problems.  It then describes what we 
believe to be the best model for reform: the Federal Register system for 
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collecting and reporting federal regulations.  Finally, it argues that ex-
ecutive agreements should be subject to internal collection and external 
transparency rules akin to ones that govern federal regulations, with 
modifications appropriate to the international agreements context. 
In developing the arguments below, we are conscious of the growing 
literature that highlights the potential dangers of transparency man-
dates, including reduced government deliberation, the empowerment of 
lobbyists at the expense of ordinary citizens, and diminished confidence 
in institutions.258  This literature shows that transparency mandates can 
sometimes be harmful on balance, but not that they are invariably or 
even usually bad.  The primary caution that emerges from these argu-
ments is that scholars should “drill down into the specific legal, institu-
tional, historical, political, and cultural contexts in which [transparency] 
policies are crafted and implemented” to discern if they are justified in 
context.259  We agree.  We do not advocate transparency simply for 
transparency’s sake but rather aim to provide specific recommendations 
for targeted transparency reforms, while noting both plausible benefits 
and costs.  We will return to this point below. 
1.  Transparency Issues that Emerge from the Data. — Compressing 
only a little, the legal requirements for publication and reporting inter-
national agreements are quite simple: as discussed in Part I, the State 
Department must publish to the world all nonclassified agreements 
other than ones excluded by regulation, and under the Case Act it must 
report to Congress all agreements (with special procedures for reporting 
classified agreements).  To enable the State Department to meet these 
legal obligations, all executive agencies are obligated to transmit the text 
of concluded agreements to State within twenty days of signing.  Our 
investigations have uncovered numerous problems with this regime. 
The most obvious problem is that the State Department and other 
agencies are not fully complying with the Case Act and its regulations.  
As noted above, 2,027 agreements appeared in the HeinOnline database 
but were not reported with cover memos from January 20, 1989 to  
January 20, 2017.260  In addition, for the agreements that the State  
Department does report to Congress, many are reported late, beyond the 
Case Act’s sixty-day rule.  As we noted in Part I, this problem has long 
been documented in a piecemeal fashion in different years through dif-
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 258 See generally, e.g., TERO ERKKILÄ, GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY: IMPACTS AND 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (2012); ONORA O’NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST (2002);  
David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1097 (2017); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018). 
 259 David E. Pozen, Seeing Transparency More Clearly, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 326, 326 (2020). 
 260 See supra p. 672.  As noted earlier, the number is 2,945 if we include agreements for which 
HeinOnline has identifying data but not the text of the agreement.  See supra note 200. 
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ferent types of publications.  The data reported here provide new sup-
port for this conclusion.  They indicate that from 2006–2013, about forty 
percent of agreements were reported late.  Other, more recent materials 
suggest that this high percentage of untimely reporting is continuing.261  
This suggests that the Congressional Research Service was too optimis-
tic in its 2001 study when observing that the timeliness of reporting 
seemed to be improving.262  Congress has frequently complained about 
late reporting going back as far as the 1970s, and it has taken various 
steps to try to ameliorate the problem.  But significant late reporting 
persists. 
In the aggregate, the underreporting and late reporting constitute 
serious and persistent violations of important congressional and regula-
tory directives that are designed to ensure at least minimal presidential 
accountability in an important area of U.S. foreign relations.  What ex-
plains these violations? 
First, one explanation for the underreporting revealed by our analy-
sis of the cover memos might be that some or all of the missing agree-
ments were reported to Congress, but without cover memos, which were 
all that we requested from the State Department in our FOIA request.  
This explanation is unlikely and not consistent with information ob-
tained in interviews, which suggests that only small numbers of agree-
ments are reported without cover memos — nothing close to this scale.  
If this were the explanation, however, then the State Department would 
not be complying with its regulatory reporting duty to include a cover 
memo including a “precise citation of legal authority” for each agree-
ment.  Another possibility is that HeinOnline’s database includes thou-
sands of documents in its international agreements database that are not 
reportable under the Case Act, most likely nonbinding commitments.  
That seems equally unlikely, as it would imply a scale of reliance on 
such commitments never before suggested.  If this were the explanation, 
it would indicate that the use of nonbinding commitments has become 
a major way of avoiding the reporting requirements of the Case Act.  
We have no reason to believe that is true (though such documents may 
explain a small part of the gap).  Whether the bulk of the discrepancy is 
explained by underreporting, reporting without cover memos, a failure 
to produce all the relevant cover memos as legally required under our 
FOIA litigation settlement, or some combination, the State Department 
appears to be in serious undercompliance with its legal obligations. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 261 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-309, DEFENSE LOGISTICS 
AGREEMENTS 1, 17 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/705110.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HBR-
5QZJ] (finding that forty-one percent of “acquisition and cross-servicing agreements,” id. at 1, which 
provide billions of dollars of logistic support, supplies, and services to more than 100 partner coun-
tries, were reported late under the Case Act). 
 262 See CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 228; supra p. 653.  
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Second, an important explanation for late reporting and underreport-
ing is that executive branch agencies often fail to send agreements to the 
State Department in a timely fashion,263 perhaps because they lack ad-
equate guidance or adequate legal compulsion.  This explanation is sup-
ported by statements that accompany many of the agreements that were 
reported in the Case Act Reports database, which more than half of the 
time during the period 2006–2013 note that if a report was made late, it 
was because the Department of State received the agreement late from 
the agency that concluded it.  It is also supported by what we have been 
able to learn about the discrepancies between HeinOnline’s data and 
the cover memos: HeinOnline appears to have obtained a number of 
agreements from agency records held by the National Archives.  That 
suggests that State may not have received the agreements.  This expla-
nation is supported, as well, by a recent Government Accountability  
Office report on defense logistics agreements, which found that forty-
one percent of the agreements were transmitted after the Case Act dead-
line “largely because DOD did not provide required information to 
State.”264 
This is not a new problem.  As discussed in Part I, Presidents were 
required until 2000 to report to Congress about the timeliness of Case 
Act submissions, and these reports showed that a significant percentage 
of the agreements were being reported late, often because the State  
Department had not received the agreements from other executive de-
partments in a timely manner.265  Similarly, in 1999 the General  
Accounting Office reported, with respect to trade agreements, that 
“Congress may not have received all of the agreements and accompany-
ing documents, as required by law.”266  It explained that a likely reason 
was that the agreements were never provided to the Department of 
State: “In spring 1999 officials in Treaty Affairs told us that they be-
lieved many USTR-negotiated trade agreements had never been trans-
mitted to State for review.  According to the State officials, they had 
previously raised this issue with USTR on several occasions.”267  The 
USTR is almost certainly not alone in failing to report to the State  
Department.268  Congress’s various piecemeal reform efforts to improve 
compliance have not led to significant improvements, in part because 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 263 This assessment is based on annotations that accompany the late-reported agreements on the 
Case Act Reports database.  
 264 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 261, at preface.  The report further indi-
cated that “[f]or two agreements that entered into force in 1983 and 2002, State records are insuffi-
cient to determine whether or not State notified Congress.”  Id. at 17.  There was no evidence, 
however, that agreements were concluded by DOD but not transmitted to State.  See id. 
 265 See id. at 28; supra p. 653. 
 266 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 196, at 15. 
 267 Id. 
 268 As we note above, the USTR cannot account for the entire difference because only twenty-
two percent of unreported agreements in our database (530 out of a total of 2,361) are on the subject 
of trade.  See supra Table 3, p. 674. 
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the efforts have not recognized or sought to seriously address the scale 
of the problem.  
Third, many of the problems we have identified appear to result 
from the State Department’s lack of sufficient resources dedicated to 
recording, reporting, and publishing executive agreements.  Several for-
mer State Department officials mentioned insufficient money, personnel, 
and technology to address the issue.  We cannot discern whether this 
problem results from inadequate funding by Congress, misplaced allo-
cation of funds by the Department, or some combination of the two.  
But it is clear that whatever the reason, the Department lacks sufficient 
resources dedicated to meeting its statutory and regulatory obligations.  
In addition, while we do not believe that State Department officials are 
purposefully defying the law, it is clear from the interviews and data 
that fixing the problems we have identified has often not been a priority. 
Fourth, the data highlight another transparency problem related to 
publication that demands explanation.  The State Department’s TIAS 
database contains just under a third of all U.S. nonclassified agreements 
during our time period.  The data do not reveal whether the difference 
between all nonclassified U.S. agreements and the published ones is ex-
plained by pathologies akin to ones that occur under the Case Act, or 
whether they are explained by the regulations that permit the  
Department not to publish less important agreements.  It might be some 
of both.269 
2.  Reform Proposals. — The best model for reforming the broken 
system of collecting and reporting executive agreements, we contend, is 
the Federal Register system that has long governed the collection and 
organization of federal regulations. 
In 1934, at the dawn of the New Deal, Erwin Griswold wrote an 
influential essay about the need to organize and publish the mass of 
federal regulations then emerging from the U.S. government.270   
Griswold noted that regulations and related executive directives were 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 269 As a partial solution, one might imagine relying on the other parties to the agreements to 
disclose the agreements.  After all, the agreements, by definition, have at least one other state party.  
Indeed, there is at least one instance where the content of an executive agreement came to light in 
the United States through its partner.  See Bill Delahunt & Oona Hathaway, Opinion, Bush Should 
Include Congress, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 26, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ 
editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/11/26/bush_should_include_congress/?page=full 
[https://perma.cc/3BX5-A4P4] (“[President Bush] has insisted on keeping the American people in 
the dark by refusing to release the English text of the agreement, while in Iraq the Arabic version 
is available to all.”).  But relying on other nations to inform the American public about the agree-
ments its government makes will inevitably lead to a reporting regime that is incomplete and subject 
to the particular laws and practices of other countries, and thus is clearly inadequate as a means of 
ensuring transparency in this country.   
 270 Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law — A Plea for Better Publication of 
Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1934).  
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practically as important as federal statutes.  But, in looking at their or-
ganization and publication, he found “chaos.”271  Since there was no 
centralized mandatory system for collection, organization, and publica-
tion of the regulations, citizens (and their legal advisors), and even gov-
ernment officials, had no reliable way of knowing which ones were in 
force, or whether they had been amended, superseded, or withdrawn.  
They thus had no way to understand what the government had done in 
the exercise of federal regulatory power or to know how to conform 
behavior to government prescriptions. 
To Griswold, the situation was so obviously unacceptable in a nation 
committed to the rule of law that its reform required little normative 
justification.  This was especially so, he believed, since “the solution 
[was] amazingly simple.”272  Griswold noted that statutes were centrally 
reported and publicly available.  “All that is needed,” he noted, “is an 
official publication, analogous to the Statutes at Large, in which all rules 
and regulations shall be systematically and uniformly published.”273  
Thus was born the idea for the Federal Register Act,274 which Congress 
enacted in 1935.275  The Act created an organization under the Archivist 
of the United States, and established a series of legal duties that together 
today ensure that nonclassified regulations are promptly collected, cen-
trally stored, published, and then organized in a searchable fashion. 
Here, in a nutshell, is how the Federal Register system for regulations 
works today.  Each agency must publish its rules of procedure and sub-
stantive federal regulations of general applicability in the Federal  
Register.276  It must also designate a “liaison officer” to represent it “in 
all matters relating to the submission of documents to the Office of the 
Federal Register, and respecting general compliance” with reporting 
rules.277  The liaison officer must provide an original copy of each final 
regulation, as well as two duplicate copies, to the Director of the Federal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 271 Id. at 204. 
 272 Id. at 205. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Ch. 417, 49 Stat. 500 (1935) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511). 
 275 For detailed histories of the Federal Register Act, see Lotte E. Feinberg, Mr. Justice Brandeis 
and the Creation of the Federal Register, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 359 (2001); and Harold C.  
Relyea, The Federal Register: Origins, Formulation, Realization, and Heritage, 28 GOV’T INFO. Q. 
295 (2011). 
 276 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).  The Federal Register is maintained by the National Archives and  
Records Administration’s Office of the Federal Register (OFR).  See 44 U.S.C. § 1502.  OFR prom-
ulgates the Federal Register in print, through microfiche, and online as PDFs.  1 C.F.R. § 5.10 
(2020); see also About the Federal Register, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www. 
archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/about.html [https://perma.cc/UF5J-J4D8].  It also 
maintains an unofficial online version.  Id.  Classified agency rules and regulations need not be 
published.  See GOITEIN, supra note 94, at 44–45. 
 277 See 1 C.F.R. § 16.2.  That person, or another designated person, must certify that true copies 
are submitted to the Office of the Federal Register.  Id. § 16.3. 
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Register for publication in the Federal Register.278  The Office of the 
Federal Register then publishes the regulation in the Federal Register in 
several media.279  Most regulations must be published not less than 
thirty days before their effective dates.280  Each agency has a duty to get 
the regulation to the Federal Register in time to meet this require-
ment.281  There appear to be two mechanisms for ensuring compliance 
with these publication duties.  First, a person who lacks actual notice of 
a regulation that is not timely published cannot be bound or burdened 
by it.282  In other words, a regulation is generally ineffectual until it is 
published.  And second, the liaison officer responsible for publication is 
the locus of accountability on the agency side and can presumably be 
reprimanded if he or she fails to carry out the appropriate duties.283 
The reasons recounted in Griswold’s 1934 article for the creation of 
the Federal Register system for domestic regulations apply with full 
force to executive agreements today.  Executive agreements are as cha-
otic in their organization as regulations were in the 1930s.  And they, 
like regulations, have “the force and effect of law.”284  Indeed, the ex 
ante congressional-executive agreements that form the bulk of our study 
are akin to regulations in the sense that they are executive directives 
with the force of law that are ostensibly authorized by congressional 
statute.  When the administrative law transparency reforms of the 1930s 
and 1940s were undertaken, executive agreements were excluded from 
the reforms, and, over time, Congress instead established a piecemeal 
bifurcated system, described in Part I, of partial publication combined 
with (supposedly) comprehensive reporting to Congress.  This system 
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 278 Id. §§ 18.1, 18.3 (describing requirements and process for all documents to be published in 
the Federal Register).  After receiving a final rule from an agency, OFR takes approximately three 
business days to publish it in the Federal Register.  See 1 C.F.R. § 17.2 (prescribing a regular sched-
ule for filing for public inspection and publication); see also Lissa N. Snyders, When Does This Rule 
Go into Effect?, FED. REG.: OFF. OF THE FED. REG. BLOG, https://www.federalregister. 
gov/reader-aids/office-of-the-federal-register-blog/2015/03/when-does-this-rule-go-into-effect 
[https://perma.cc/2YYK-NKMX].  Emergency schedules and deferred schedules are also available 
under certain circumstances.  See 1 C.F.R. §§ 17.3–.7 (describing criteria for emergency and deferred 
schedules and laying out schedules). 
 279 1 C.F.R. § 5.10; see also About the Federal Register, supra note 276. 
 280 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d); id. § 553(d)(1)–(3) (listing some exceptions).  The process for “major” 
rules has an extra step.  Before a major rule can go into effect, the agency must first submit the 
rule, along with a statement of its basis and purpose, a cost-benefit analysis, and “any other relevant 
information or requirements” to Congress.  5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(B)(iv); see id. § 801(a)(1).  Congress 
then has sixty days to pass a joint resolution rejecting the rule.  See id. § 801(a)(3).  If it does not do 
so, then the rule goes into effect.  See id. 
 281 See 1 C.F.R. § 17.2. 
 282 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (“Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the 
terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, 
a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.”). 
 283 See Exec. Order No. 13,392 § 2(c)(ii), 70 Fed. Reg. 75,373, 75,374 (Dec. 19, 2005), reprinted in 
5 U.S.C § 552 (“FOIA Public Liaisons shall report to the agency Chief FOIA Officer on their  
activities . . . .”). 
 284 Griswold, supra note 270, at 198 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 
(1920)). 
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has proven to be dysfunctional for reasons already explained, and  
Congress’s efforts at piecemeal reform over the decades have not been 
successful. 
The time has come to do for executive agreements what Congress 
did long ago for regulations: require reliable centralized collection of all 
agreements within the executive branch, and then prompt and compre-
hensive publication of all nonclassified ones.  Below we first outline and 
make the case for these reforms.  Then, in section III.A.2.c, we describe 
the structural changes that would be needed to effectuate the reforms. 
(a)  Internal Organization. — The case for mandating reliable cen-
tralized collection of the agreements akin to the centralized collection of 
regulations is simple: the executive branch needs to know what agree-
ments its various agencies and departments have made with foreign 
governments so that it can meet its obligations, avoid inconsistent com-
mitments, and learn from past agreements in negotiating future ones.  
This issue of internal bureaucratic organization arises prior to and is 
entirely independent of the question of what should be reported to  
Congress or made public. 
As noted above, the government is currently not organized to meet 
this basic requirement of bureaucratic rationality related to executive 
agreements.  State Department officials lack a comprehensive database 
of agreements, and they rely heavily on the more complete yet still- 
incomplete private HeinOnline database when researching concluded 
executive agreements.285  In other words, the State Department effec-
tively outsources — without any checks for quality or accuracy — the 
compilation of U.S. agreements on which it relies.  This crutch is grow-
ing weaker, however, because HeinOnline’s ability to outpace the gov-
ernment declined after the death of Igor Kavass. 
There is no conceivable justification for the federal government to 
have to rely on the incomplete database of a private paywalled commer-
cial service to understand the scope of U.S. executive agreements.  The 
HeinOnline database makes clear that a larger electronic database can 
be built.  It also shows, more importantly, that this larger database 
serves important governmental needs.  HeinOnline gets the vast major-
ity of the agreements it publishes, and maybe all, from government 
sources.  There is thus no reason why the government could not do at 
least what HeinOnline does, and probably significantly more, with the 
proper organization and resources. 
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 285 It is not just the State Department that suffers from the lack of a comprehensive government 
database of U.S. agreements.  As a Federal Advisory Committee on Status of Forces Agreements 
(SOFA) noted, the absence of such a database means that “different parts of the U.S. government 
disagree about whether [SOFA] agreements exist with a particular nation, whether agreements are 
still in force, and what their terms are.”  INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., REPORT ON STATUS OF 
FORCES AGREEMENTS 39 (2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M59-A7UJ]. 
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The executive branch already has an implicit duty to collect and or-
ganize executive agreements internally in order to meet its Case Act re-
sponsibilities, and it has failed in meeting this duty for decades.  We 
propose stronger medicine below in section III.A.2.c. 
(b)  Comprehensive Duty to Publish. — The executive branch should 
be required to publicize all nonclassified executive agreements, just as 
it must publish all nonclassified regulations.  (We also recommend pub-
lishing the legal authority on which each agreement is based — that 
proposal is outlined in section III.B.2 below.)  This would be a change 
from current practice, which requires comprehensive reporting to  
Congress but only limited publication to the public. 
The case for publishing all executive agreements rests on both non-
instrumental and instrumental grounds.  The main noninstrumental ar-
gument is good governance: the publicity of law is widely viewed as a 
core requirement of the rule of law, which demands special justification 
for secret law.286  The main instrumental argument is accountability: the 
executive branch must be scrutinized by outside institutions to ensure 
that it is carrying out its responsibilities to make sound executive agree-
ments in the name of the United States in a lawful, prudent manner and 
without various forms of corruption, such as self-serving discrimination 
or self-dealing.  
The need for such accountability by transparency is arguably greater 
for executive agreements than for domestic regulations since the former, 
in contrast to the latter, are typically not subject to judicial review.287  
Moreover, executive agreements, unlike domestic regulations, give rise 
to binding international obligations, the violation of which can have 
consequences for groups not directly affected by the agreement itself, 
such as through countermeasures taken by other nations against the 
United States.288  The only potential checks on the executive agreement 
process are Congress and the public.  But as we have shown, they are 
both in the dark about many of these agreements, and Congress has not 
displayed an interest in close scrutiny of the agreements.  Moreover, in-
terviews with congressional staffers revealed that one reason Congress 
does not more closely scrutinize the Case Act memos is that it lacks the 
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 286 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 49–51 (rev. ed. 1969).  See generally 
Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
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 288 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 
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resources to do so.289  Against this background, better publicity is essen-
tial to “fire-alarm” forms of accountability, in which journalists and in-
terested groups can examine presidential behavior more closely than can 
Congress, and can identify and bring to light untoward executive be-
havior, which Congress can then closely examine and, if warranted, ad-
dress.290  We cannot assess the magnitude of the change in congressional 
engagement that such accountability with the assistance of the public 
will bring.  Only practice with the new transparency regime can tell us 
that. 
It is true that executive agreements impact the primary behavior of 
citizens less often than do domestic regulations.  Nevertheless, they often 
still govern primary behavior, mainly outside the United States, in de-
termining what government officials and private citizens can and cannot 
do in areas ranging from air transport services, to health care for mili-
tary members and their dependents, to civil aviation infrastructure, to 
science and technology cooperation, to investment incentives, to some-
thing as mundane as global postal services.  In some instances, more-
over, executive agreements may preempt state law.291  In addition, ab-
sent such transparency, Congress and the American people cannot fully 
observe executive branch action and thus cannot hold the President and 
other executive officials accountable in these important elements of the 
conduct of foreign policy and in the distribution of billions of dollars in 
aid, assistance, and other forms of government largesse.  This form of 
accountability is especially important since, as noted, executive agree-
ments are generally not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act292 
(APA) or judicial review.  
It is against this background that we propose to replace the executive 
branch’s current duty to publish only a subset of international agree-
ments with a duty to publish all nonclassified ones.  A standard objec-
tion to a broad transparency mandate of this sort is that the monetary 
and diversion costs of searching and collecting information to be pub-
lished can be wasteful compared to the ends achieved.293  But the exec-
utive branch is already supposed to be collecting this information to 
meet its Case Act obligations, and the collection and organization of this 
information is needed in order to conduct a coherent foreign policy.  The 
additional cost of publication, after internal collection and organization, 
should be relatively small.  This small cost is relevant because the orig-
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 289 See supra p. 665. 
 290 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police  
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166–67 (1984). 
 291 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“Generally, then, valid executive 
agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are . . . .”). 
 292 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559, 701–706. 
 293 See, e.g., Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, supra note 
258, at 1123–26.  
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inal justification for not requiring the publication of supposedly less im-
portant agreements was the extreme burden of publishing them all in 
hard copy.  TIAS publication was years behind, and Congress made 
concessions to allow the State Department to catch up.  In an age of 
digital storage and production, digital automation, and instantaneous 
transmittal, however, this justification no longer holds force. 
One happy consequence of comprehensive publication is that a large 
portion of Case Act reporting duties can be eliminated.  Comprehensive 
and timely publication of agreements renders superfluous the need for a 
parallel track of reporting to Congress.  There should be one rule for 
nonclassified agreements: publication.  Congress will get notice at the 
same time as the public. 
There are, to be sure, potential downsides to a comprehensive pub-
lication duty.  The duty may lead the executive branch not to make some 
agreements it otherwise would have made, or to make them on different 
terms, due to new political pressures that it anticipates as a result of ex 
post transparency.  To the extent that some of these avoided or altered 
agreements might have been entirely proper and served U.S. interests 
(despite their unpopularity in certain circles), the transparency would be 
costly to U.S. foreign policy.  By contrast, to the extent that the executive 
branch changes its practices to avoid scrutiny of bad agreements, how-
ever defined, or agreements based on poor information, or agreements 
that are unlawful or close to being so, transparency would be performing 
a useful function.  It is very hard to know in advance what the aggregate 
effect of comprehensive transparency will be on this dimension.  It is 
similarly hard to know whether more transparency will on balance em-
power ordinary citizens or special interests more.294 
We cannot sort out these empirical questions without additional in-
formation.  But that should not matter to the case for reform.  Congress 
has long mandated, and the rule of law presumptively demands, that 
executive agreements be published.  The exception to publication for a 
subset of supposedly unimportant executive agreements has never been 
justified on any ground related to foreign policy need or concern about 
interest-group activity.  It has been justified solely on the basis of re-
source constraints — a justification that no longer makes sense in the 
digital age.  And as noted, comprehensive publication will achieve a 
form of efficiency since it will eliminate the need for separate Case Act 
reporting to Congress for nonclassified agreements.  Finally, to the ex-
tent that there are legitimate concerns about the negative consequences 
of heightened transparency in this area, the executive branch is in the 
best position to identify and articulate those concerns, and it presumably 
can make the case for any needed limitations on transparency when 
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 294 Cf. id. at 1112–17 (noting how powerful firms exploit FOIA).  Notably, such powerful interests 
already may be more likely than the broader public to know about the unpublished agreements, so 
the change in scrutiny from these interests may be less than it otherwise might be. 
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proposed reforms are considered by Congress.  Subject to that caveat, 
we propose that laws made by executive agreement should be published 
just like laws made by administrative agencies. 
(c)  Implementing Reforms. — Most elements of the modern Federal 
Register system can be translated straightforwardly to international 
agreements.  For example, every agency that makes agreements should 
be required to designate a liaison officer who is responsible for meeting 
the agency’s reporting duties.  And such agreements should be promptly 
published in the Federal Register or in a publication akin to the Federal 
Register.  However, international agreements have characteristics that 
might require adjustment of three elements of the Federal Register  
system. 
One important issue is whether the central repository for receiving 
and publishing the agreements should be the State Department, a new 
agency under the Archivist of the United States akin to the Office of the 
Federal Register, or the Office of the Federal Register itself.  There is a 
strong argument to be made that these tasks should be the responsibility 
of a new agency under the Archivist or made part of the Office of the 
Federal Register’s responsibilities.  First, the State Department has 
failed at the tasks for decades.  Second, the Archivist and Office of the 
Federal Register have extensive experience with publication tasks for 
domestic laws, regulations, proclamations, and the like, and have proven 
themselves rigorous, professional, and competent.  Third, and relatedly, 
publication would almost certainly be more orderly and complete under 
the command of these relatively independent institutions, at least in the 
short to medium term. 
Despite these points, we believe the task of publication should re-
main within the State Department, albeit in a component with signifi-
cantly greater resources and authorities than at present.  First, the State 
Department is where the expertise lies with respect to executive agree-
ments.  This is important for substantive tasks like distinguishing bind-
ing from nonbinding agreements.  Expertise is also important in deter-
mining how best to organize the information.  A key task of reform will 
be to organize executive agreements in an intelligent and searchable 
fashion, akin to regulations, by subject matter or by the legal authority 
that authorized them.295  Expertise is vital in performing these tasks. 
Second, the State Department has an unavoidable duty, with no par-
allel in domestic regulations, of vetting the agreements (through the  
C-175 process) to ensure that they cohere and do not conflict with one 
another.  This makes the State Department the natural entity for the 
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 295 At a minimum, the duty to organize and publish executive agreements must include agree-
ments entered into after the Federal Register–like system for agreements is established.  Ideally, the 
State Department would also be required to include prereform executive agreements in the publicly 
searchable database, although this task is harder and would require significantly more resources.  
The funding restriction we propose on implementation of nonpublished agreements, see infra p. 
707, should attach only to agreements concluded postreform.  
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back-end tasks of collecting and publishing finalized agreements.  And 
the Treaty Division within the Legal Adviser’s Office is the natural en-
tity within the State Department to be responsible for these tasks.  
Third, Congress has always wanted publication and reporting to be cen-
tralized in and performed by the State Department — which is, after all, 
the central diplomatic arm of the U.S. government.  Yet the State  
Department has never been given adequate resources and adequate au-
thority within the executive branch to do these tasks properly.  It should 
be given these things. 
The last reason for vesting the responsibility with the State  
Department is that a single agency should have primary responsibility 
for overseeing and managing our international relations.  The obvious 
agency for those purposes is the Department of State.  Our study reveals 
that the Department often does not receive the cooperation from other 
agencies that it needs in order to meet its responsibilities.  Both late 
reporting and underreporting are driven in no small part by the failure 
of other executive branch agencies to communicate with State.  This is 
a problem not only for reporting and publication but also for interna-
tional diplomacy.  If no single agency in the U.S. government knows all 
the agreements concluded between the United States and the rest of the 
world, it is hard to maintain consistency and coherence among U.S. 
agreements.296  One goal of the C-175 process was to force coordination 
through the State Department.  By all appearances, that process is not 
working as well as it should.  Rather than abandon it, Congress should 
reaffirm and reinforce it with real consequences for failures to coordi-
nate, as described below. 
A separate issue concerns when the concluded agreement must be 
published.  The rule for Federal Register publication is thirty days before 
the regulation enters into force.  As noted in Part I, under current law 
most international agreements must be transmitted to Congress no later 
than sixty days after they enter into force, and published within 180 days 
of entering into force.  So the questions are whether the general publi-
cation requirement should be ex ante (like regulations) or ex post (like 
agreements today), and what the time period for publication should be. 
As noted in the Introduction, before INS v. Chadha, it was common 
for Congress and the public to receive advance notice of agreements.  
Today, however, ex post publication for nonclassified agreements is the 
norm.  This more limited obligation has long been accepted by the ex-
ecutive branch and imposes few if any costs on the process of negotiating 
and completing agreements.  Ex post publication does not interfere with 
the confidentiality of negotiations, and it can usefully expose bad agree-
ments after the fact and thereby give the executive branch an incentive 
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 296 It also likely makes it difficult for the United States to comply with its international legal duty 
to register with the United Nations “[e]very treaty and every international agreement . . . as soon as 
possible.”  U.N. Charter art. 102, ¶ 1. 
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not to make bad agreements in the first place.  These are the aims of 
transparency.  Extending such ex post publicity to a class of less im-
portant agreements is unlikely to hamper the executive branch in mak-
ing agreements as part of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 
Congress almost certainly has the constitutional authority to impose 
earlier publication requirements.  Article II treaties, after all, must be 
published, debated, and consented to prior to ratification.  The same is 
true of ex post congressional-executive agreements.  Moreover, as noted 
in Part I, Congress sometimes requires that certain agreements or classes 
of agreement be disclosed to Congress (and the public) for a period be-
fore the agreement comes into force so that Congress can scrutinize and 
push back on the agreement if it sees fit.  These are entirely legitimate 
mechanisms of transparency and increased accountability to Congress.  
But they come at the expense of the efficiency that Congress has long 
sought for many congressional-executive agreements.  They elongate the 
agreement-making process and make it harder for the President in many 
instances to negotiate particular agreements since he or she must in ef-
fect negotiate with two different audiences — first the foreign govern-
ment, and then Congress. 
Congress has full discretion to change the allocation of publication 
requirements before and after an agreement comes into force.  But it 
appears to be generally satisfied with ex post reporting, and it has shown 
every ability to impose various forms of ex ante reporting when it 
wishes.  It may come to a different view in the face of a more robust 
transparency regime.  For now, there is little evidence that Congress is 
dissatisfied with its presumption that the vast majority of agreements 
can receive adequate accountability through ex post publication.  And 
as noted above, a better publication system will only improve the ac-
countability provided by ex post publication.  For these reasons, we be-
lieve that ex post publication can achieve the transparency goals out-
lined here.297 
As for timing, we propose that the executive branch should have 
sixty days to publish after the agreement enters into force.  This has 
been the amount of time that Congress has for decades prescribed for 
State Department reports under the Case Act, and it is more forgiving 
than the advance-publication requirement for regulations.  We are cog-
nizant of the potential costs of strict deadlines in related contexts.298  But 
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 297 One of us has advocated an Administrative Procedure Act–type regime for international 
law — which would involve reforms to the process for making executive agreements based on the 
APA’s domestic rulemaking process, but with modifications to account for the international nature 
of the agreements.  See Hathaway, supra note 8, at 242–53.  That proposal called for ex ante publi-
cation, with a period for notice and comment.  See id. at 243–49.  This new proposal is not intended 
to suggest that the author of that piece has shifted positions, but simply that there are other possible 
ways to achieve many of the same goals.  
 298 See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 923, 929 (2008).  
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given the relatively long sixty-day window, modern communication and 
organization technologies, and the importance of the issue, the executive 
branch should be able to publish to the world the nonclassified agree-
ments that it is already supposed to have in hand within this period. 
The final issue here concerns the proper enforcement mechanism.  
The federal regulation process is enforced primarily by making the reg-
ulations nonapplicable until published.  This is a difficult rule to impose 
on international agreements generally, many of which come into effect 
upon signature.  For that reason, and because there is such a long history 
of noncompliance with reporting and publication requirements for ex-
ecutive agreements, we propose that Congress make permanent the 
scheme that prevailed from 1987–1989 and 2005–2007: Congress should 
specify that no funds are available to implement any agreement until it 
is transmitted — first to the Department of State and, then, through the 
Department of State to Congress.299  If Congress adopts the comprehen-
sive publication recommendations we propose, and thus eliminates the 
separate requirement of transmittal to Congress, then Congress should 
make funding for implementation of every nonclassified agreement con-
ditional on its publication. 
* * * 
The reforms we have proposed thus far include an extensive reor-
ganization of the executive branch to ensure comprehensive centralized 
collection of executive agreements, comprehensive publication of execu-
tive agreements, and, to the extent possible, collection and publication 
of past agreements in accordance with this new regime.  These reforms 
are consistent with the known aims of the Case Act and its amendments 
and are especially appropriate in our digital era.  Many of them — es-
pecially the internal reforms and increased funding — are also sought 
by the State Department.  However, these reforms would entail a major 
undertaking that would require significant appropriations and other 
support from Congress as well as significant organizational efforts by 
the State Department or the National Archivist.  Congress should pro-
vide adequate resources but also impose a deadline. 
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 299 See supra pp. 653–54.  There are indications in the 2001 Congressional Research Service study 
that the funding restriction in the 1980s may have helped improve reporting.  See CRS TREATY 
STUDY, supra note 14, at 226 tbl.X-1 (showing a drop in late reporting from the early ’80s to the 
late ’80s).  In addition, the information in the Case Act Reports database that the State Department 
maintained between 2006 and 2013 suggests that the reports were more timely during the 2005–
2007 funding-cutoff period than they have been since that time.  (In 2006, twenty-one percent of 
the reports were late, and in 2007, thirty-four percent were late — compared to roughly forty percent 
in later years.) 
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3.  Political Commitments. — The current regime of publication and 
reporting for international agreements excludes nonbinding commit-
ments, also known as “political commitments.”300  This is true even 
though political commitments have become an increasingly important 
component of the executive branch’s agreement-making practice.  For 
example, the Obama Administration used nonbinding provisions in both 
the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate change agreement without 
seeking congressional approval, and the Trump Administration did the 
same in signing the U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration and Supplementary 
Agreement to “address the current situation at the southern border of 
the United States.”301  More broadly, political commitments govern day-
to-day international regulatory cooperation between federal agencies 
and foreign counterparts.302 
Even back in its 2001 study of treaties, the Congressional Research 
Service noted that the lack of reporting of nonbinding political commit-
ments “could represent a large loophole” in the Case Act regime.303  And 
if the reporting requirements for binding agreements are made more ef-
fective, it is possible that the executive branch or agencies within it could 
be even more motivated to circumvent those rules by concluding the 
agreements instead as “nonbinding” agreements not subject to the re-
porting rules. 
The same basic arguments for requiring transparency of executive 
agreements apply to political commitments — but not all political com-
mitments, in our view.  The main reason is that the category of political 
commitments is not nearly as sharp as the category of binding executive 
agreements, since at one end of the spectrum all diplomatic speech that 
entails pledges can be seen as political commitments.  At the same time, 
political commitments, especially in the regulatory context, can have 
large impacts on the economy and foreign policy, and on the primary 
behavior of domestic actors, just as domestic regulations do.304  The 
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 300 See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(1) (2019) (“The parties must intend their undertaking to be legally 
binding, and not merely of political or personal effect.”).  But see Ryan Harrington, A Remedy for 
Congressional Exclusion from Contemporary International Agreement Making, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 
1211, 1243 (2016) (“There is no reason why, textually, the Case Act should not apply to political 
commitments, which would require modification of the C.F.R. provisions, not of the U.S. Code.”).   
 301 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1242, 1248–52; Joint Declaration and  
Supplementary Agreement on Migration, Mex.-U.S., June 7, 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 19-607. 
 302 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-588, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 10–11 (2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656488.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3NM-
W2QA]. 
 303 CRS TREATY STUDY, supra note 14, at 231. 
 304 For example, the United States and the European Union coordinate enforcement of their 
antitrust, securities, and banking laws pursuant to nonbinding political commitments.  See, e.g., 
Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, E.U.-U.S., Oct. 14, 2011, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/111014eumerger.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XFC-6P8V]; Framework  
Cooperation Agreement, E.U.-U.S., Sept. 18–27, 2017, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/ 
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public should thus have access to important political commitments in 
an organized and searchable fashion on the same terms as it does in the 
reformed executive agreement process.305 
Congressional staffers whom we interviewed emphasized the prob-
lem of accountability for political commitments and stated that reforms 
to increase the transparency of executive agreements should be coupled 
with reforms to increase the transparency of political commitments.306  
Otherwise, they feared, greater transparency for binding executive 
agreements could create incentives to shift toward even less transparent 
nonbinding political agreements.  To prevent this shift — which would 
lead to less, rather than more, transparency — from occurring, it is im-
portant to anticipate it and create disincentives for such a shift. 
The challenge is how to define the category of nonbinding political 
commitments.307  On the one hand, the definition should not be so broad 
as to sweep in, for example, agreements to conduct future meetings.  On 
the other hand, it should not be so narrow as to allow agreements that 
are effectively the same as binding executive agreements to be concluded 
by executive agencies with almost no oversight from Congress — or 
even the State Department itself. 
One possibility is to describe a list of types of commitments — such 
as ones that create a likely impression of an obligation to take actions 
not solely within the scope and authority of the current presidential ad-
ministration (for example, actions that would be taken after the conclu-
sion of the current presidential term) or that require congressional action 
to implement — that must be centrally collected and published.  A sec-
ond possibility is to create a statutory duty to collect and publish all 
political commitments that are comparable to past binding executive 
agreements in their scope and subject matter (where the agreement is 
substantially similar but uses slight changes of phrase to make it not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
oia_bilateral/eba-framework-cooperation-arrangement-sep17.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM8Z-7UJ4]; 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation, Cooperation, and the Exchange of Infor-
mation Related to the Supervision of Cross-Border Regulated Entities, E.U.-U.S., Mar. 14–15, 2012, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_bilateral/esma-mou.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2DU-LD83].  
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 302. 
 305 See also Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the  
Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 575 (2009) (“Congress may facilitate (or demand) the disclosure 
of political commitments, and the President would have a corresponding obligation to provide  
Congress with such data.”). 
 306 Telephone Interview by Oona Hathaway with Current U.S. Government Lawyer (May 27, 
2020). 
 307 It may be useful to study how other constitutional democracies that require legislative in-
volvement in treaty-making have handled this issue.  For example, in 2014, Spain enacted a new 
Treaties Act that, among other things, requires nonbinding agreements to be centrally collected by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and maintained in a public registry.  See Carlos Espósito, Spanish 
Foreign Relations Law and the Process for Making Treaties and Other International Agreements, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 205, 213–16  
(Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019). 
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expressly binding).  A third possibility is to require the executive branch 
to collect and publish political commitments meeting a general standard, 
such as “significant” or “important.”308  This less precise standard may 
have the disadvantage of being subject to convenient interpretation by 
the executive branch, but it has the distinct advantage of sweeping into 
publication novel forms of important political commitments that fall 
outside the more rigid categories.  This approach could give agencies 
notice that they need to figure out and report what counts as important, 
and will be penalized by Congress and the public if they are later 
deemed wrong.309 
B.  Ensuring Legality 
We now turn to the legality of the agreements reported under the 
Case Act.  As noted above, regulations implementing the Case Act re-
quire that all reported agreements be accompanied by a cover memo 
that includes a “precise citation of legal authority.”  Our analysis of thou-
sands of these memos reveals that, for a significant number of executive 
agreements, the executive branch’s legal authority to conclude the agree-
ments is at best uncertain and sometimes highly questionable.  It is not 
our aim in this section, however, to resolve the legal questions implicated 
by the memos.  As explained in Part I, there are many uncertainties 
about the legal basis for executive agreements that we cannot resolve in 
this Article.  Instead, our argument here is simply that there should be 
greater transparency concerning what the executive branch is doing and 
claiming so that Congress and the interested public can better evaluate 
these legal issues. 
1.  Legality Issues that Emerge from the Data. — The thousands of 
cover memos that we obtained provide insights into how broadly the 
executive branch has been interpreting its authority to conclude agree-
ments.  Before considering the implications of the data, however, a ca-
veat is in order.  As discussed in Part II, the “legal authority” section in 
the cover memos is not typically written by lawyers and does not neces-
sarily reflect the full or considered judgment of the lawyers in the State 
Department about the legal basis for the agreement.  The cited legal 
authorities thus might not be the best, or the most accurate, statement 
of the actual legal authorities for making the agreement.  This problem 
infects the entire corpus of Case Act cover memos that are supposed to 
inform Congress about the legal bases for every international agreement. 
These citations of legal authority are nevertheless important.  They 
are very likely drawn from the internal C-175 legal memos, which are 
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 308 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 3092(a) (requiring the executive branch to keep “intelligence committees 
fully and currently informed” of noncovert U.S. intelligence activities, including “significant antic-
ipated intelligence activity”). 
 309 For how this approch has worked in the intelligence reporting context, see JACK 
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 88–91 (2012). 
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prepared by State Department lawyers.  And whatever their quality, the 
citations are official communications from the executive branch to  
Congress, pursuant to regulation, of the legal authority for executive 
agreements.  If they are unreliable, that is itself an important fact in 
evaluating the transparency regime governing executive agreements. 
(a)  Executive Agreements+. — As discussed in Part II, approxi-
mately seven percent of the cover memos we obtained cite only Article 
II of the Constitution.  These are the agreements that the executive 
branch appears to believe are sole executive agreements.  The remaining 
ninety-three percent of the cover memos invoke statutory or other non-
constitutional authority — sometimes with, and sometimes without,  
Article II as well.  This finding seems to confirm, consistent with con-
ventional wisdom, that the sole executive agreement power is narrow in 
scope.  
The database also allowed us to examine the Executive Agreements+ 
theory by examining the cover memos for the agreements cited by  
Professors Bodansky and Spiro as examples of this theory.310  We found 
for each of these agreements that the government sought to justify them 
not on the basis of Article II alone or an Executive Agreements+ theory, 
but rather on the basis of congressional (or treaty-based) authoriza-
tion.311  For example, Bodansky and Spiro cite the Paris Climate Change 
Agreement as an Executive Agreement+.312  The agreement became ef-
fective too late to be included in our database, but we separately ob-
tained a copy of the Case Act cover memo for the agreement.313  Far 
from claiming mere consistency with domestic law, the memorandum 
cites five bases of “Legal Authority,” including the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which by itself probably 
suffices to authorize the agreement.314  Similarly, the environmental and 
tax-related agreements cited by Bodansky and Spiro315 are ones where 
the government claimed several bases of statutory legal authority.316 
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 310 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 56, at 887, 889. 
 311 There is no cover memo for the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement, nor was there a C-175 
memorandum prepared for it.  See Letter from Sheryl L. Walter, Dir., Off. of Info. Programs & 
Servs., U.S. Dep’t of State, to Mark Rumold, Elec. Frontier Found. 1 (May 1, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/acta_foia_response_5-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/582Z-7J6B]. 
 312 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 56, at 886–87. 
 313 See Letter from Michael J. Mattler, Assistant Legal Adviser, Off. of Treaty Affs., U.S. Dep’t 
of State, to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Rels. (Dec. 22, 2016) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library) (providing, inter alia, cover memo for Paris Agreement). 
 314 For an explanation of why the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
probably suffices to authorize the agreement, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1268–69. 
 315 See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 56, at 889, 905–06, 911–14. 
 316 For example, Bodansky and Spiro mention several international agreements that implement 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).  See id. at 912–13.  However, the government 
did not argue that these agreements were unauthorized by statute or merely “consistent” with 
FATCA or any other law.  To the contrary, it cited numerous legal bases for the agreements, see id., 
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Bodansky and Spiro also cite the Minamata Convention on Mercury, 
a multinational agreement that regulates the production, use, and dis-
posal of mercury.317  The government publicly explained that the agree-
ment “complements domestic measures by addressing the transnational 
nature of the problem” and noted that the United States “can implement 
Convention obligations under existing legislative and regulatory author-
ity,”318 language that sounds like it might reflect the Executive  
Agreements+ theory.  Although the agreement falls outside the scope of 
our FOIA request,319 we managed to obtain the Case Act cover memo 
for it as well.320  While many of the constitutional and statutory bases 
cited in the memo as legal authority for the agreement do not plausibly 
authorize the agreement, one cited statute, the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969,321 provides at least plausible authorization.  The 
statute authorizes federal agencies to administer the Act’s policies and 
directs them to provide “support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs 
designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and pre-
venting a decline in the quality of mankind’s world environment.”322  
This statute is cited in some of the cover memos in our database, and 
we coded it a 4.  
In sum, we see no indication in the cover memos that the executive 
branch was asserting a claim that it has the authority to conclude exec-
utive agreements as long as they are consistent with domestic law.  To 
the contrary, the ostensible examples of Executive Agreements+ for 
which we have memos all cite statutes as “legal authority” and include 
at least one citation to a statute or treaty that we view as at least plau-
sible authorization for the agreement.  As a result, it would be very dif-
ficult to argue that, by receiving and failing to challenge these memos, 
Congress has somehow acquiesced in the Executive Agreements+ claim. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
one of which, 26 U.S.C. § 1471, we coded as a 3.  The same is true of the one environmental agree-
ment that Bodansky and Spiro cite for which we have a cover memo in the database.  See Bodansky 
& Spiro, supra note 56, at 906; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication, and Ground-Level Ozone, opened for signature 
Dec. 1, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,073.  The cover memo for this agreement cites three bases of authority, 
including one, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., which we coded as a 4. 
 317 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 56, at 910. 
 318 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Joins Minamata Convention on Mercury 
(Nov. 6, 2013), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217295.htm [https://perma.cc/TQ3V-
BDQ3]. 
 319 The Minamata Convention was signed by the executive branch on November 6, 2013.  See 
id.  The agreement did not formally enter into force until August 16, 2017, however, see Minamata 
Convention on Mercury, adopted Oct. 10, 2013, T.I.A.S. No. 17-816, and it was not reported to 
Congress until September 27, 2017, see Letter from Michael J. Mattler, Assistant Legal Adviser, 
Off. of Treaty Affs., U.S. Dep’t of State, to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman, Senate Comm. on  
Foreign Rels. (Sept. 27, 2017) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 320 See Letter from Michael J. Mattler to Senator Bob Corker, supra note 319. 
 321 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347. 
 322 See id. § 4332(2)(F). 
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(b)  Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements. — As noted 
above, approximately ninety-three percent of the memos in our database 
cite one or more statutes or other nonconstitutional authorities as a 
source of authority.  As explained in Part II, we coded cited authorities 
listed in these memos into one of five categories on a spectrum ranging 
from express support for executive branch agreement making (category 
1) to no such support (category 5).  Determining whether the cited au-
thorities genuinely authorize the executive branch to conclude the agree-
ment presents difficult interpretive questions. 
As an initial matter, when the executive branch cited one or more 
nonconstitutional sources of authority for an executive agreement, it also 
commonly cited to the Constitution, usually to Article II.  Many of these 
references to the Constitution appear to be included in the cover memos 
reflexively rather than in a considered manner as an actual basis for the 
agreement.  For example, about sixty-eight percent of agreements that 
cite a nonconstitutional authority coded 1 also cite the Constitution.  In 
these cases, a citation to the Constitution is unnecessary since the other 
citation does all of the necessary authorizing work. 
It is difficult to draw firm general conclusions about the relevance of 
Article II for the agreements for which Article II is cited alongside stat-
utes in categories 2–4.  Although the constitutional power to conclude 
sole executive agreements is probably narrow, it is possible that Article 
II can in some instances be combined with a statute in a way that pro-
duces more overall authority than either would provide alone.  Among 
other things, courts tend to be more willing to find implicit statutory 
authority in areas in which the President has some independent consti-
tutional authority.323 
Even putting this complication aside, interpreting the statutes that 
are cited is challenging, especially in categories 2–4.  The authorizations 
in these categories provide some indication of congressional intent to 
engage in global cooperation but no express authority to conclude an 
agreement.  The difficult legal question here, as noted in section I.A.2, 
comes in determining whether these authorities should be interpreted to 
implicitly authorize executive agreements.324  The authorities that the 
government relied on in practice make plain how difficult this question 
can be. 
In category 2, it is unclear whether an authorization to negotiate an 
agreement should count as authority to conclude one.  An authorization 
to negotiate, combined with an ex post congressional approval require-
ment, seems clearly not to be an authorization to the executive to con-
clude an agreement.  So it is unclear why silence on executive authority 
to conclude an agreement should be construed in favor of authority to 
conclude one, as opposed to mere authority to negotiate, as the plain 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 323 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1264. 
 324 See supra section I.A.2, pp. 641–43. 
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text of these statutes indicates.  Authorizations in categories 3 and 4 are 
similarly uncertain.  When Congress authorizes an executive branch 
agency to furnish assistance or make economic arrangements with a for-
eign country, or to engage in international cooperation or establish a 
program with them, it is not obviously authorizing the making of bind-
ing international agreements; it might be, but one needs to know more. 
An additional complicating factor here is that many of the “legal au-
thority” sections in the cover memos contain multiple legal citations — 
sometimes to statutes alone, often to statutes and Article II — without 
further explanation.  The practice of supporting the legality of agree-
ments with multiple authorizations is practically unheard of in the con-
text of domestic authorization for administrative action.325  Executive 
orders, however, sometimes cite multiple sources of authority, including 
Article II and statutes.326  Supreme Court decisions addressing how to 
approach multiple authorizations in this latter context provide no gen-
eral guidance.327 
The multiple-citation practice presents few if any interpretive prob-
lems when at least one of the cited authorities provides express author-
ization.  To take one example, the cover memo for the 2004 Acquisition 
and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the United States and  
Afghanistan cites as legal authority “[t]he President’s Constitutional au-
thority as Chief Executive to conduct the foreign relations of the United 
States, as well as his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, (Article II, Sections 1 and 2); NATO Mutual Support Act of 
1979, as amended, 10 U.S.C. 2342(a) and (b).”  The NATO Mutual  
Support Act of 1979328 is coded 1, because it provides that the “Secretary 
of Defense may enter into an agreement [with] . . . [t]he government of 
a North Atlantic Treaty Organization country”329  or a country not a 
member of NATO but that has been designated by the Secretary of  
Defense and properly noticed to Congress.330  Of the 5,689 cover memos 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 325 While we cannot rule out the possibility, we have been unable to locate a single instance in 
which an agency tried to rely on multiple statutes in support of its authority to enact a regulation. 
 326 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. 
§ 3001 note.  
 327 In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), the Supreme Court, in the context of an 
executive order implementing corporate disclosures related to affirmative action, interpreted several 
ostensible congressional bases for the order seriatim and concluded that none authorized it.  See id. 
at 304–08.  And in Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), the Court stated 
with little analysis that an executive order governing labor relations in federal employment both 
had “express statutory authorization” and was a “reasonable exercise of the President’s responsibil-
ity for the efficient operation of the Executive Branch.”  Id. at 273 n.5. 
 328 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2348, 2350. 
 329 Id. § 2342(a)(1). 
 330 Id.  The required notification process for a non-NATO country was presumably completed 
in this case, because of the high visibility of the U.S. commitments in Afghanistan, but this example 
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we analyzed, 44.31% are supported by an authorization in category 1.331  
In these cases, the agreement probably had adequate authorization (as-
suming the agreement actually fell within the scope of the authoriza-
tion — which we did not assess), regardless of what additional authority 
the other statutes might have provided. 
For the 55.69% of agreements that lack a citation to an authority in 
category 1, however, the multiple-citation issue presents many problems, 
and the legality of the agreements is much less certain.  One problem, 
noted above, is that none of the cited authorities in categories 2–5 con-
tains an overt authorization to make an executive agreement.  So the 
authorization to make the agreement exists, if at all, because the cited 
authority, combined with Article II, should through interpretation be 
deemed to authorize the agreement.  One must presumably consider all 
of the statutory authorizations in support of an agreement, plus the ef-
fect of Article II when indicated, as well as the possible aggregative 
effect of these provisions, on legality.  But courts have rarely considered 
the impact of multiple authorizations on a single executive branch act, 
and thus have provided few interpretive guideposts.  The interpretive 
task is made all the more difficult because the underlying statutory au-
thorizations are differently worded, arise in different historical and  
subject-matter contexts, and combine in different ways that might have 
differing aggregative effects on the legality of particular agreements. 
The agreements that have the most questionable claim of legal au-
thority are those for which the highest-coded cited authority was in cat-
egory 5 — something true for about seventeen percent of the agreements 
covered by our database.332  For these agreements, the executive branch 
does not appear to be claiming that the agreement is a sole executive 
agreement (because it is citing a nonconstitutional authority), and yet 
the authority that it is citing in support of the agreement does not plau-
sibly appear to be conveying any authority to conclude an agreement. 
These various uncertainties are compounded by the kitchen-sink and 
nonspecific way that the executive branch reports legal authority to 
Congress.  Moreover, neither the American people, nor the few experts 
who could assess the problem, have ever had access to the documents 
that we are analyzing.  All of these considerations inform our reform 
proposals, to which we now turn. 
2.  Reform Proposals. — It is not our aim in this Article to draw 
conclusions about the legality or illegality of the executive agreements 
in our database.  Instead, our goal is to bring to light the ways in which 
legal authority has been invoked in support of executive agreements for 
much of the past three decades.  Our reform proposals are similarly 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
helps illustrate why we cannot be confident that an authority actually provides support for the 
agreement for which it is cited, even if that authority is coded 1. 
 331 See supra Table 4, p. 685. 
 332 See supra Table 4, p. 685. 
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aimed at bringing greater transparency to what the executive branch is 
doing and claiming with respect to executive agreements so that  
Congress and the interested public can better evaluate the relevant legal 
issues.  To achieve such transparency, we propose several reforms. 
First, in addition to publishing all agreements, the executive branch 
should be required to publish the legal authority for all agreements.  
This has been a requirement for administrative regulations since the 
dawn of the APA.333  The reasons for this requirement in the regulatory 
context are (1) to make judicial review more efficient, (2) to give full 
notice to the public, and (3) to ensure more careful deliberation on the 
part of the issuing agency or department.334  Reasons (2) and (3) apply 
straightforwardly to executive agreements.  Reason (1) does not apply 
here, since there is typically little judicial review of executive agree-
ments.  But the lack of judicial review in this context only heightens the 
importance of reasons (2) and (3).  In the absence of judicial review, 
publicity about legal basis is even more important to ensure that the 
government is careful and that the public can see what it is doing and 
hold it accountable. 
Second, Congress should act to redress the executive branch’s prac-
tice of including irrelevant or barely relevant authorities in a “kitchen-
sink” fashion along with more relevant authorities.  This practice, as we 
have shown, makes it enormously difficult to assess the legality of an 
agreement.  This practice is so common that it seems likely that the 
executive branch is using the kitchen-sink approach as a substitute for 
analysis or in an effort to evade scrutiny. 
We therefore propose that, for each agreement, the executive branch 
should be required to do one of two things.  When Article II alone is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 333 See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 4, 60 Stat. 237, 238–39 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553).  Under the current APA, the requirement derives from 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b), which requires that a general notice of proposed rulemaking “shall be published in the 
Federal Register” and “shall include . . . reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed,” id., and 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), which requires agencies to incorporate “a concise general 
statement of . . . basis and purpose” into the final rule, id.  The phrase “basis and purpose” in 
§ 553(c) has long been understood to incorporate by reference the requirement to publish legal au-
thority from § 553(b)(2).  See Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 714 F.2d 1290, 
1298 (5th Cir. 1983); see also 1 C.F.R. § 21.40 (2020) (requiring citation of legal authority for docu-
ments “subject to codification”).  
 334 On judicial review, see DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 119 (1941) (noting that judicial review de-
mands that agencies be required “to demonstrate that they come rationally within the statutory 
authorization”); Am. Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 269 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“The purpose 
of requiring a statement of the basis and purpose is to enable courts, which have the duty to exercise 
review, to be aware of the legal and factual framework underlying the agency’s action.” (emphasis 
added)).  On public notice, see S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 200 (1945) (“Agency notice must be sufficient 
to fairly apprise interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may present responsive data 
or argument relating thereto.”).  On ensuring careful deliberation, see Texaco, Inc. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (rulemaking provisions of § 553 enable “the agency prom-
ulgating the rule to educate itself before establishing rules and procedures which have a substantial 
impact on those regulated”). 
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being relied upon, the agreement should be labeled a “sole executive 
agreement” and only Article II should be cited.  For any agreement that 
is not claimed to be a sole executive agreement, Congress should require 
the executive branch to list one statute or treaty on which it primarily 
relies.  If it cites any additional authority — statute, treaty, or Article 
II — it should be required to explain concretely the authority’s rele-
vance — that is, what it adds to the primary statutory or treaty author-
ization, and why.  This approach acknowledges that some agreements 
can potentially be supported by a number of different authorizations, 
including an Article I source and an Article II source in combination.  
But it will discourage the inclusion of irrelevant authorities and will 
discipline the government to more closely focus on the proper legal basis 
for agreements.  It would also make it easier for observers to assess — 
and, where warranted, critique — the legal basis for agreements. 
Third, the Legal Adviser should be required to personally warrant, 
in individual certifications to Congress, that each agreement is lawful.  
Congress often requires such certifications from senior officials when it 
wants to incentivize greater attention to a matter, especially when ordi-
nary judicial review is lacking.  For example, beginning in 1991,  
Congress prohibited the President from engaging in covert action with-
out a finding by the President that contains many elements.335  Congress 
specified that such a finding “may not authorize any action that would 
violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States,” which in 
practice means that the President must ensure that the covert action is 
not unlawful.336  Similarly, for a traditional Title I Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act337 (FISA) application, the Attorney General must cer-
tify various matters to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to 
ensure compliance with Fourth Amendment and other privacy con-
cerns.338  Such certification requirements are obviously no panacea, but 
they do promote closer attention to the legality of the actions in question 
as well as greater accountability.339 
All three of these proposals could be accomplished in connection 
with a simple overarching reform: a requirement that the cover memos, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 335 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a); see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1276–77. 
 336 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a)(5). 
 337 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 338 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15, 23, 54, 73 (1978). 
 339 On covert action, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 309, at 89–90.  On FISA, see H.R. REP. NO. 
95-1283, pt. 1, at 54, 73.  See also 18 U.S.C. §  2332(d) (requiring Attorney General to make certifi-
cation before prosecuting certain crimes).  
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like the ones we obtained through FOIA, be published.340  Under a pub-
lication scheme, the cover memos could be required to include a deter-
mination of whether the agreement is a sole executive agreement or a 
congressional-executive agreement, and, if it is a congressional-executive 
agreement, the primary legal authority.  The cover memo could also  
be required to include a personal certification by the Legal Adviser.  
Creating a publication system for the cover memos (ideally in conjunc-
tion with publication of all nonclassified executive agreements, as dis-
cussed above) would ensure greater transparency and accountability.  It 
would also, we expect, encourage more careful attention to ensuring that 
executive agreements rest on adequate legal authority. 
C.  Reforms that Would Not Require Legislation 
The reform proposals discussed above would require new legislation.  
One advantage of implementing reforms through legislation is that they 
are likely to be more robust because they will involve binding legal du-
ties.  Legislation will also outlast any change in personnel on congres-
sional committees.  But there are also obvious disadvantages of relying 
on legislation for reform: Legislation requires members of Congress to 
act collectively, something that has become especially difficult with the 
rise of hyperpartisanship, and it generally requires the cooperation of 
the executive branch.  If a statute is likely to provoke an executive veto, 
it is extraordinarily difficult to enact it, as it is practically impossible to 
muster the majorities necessary to overcome a presidential veto. 
There are, fortunately, some reforms that the congressional commit-
tees that currently receive Case Act reports could carry out themselves 
without any new legislation.  First, either the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could simply 
publish the unclassified cover memos and agreements that they receive 
through Case Act reporting.  There is no legal prohibition on making 
these government documents public.  Congress already maintains its 
own online database for Article II treaties,341 and it could easily add a 
similar database for executive agreements reported under the Case Act.  
When publishing the agreements, it could also include the cover memos.  
As discussed above, such publication would itself substantially heighten 
transparency in this area.  The Committees already go to the trouble of 
scanning the Case Act submissions and circulating them internally in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 340 A more ambitious approach would be to adopt a rule of construction that no statute or pro-
vision in a statute may be construed to provide authority for an international agreement or arrange-
ment absent an explicit and specific statement of authority (effectively ruling out reliance on statutes 
we have coded 2–5).  Another more ambitious proposal would specify that no funds would be avail-
able to implement any congressional-executive agreement that relies on anything other than express 
statutory authority.  But such measures would require Congress to conclude that only express stat-
utory authority provides sufficient legal basis for agreements — a conclusion it has yet to embrace. 
 341 About Treaty Documents, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/treaties/about [https:// 
perma.cc/SF2F-ZVQQ]. 
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electronic form.  It is not a significant additional step to make those 
electronic files public. 
Second, the congressional committees could request that the “precise 
citation of legal authority” set forth in the cover memos provide more 
specific information.  For example, the committees could ask the State 
Department to differentiate between agreements where the President 
relies only on his own constitutional authority (sole executive agree-
ments) and those where the President relies on authority granted by 
Congress in prior legislation or a prior agreement.  When an agreement 
relies solely on the Constitution, the committees could request that it be 
labeled a “sole executive agreement.”  For any agreement that is not a 
sole executive agreement, the State Department could be asked to list 
one legal authority on which it primarily relies and to explain the rele-
vance of any additional authority. 
Of course, without legislation, these committee requests would not 
have the force of law.  Historically, however, the State Department has 
sought to accommodate reasonable requests of the congressional com-
mittees that oversee its work.  Congress also has tools at its disposal to 
force the executive branch’s hand, if it wishes — for example, it could 
hold up approval of executive branch appointees or even threaten to 
withhold appropriations. 
Again, such reforms are not likely to be as effective as those imple-
mented through legislation.  But they would nevertheless be an improve-
ment over the status quo.  Moreover, if the congressional committees 
made clear their intent to carry out such reforms even without executive 
branch cooperation, that could blunt opposition by the executive branch 
to legislative reforms.  Indeed, the executive branch might perceive that 
it would be in a better position during a legislative reform process to 
articulate any concerns that it may have about what is feasible, and 
about the possibility that particular reforms could undermine its con-
duct of foreign affairs.  Moreover, in such a process, the executive 
branch might be in a better position to seek from Congress whatever 
resources it will need to implement the transparency reforms.   
Importantly, as we have noted, some of the reforms we have proposed 
are in the interest of the executive branch itself, but it may need addi-
tional resources to carry them out. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, the United States makes binding international commitments 
almost entirely through the practice of executive agreements.  But, as 
this Article has shown, the transparency regime that is supposed to reg-
ulate these agreements is not working.  The goals that Congress set for 
this regime are not being met, and there is substantial noncompliance 
with the statutory and regulatory requirements that have been put into 
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place.  Moreover, not only is the practice of executive agreements insuf-
ficiently transparent to Congress and the public, but it is also insuffi-
ciently transparent even to the executive branch itself.  There is no nor-
mative justification for the current state of affairs, which is the product 
of disorganization within the executive branch, a failure by Congress 
and the executive branch to allocate sufficient resources to ensure com-
pliance with the law, and outdated regulations and institutional prac-
tices.  This Article suggests relatively modest reforms that, if adopted, 
would make it easier to ensure that agreements are properly authorized 
and to achieve Congress’s original goals in establishing the transparency 
regime, all without seriously affecting the executive branch’s flexibility 
in foreign affairs. 
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY 
To obtain the cover memos, which have not previously been made 
public, we filed a FOIA request on behalf of the Yale Law School Center 
for Global Legal Challenges.  The request was as follows: 
  We respectfully request that the Department provide to us all records 
documenting the “precise citation[s] of legal authority” for unclassified in-
ternational agreements (other than treaties) submitted to the President of 
the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives pursuant to 1 
U.S.C. § 112b(a) and 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(c), during the last four Presidential 
administrations (i.e., between the dates of January 20, 1989, and January 
20, 2017).  Our understanding is that all records responsive to this request 
are retained within the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty  
Affairs. 
  We are requesting these records to promote increased transparency re-
garding the thousands of international agreements concluded between for-
eign states and the U.S. government over the last four administrations.  
Many of these agreements have had a significant impact on the nation’s 
economic and security interests.  Indeed, international agreements regulate 
numerous subjects of public concern, including trade policy, nuclear energy, 
criminal law enforcement, and environmental protection.  Given the far-
reaching impact of international agreements on American society, it is criti-
cal that the public has a complete understanding of their basis in U.S. 
law.342 
When we received no response for 224 days, we filed a complaint in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging that 
“State’s failure to make available the records requested by the Center 
for Global Legal Challenges in a timely manner violates FOIA and 
State’s regulations promulgated thereunder.”343  We also argued that 
“State’s failure to make available for public inspection in an electronic 
format all records documenting the ‘precise citation[s] of legal authority’ 
for unclassified non–Article II treaty international agreements . . . vio-
lates FOIA.”344 
The Department of State agreed to settle the suit, providing us with 
the cover memos attached to Case Act reports for the last four presiden-
tial administrations.  Over the course of six months, we received 5,518 
cover memos.  After a query to the State Department about gaps we 
had identified, we received another production of 171 additional docu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 342 Letter from authors to Freedom of Information Officer, U.S. Dep’t of State 2 (Mar. 16, 2017) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(c) (2019)). 
 343 Complaint ¶ 37, Yale L. Sch. Ctr. for Glob. Legal Challenges v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-
cv-02042 (D. Conn. Dec. 7, 2017) (citation omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (a)(6)(A)). 
 344 Id. ¶ 45 (quoting 22 C.F.R. § 181.7(c)).  We were represented by the students and faculty of 
the Yale Law School Media Freedom Information Access Clinic.  We are especially grateful to 
Hannah Block-Wehba, Charles Crain, Diana Lee, and Paulina Perlin. 
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ments.  The Department of Justice’s explanation for the failure to pro-
duce initially these documents was as follows: “This new material was 
not found in the agency’s initial searches because State only searched 
the classified system since it was the practice of the Office of the Legal 
Adviser to store material associated with the requested reports under 
the Case Act on the classified system.”345  This was striking because the 
agreements produced were not classified.  Although the attorneys re-
sponding to the FOIA request refused to explain why the agreements 
were stored on a classified system, subsequent interviews revealed that 
unclassified agreements are stored on a classified system because the 
computer systems do not permit reports to be sent to the “front office” 
for approval except through the classified system. 
To begin our analysis of the memos, we separated the 5,689 agree-
ments and made them all text searchable.346  With few exceptions, each 
cover memo shares a consistent format.  Using a text-scraping program, 
we pulled the key identifying information as outlined in the Codebook 
in Appendix B.  We also cross-referenced the agreements with the TIAS 
database, the Case Act Reports database, and HeinOnline, where avail-
able.347  If we identified a cross-reference, we recorded the relevant iden-
tifying number for those collections. 
Almost all of the cover memos include a section labeled “legal au-
thority” (twelve of the cover memos are missing this section).  Using a 
data-scraping tool, we recorded the legal authorities cited for each agree-
ment.  We then verified the recorded information for each agreement, to 
ensure that there were no errors.  From this, we developed a list of legal 
authorities that are cited in at least one cover memo.  A team of five law 
student research assistants then read these statutory authorities and cat-
egorized each as falling into one of five categories, as described in Part II. 
  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 345 Email from John Larson, U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Charles Crain, YLS Media Freedom & Info. 
Access Clinic (May 2, 2019, 4:27 PM) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  
 346 Andrea de Sa, YLS ’20, oversaw the creation of databases and database comparison, with 
the assistance of Ayoub Ouederni, YLS ’21.  To ensure accuracy, undergraduate research assistants 
double-checked that the correct information had been pulled and that there were no typographical 
errors.  Five Yale undergraduates — Kelsea Jeon, Christopher Kim, Julianna Lai, Max Obmascik, 
and John Park — assisted. 
 347 For more information on the matching process, see supra note 185. 
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APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK 
 For each cover memo that we received, we recorded the following 
information: 
 
Unique No.  We assigned a unique number to each cover memo. 
 
Bates No.  The State Department assigned a nine-digit Bates number to 
each cover memo, typically following the format C06512345.  The Bates 
number is stamped on the top and bottom of each page.  The same Bates 
number was sometimes assigned to different cover memos.  For exam-
ple, the number C06541494 was assigned twice, to two different cover 
memos: C06541494(1) and C06541494(2). 
 
Stamped No.  Many of the cover memos we received also have a hand-
written or stamped number on the upper-right-hand side of the page.  
The stamped number is typically a five-digit number, such as 12-134 or 
04-111.  The number sometimes, though not always, corresponds to the 
TIAS or Case Act Reports database number.  For example, C06540799 
is stamped with the number 2013-0172 but refers to Case Act Reports 
database No. 2013-0003 and TIAS No. 12-1130.1.  Additionally, the 
stamped numbers are not always unique.  For example, C06541615 and 
C06542530 refer to different agreements but are both stamped 14-404. 
 
TIAS.  If the agreement was available in TIAS, the identifying number 
is provided with a hyperlink to the database. 
 
Case Act Reports Database.  If the agreement was available in the Case 
Act Reports database, the identifying number is provided. 
 
HeinOnline.  If the agreement was available on HeinOnline, the identi-
fying number is provided. 
 
Cover Letter Title.  This title usually indicates the subject of the agree-
ment, the counterparty, and the dates that the agreement was signed  
or came into effect.  For example, C06538588 has the following title:  
“Background Statement Concerning the Agreement Between the United 
States and Estonia Extending the Agreement Of June 1, 1992 Concern-
ing Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States.  Effected by Exchange 
of Notes at Tallinn March 11 & May 12, 1994.  Entered into Force  
September 1, 1995.”  From the title, we were also able to derive: 
 
• Country.  The counterparty state or international organization. 
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• First Signed Date.  The first signed date represents the date that 
the agreement was first signed.  In the aforementioned case, that 
date is March 11, 1994. 
• Last Signed Date.  The last signed date represents the last date 
on which the agreement was signed.  In the aforementioned case, 
that date is May 12, 1994. 
• Entry into Force.  This date represents the date of entry into 
force, if any is given.  In the aforementioned case, that date is 
September 1, 1995. 
 
Highest Rating.  This is the highest rating among the nonconstitutional 
references cited in the “Legal Authority” section. 
 
Category//Subcategory.  This is the subject matter category and subcat-
egory that we assigned to the agreement. 
 
Legal Authority (as it appears).  All but a small number of the memos 
have a section titled “Legal Authority.”  Some cover memos cite only the 
Constitution as a legal authority.  Others cite various statutory provi-
sions.  We recorded the legal authority precisely as it appears — often 
as a string cite of several authorities.  We then separated out each cited 
legal authority.  The database includes each authority that we identified 
for each agreement: 
 
• Constitutional Reference.  If there is a reference to the  
Constitution, it is listed here as it appears. 
• Reference 1.  If there is a reference to a nonconstitutional au-
thority, it is listed here. 
• Rating 1.  If there is a reference to a nonconstitutional authority, 
its coding is listed here. 
• Reference 2.  If there is a reference to a second nonconstitutional 
authority, it is listed here. 
• Rating 2.  If there is a reference to a second nonconstitutional 
authority, its coding is listed here. 
 
(The “Reference” and “Rating” columns are each repeated another 















Figure 4: Sample Cover Memo 
 
 
